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AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 


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AMERICAN 
FOREIGN   POLICY 

BY  A  DIPLOMATIST 

cLewIs  TDavxi-    ~E,n«> 


•    ,•  •   •> 


BOSTON   AND    NEW   YORK 

HOUGHTON  MIFFLIN  COMPANY 

<$ht  BiterfiDe  }Dre?jS  CambriDge 

1909 


COPYRIGHT,  1909,  BY  HOUGHTON  MIFFLIN  COMPANY 
ALL  RIGHTS  RESERVED 

Published  October  xgOQ    . 


PREFACE 

It  is  no  unmixed  evil  that  the  feeling 
of  confidence  in  the  limitless  extent  of  the 
country's  resources  and  in  its  economic 
self-sufficiency  should  lately  have  been 
shaken.  So  long  as  an  apparently  bound- 
less horizon  extended  before  us,  we  moved 
on  a  plane  different  from  the  rest  of  the 
world  and  indifferent  thereto.  To-day, 
when  for  the  first  time  we  are  beginning 
to  understand  that  our  natural  resources  are 
limited,  that  the  end  of  the  nation's  possi- 
bilities for  internal  development  is  almost 
within  sight,  and  that  its  capacity  of  con- 
sumption has  been  unable  to  keep  pace  with 
its  production,  the  necessity  of  providing 
foreign  markets  for  our  industry  is  increas-^/ 
ingly  felt.  Accompanying  this  has  come 
the  realization  of  the  need  for  a  navy  suf- 
ficiently powerful  to  protect  our  over-sea 


227118 


vi  PREFACE 

commerce  and  our  coast  line,  our  policies 
in  Latin  America  and  our  distant  depend- 
encies in  the  Pacific.  The  country  has  at 
last  realized  the  importance  of  a  fleet  as 
an  insurance  against  war.  It  has  still  to 
be  aroused  to  the  necessity  of  an  efficient 
diplomacy  as  an  adjunct  to  the  navy,  both 
in  the  extension  of  our  commerce  and  in- 
fluence abroad  and  in  the  preservation  of 
peace  while  carrying  out  the  national  poli- 
cies. 

Hitherto  our  attainment  to  national  great- 
ness has  been  unaccompanied  by  the  cor- 
responding preparation  in  the  public  mind 
!  for   a   foreign    policy  conforming    to   the 

i  magnitude  of  the  country's    new  respon- 

sibilities and  the  loftiness  of  its  manifest 
destiny.    American    public   opinion,    only 
Q        lately  awakened  to  the  importance  of  inter- 
course with  other  nations,  has  still  to  be 
I  trained  to  the  consciousness  of  what  it  may 
'  rightly    demand    from    diplomacy    as    an 
instrument  for   the    nation's    welfare.     It 
remains  weighted  by  the  handicap  of  tradi- 


PREFACE  vfi 

tions  which,  though  they  have  outlived  their 
utility,  have  not  yet  lost  their  hold.  The 
same  process  of  renovation  which,  acting 
in  industry,  has  borne  us  into  the  forefront 
of  nations  requires  infusion  into  the  mecha- 
nism of  our  foreign  policy,  in  order  to  adapt 
it  to  the  present  and  future  exigencies  of 
the  Republic's  international  position. 

The  purpose  of  these  studies  is  to  draw 
attention  to  the  duty  of  diplomacy  to  fur- 
ther our  foreign  policy  in  different  regions 
of  the  world,  and  to  the  conditions  of 
national  security  upon  which  must  rest  its 
assertion. 

The  Author. 

June,  1909. 


^ 
X 


Q 


CONTENTS 

I.  The  Policy  of  Understandings    .  1 

II.   Relations  with  Europe.      ...  SO 

III.  The  Recognition  of  the  Monroe 

Doctrine 56 

IV.  The  Latin  Republics     ....  77 
V.  The  Far  East 105 

VI.  The  Near  East 129 

VII.  The  Diplomatic  Service  and  the 

State  Department     ....  157 

Vin.  The  Future  of  our  International 

Position f.  183 


AMERICAN  FOREIGN 
POLICY 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  POLICY  OF  UNDERSTANDINGS 

Our  prejudice  against  foreign  alliances 
has  been  handed  down  as  the  tradition  of 
a  century,  confirmed  by  the  early  difficul- 
ties the  Republic  encountered.  The  result 
of  the  Revolution  had  been  to  withdraw  the 
new  federation  from  the  orbit  of  European 
politics.  The  French  fleet  sailing  from 
Yorktown  cut  the  cord  which  linked  us 
with  the  Old  World,  and  we  were  left  to 
pursue  alone  the  destinies  to  which  our 
position  and  our  energies  were  to  summon 
us.  When  the  acquisition  of  Louisiana 
extended  the  nation's  frontiers  to  the  Pa- 
cific, our  insular  position  towards  Europe 
offered,  save  from  Canada,  no  basis  for 


2  AMERICAN   FOREIGN   POLICY 

attack,  and  we  were  freed  from  that  dread 
of  invasion  never  absent  from  the  minds  of 
continental  statesmen.  After  the  War  of 
1812,  our  relations  with  other  countries  sub- 
sided to  a  calm  level  of  platonic  cordiality, 
interrupted  only  by  outbursts  of  sympathy 
for  the  cause  of  liberty  abroad,  and  hardly 
disturbed  except  for  solicitude  with  regard 
to  Cuba,  Confederate  attempts  at  securing 
foreign  recognition,  and,  connected  there- 
with. Napoleon  the  Third's  abortive  Mexi- 
can adventure.  The  attitude  of  aloofness 
we  preserved  toward  the  Old  World  re- 
mained practically  unchanged  for  a  cen- 
tury. Almost  our  only  point  of  continuous 
contact  came  through  the  mass  of  emigrants 
who  were  speedily  absorbed  by  the  nation's 
phenomenal  growth;  and  apart  from  certain 
Irish  eflForts  to  draw  us  into  Anglophobia, 
the  foreign  elements  in  the  country  have 
never,  in  matters  of  importance,  attempted 
to  influence  our  diplomacy  with  regard 
to  their  lands  of  origin.  The  nation  was 
left  to  effect  its  internal  evolution  free  from 


THE   POLICY   OF  UNDERSTANDINGS      3 

the  consideration  of  problems  of  foreign 
policy,  and  in  struggle  only  with  itself. 

Where  the  very  existence  of  a  country  is 
at  stake,  international  relations,  when  they 
are  not  immediately  threatening,  appear 
of  minor  consequence.  The  long  struggle 
leading  up  to  the  Civil  War  and  the 
period  of  Reconstruction  evolving  from  it 
had  withdrawn  our  interest  from  abroad. 
Occupied  by  its  industrial  evolution,  the 
internal  development  of  the  country,  which 
required  and  consumed  its  remaining  en- 
ergy, pointed  to  the  West.  For  a  century 
foreign  intercourse  rightly  appeared  to  the 
nation  to  be  of  secondary  importance. 
In  these  years  when  the  material  founda- 
tions of  our  present  position  were  being 
laid,  the  diplomatic  experience  early  dif- 
ficulties had  given  us  came  almost  to  be 
forgotten.  Economically  and  politically, 
the  nation's  energies  were  all  engaged  and 
abse^^bed  in  other  directions. 

To  the  outbreak  of  the  Spanish  War,  we 
had  little  or  no  foreign  danger  to  fear.    In 


4  AMERICAN  FOREIGN   POLICY 

that  critical  first  century  of  the  Republic's 
development,  the  necessity  for  a  national 
policy  of  isolation  was  manifestly  dictated 
to  our  interests.  Any  other  course  would 
have  enmeshed  us  in  the  European  system 
of  balances  and  obviously  have  hindered 
our  expansion,  even  had  it  led  to  no  more 
baneful  result.  The  wisdom  of  this  policy, 
which  had  impressed  itself  on  the  leaders 
of  both  parties,  appeared  to  receive  further 
consecration  from  the  political  testament  of 
Washington.  His  counsel  had  been  trans- 
mitted from  generation  to  generation,  im- 
pressive by  the  weight  attached  to  his  great 
name.  That  it  was  directed  not  against 
alliances,  but  against  entangling  alliances, 
came  almost  to  be  overlooked. 

Mr.  Olney  has  justly  observed  in  his 
acute  analysis  *  of  the  Farewell  Address 
that,  correctly  interpreted,  it  holds  as  true 
to-day  as  when  delivered.  Washington 
had  founded  his  reasoning  on  our  then 
feebleness  as  a  nation  and  on  our  remote- 

*  Atlantic  Monthly,  May,  1898,  pp.  578  el  seq. 


THE   POLICY   OF  UNDERSTANDINGS      5 

ness  in  distance  and  in  interest  from  events 
of  a  strictly  European  order.  He  had  said, 
to  quote  again  oft-repeated  words :  — 

"Europe  has  a  set  of  primary  interests, 
which  to  us  have  none,  or  a  very  remote 
relation.  .  .  .  Our  detached  and  distant 
situation  invites  and  enables  us  to  pursue 
a  different  course.  ...  It  is  our  true 
policy  to  steer  clear  of  permanent  alliances 
with  any  portion  of  the  foreign  world.  .  .  . 
Taking  care  always  to  keep  ourselves,  by 
suitable  establishments,  on  a  respectable 
defensive  posture,  we  may  safely  trust  to 
temporary  alliances  for  extraordinary  emer- 
gencies." 

Three  things  ensue  from  this.  While 
we  were  to  abstain  from  all  participation 
or  interference  in  the  internal  affairs  of 
Europe  on  account  of  our  remote  relation 
thereto,  no  mention  is  made  of  the  rest  of 
the  world.  It  may  be  argued  that  the 
future  of  other  continents  did  not  present 
itself  as  of  importance  to  Washington's 
mind.   But  even  if  this  assumption  were 


6  AMERICAN  FOREIGN   POLICY 

true,  are  we  to  allow  a  prescriptive  force 
to  govern  our  attitude  toward  questions 
ignored  by  our  first  President  when  he  had 
carefully  limited  the  application  of  his  ad- 
vice to  specific  conditions  ?  Secondly,  while 
our  remoteness  invited  a  certain  line  of 
policy,  the  need  for  this  once  ended,  it  is 
presumable  that  our  policy  would  likewise 
change  in  conformity  to  new  requirements. 
Lastly,  he  advocated  in  the  clearest  un- 
mistakable terms  the  expediency  of  tem- 
porary alliances  for  extraordinary  emergen- 
cies. Indeed,  who  could  have  been  more 
sensible  to  the  fact  that  without  a  foreign 
alliance  our  national  independence  would 
hardly  have  been  established  ? 

The  marvelous  expansion  of  the  country 
during  the  last  century  appears  to  have 
amply  justified  the  success  of  all  its  policies. 
But  there  is  an  unearned  increment  even 
in  statecraft.  The  force  of  impact  of  the 
huge  moving  mass  upon  the  American 
continent  has  perhaps  gained  more  for  us 
than  any  foresight  of  statesmanship.    In 


THE   POLICY   OF   UNDERSTANDINGS       7 

the  presence  of  such  diplomatic  problems 
as  we  have  hitherto  had  to  solve,  the  wis- 
dom or  error  of  a  few  has  been  of  second- 
ary importance.  The  country's  prosperity 
has  been  built  on  the  solid  rock  of  common 
effort  rather  than  on  the  individual  genius 
of  statesmen.  Save  perhaps  with  Lincoln, 
its  destinies  have  never  been  intimately  tied 
with  those  of  any  single  man.  This  result, 
while  it  has  firmly  established  the  founda- 
tions of  the  nation's  welfare  by  making 
them  largely  independent  of  governmental 
action,  has  not  been  without  drawbacks 
of  another  order.  Little  obvious  as  these 
were  so  long  as  we  remained  within  an  in- 
sular wall,  they  became  manifest  the  day^ 
of  our  emergence  from  political  seclusion. 

We  had  rejoiced  in  isolation  without 
realizing  that  the  strength  we  were  acquir- 
ing was  destined  to  outgrow  its  limitations, 
and  that  almost  unconsciously  we  were 
laying  the  foundation  upon  which  the 
future  assertion  of  our  foreign  policy  was 
to  rest.    The  accumulation  of  wealth  ap- 


8  AMERICAN   FOREIGN   POLICY 

peared  to  be  the  nation's  principal  interest. 
Politically  and  economically,  the  aloofness 
which  had  shielded  our  infancy,  after  hav- 
ing been  its  protection,  was  beginning  to 
prove  an  obstacle  to  further  development. 
Yet,  paradoxically,  we  failed  to  appreciate 
the  importance  of  the  change  which  brought 
our  isolation  to  an  end. 

The  training  of  our  public  life  had  for  a 
century  been  that  of  domestic  politics.  The 
complications  of  international  relations 
with  their  new  responsibilities  flashed  al- 
most as  a  revelation  before  the  entire  nation, 
which  found  itself  on  the  morrow  of  the 
Spanish  War  in  the  presence  of  problems 
as  novel  as  they  were  unforeseen.  Without 
realizing  either  their  gravity  or  their  solu- 
tion, we  have  since  approached  these  with 
calm  confidence,  a  loftiness  of  purpose  char- 
acteristic of  our  highest  political  ideals. 
We  have  given  in  Cuba,  and  are  giv- 
ing now  in  the  Philippines,  an  example  of 
national  altruism  that  history  has  not  often 
paralleled.    The  remembrance  of  our  own 


THE   POLICY   OF   UNDERSTANDINGS      9 

past  security  has  caused  us,  however,  to 
consider  the  problems  they  present  less  in 
their  relation  to  us  than  in  our  relation  to 
them,  and  to  devote  correspondingly  less 
solicitude  to  the  diplomatic  and  military 
exigencies  imposed  by  our  dependencies 
in  order  to  forestall  the  possibility  of  later 
humiliation.  Our  former  weakness  had 
proved  our  strength.  The  conquests  of 
our  strength  and  our  fortune  have  now  be- 
come our  weakness. 

By  the  acquisition  of  the  Philippines  we 
have  assimilated  the  conditions  of  our  pos- 
session to  those  of  other  nations  holding 
Asiatic  colonies.  Beyond  this  the  occu- 
pation of  the  archipelago  affects  the  asser- 
tion of  our  influence  elsewhere,  curtailing 
the  independence  of  what  would  otherwise 
have  been  an  exclusively  American  policy 
by  holding  in  view  the  special  requirements 
of  our  Asiatic  position.  From  a  diplomatic 
and  military  standpoint,  the  possession  of 
these  dependencies  is  beyond  question  such 
a  source  of  weakness  that  it  may  well  be 


10  AMERICAN   FOREIGN   POLICY 

asked  if  a  public  opinion  with  higher  po- 
litical training  would  ever  have  voluntarily 
assumed  the  responsibility  of  their  acquisi- 
tion, had  it  been  aware  of  its  veritable  im- 
port. But  even  a  greater  weakness,  when 
considered  in  the  light  of  similar  deficien- 
cies shared  by  other  powers,  is  far  from 
being  without  remedy  if  we  do  not  volun- 
tarily deprive  ourselves  thereof. 

Emerging  from  a  century's  isolation,  we 
find  ourselves  at  the  threshold  of  a  new 
era  with  two  roads  before  us.  The  one 
supposedly  traditional  in  its  character  coun- 
sels us  to  rely  entirely  upon  our  unaided 
resources,  to  be  strong  in  the  conscious- 
ness of  our  might  as  well  as  of  that  right 
which  every  nation  arrogates  as  peculiar 
to  itself.  This  policy  appeals  on  the  sur- 
face to  the  manliness  of  the  nation.  Car- 
ried to  its  logical  conclusion  it  might  be 
practical,  but  at  what  sacrifice !  A  triumph 
of  militarism  would  be  the  only  effective 
I  means  by  which  we  could  assure  the  safe- 
'  guarding  of  our  pretensions  and  over-sea 


THE   POLICY   OF   UNDERSTANDINGS    11 

possessions.  Should  our  ambitions  ever 
clash  against  those  of  a  state  equal  to  us  in 
sea  power,  that  had  adopted  the  principle 
of  the  nation  in  arms,  we  could  successfully 
oppose  it  only  at  the  same  cost.  Even 
greater  sacrifices  would  be  necessary  on 
our  part,  since  other  nations  could  rely 
under  certain  conditions  on  the  aid  of  allies, 
from  which  we  should  presumably  be  de- 
barred. In  any  measure  short  of  an  enor- 
mous increase  in  armed  strength,  so  great 
that  no  nation  or  coalition  would  wish  to 
risk  the  challenge  of  our  titles,  lies  dan- 
ger ahead.  A  traditional  policy  inevitably 
means  for  us  a  military  policy. 

Statesmanship  is,  above  all,  guidance  in 
economy  of  effort.  To  adjust  the  require- 
ments of  a  national  policy  in  conformity 
with  its  resources,  to  see  that  no  greater 
effort  is  called  for  than  may  be  necessary 
to  accomplish  a  given  result,  is  its  method. 
Armed  strength  is  certainly  the  foundation 
of  our  security,  and  to  neglect  it  would  be 
to  incur  greater  risk.    But  while  a  nation's 


^ 


12  AMERICAN   FOREIGN   POLICY 

safety  is  purchased  only  at  the  price  of 
constant  vigilance  and  preparation,  there 
is  a  limit  even  to  this.  Our  strength,  how- 
ever great,  is  only  relative  —  proportionate 
neither  to  the  magnitude  of  our  ambitions 
nor  to  the  defenselessness  of  our  foreign 
policies. 

Any  undue  increase  in  armaments  such 
as  would  be  necessary  to  guarantee  us 
against  all  dangers  presents  two  serious 
disadvantages.  It  is  costly,  especially  in  a 
country  without  conscription,  where  mili- 
tary expenditure  already  meets  with  mili- 
tant opposition.  It  further  conduces  to 
rivalry  on  the  part  of  other  nations.  More- 
over, any  sudden  or  unlimited  increase 
would  hardly  be  in  tenor  with  our  repeated 
declarations  of  peaceful  intentions.  Yet 
such  is  the  force  of  an  outworn  tradition 
that  its  alternative,  or  rather  its  supple- 
ment, has  hardly  been  considered.  Diplo- 
matic means  of  defense  exist  as  potent  as 
military,  and  the  presence  of  an  ally's  fleets 
may  preserve  our  own  from  action.    The 


^/ 


THE   POLICY   OF  UNDERSTANDINGS    13 

choice  lies  before  the  nation :  either  we  must 
maintain  as  many  troops  in  the  Philip- 
pines as  our  military  advisers  judge  neces- 
sary against  all  contingencies,  and  provide 
as  many  battleships  to  guard  the  oceans 
which  encircle  us  as  our  naval  advisers 
deem  indispensable,  or  we  must  consider 
the  advisability  of  other  measures.  Com- 
plete isolation  from  the  world's  affairs  on 
a  nation's  part  is  warranted  only  by  ex- 
treme feebleness  or  confident  strength.  The 
fruit  of  recent  victories  has  now  deprived 
us  of  former  invulnerability.  National  great- 
ness has  not  been  achieved  without  the  peril 
of  novel  responsibilities.  We  find  ourselves 
exposed  to  danger  both  in  our  South  Ameri- 
can pretensions  and  in  our  Oriental  posses-  / 
sions,  yet  without  diplomatic  recognition(^^ 
of  the  first,  or  allies  to  aid  in  protecting 
the  second.  It  is  possible  that  our  strength 
permits  us  to  dispense  with  both.  But  for 
a  peaceful  nation  we  may  rely  too  much  on 
battleships,  and  not  enough  on  diplomacy."^ 
The  most  striking  development  in  mod- 


14  AMERICAN   FOREIGN   POLICY 

ern  diplomacy  has  been  the  vast  extension 
given  within  quite  recent  times  to  the  sys- 
tem of  arrangements  and  understandings 
which  now   link  together  the  nations  of 
/Europe.     These  differ  radically  from  the 
/eighteenth-century  idea  of  alliances,  which 
'were    mainly   offensive    in    purpose    even 
when  restricted  in  their  liability.    The  new 
conception,  on  the  contrary,  is  eminently 
pacific  in  character,  and  limited  in  appli- 
cation to  comparatively  narrow  ends.    It 
aims   within    certain    determined    regions 
to  preserve  actual  conditions  and  to  elimi- 
nate possible  causes  of  conflict,  chiefly  in 
colonial  spheres,  by  taking  cognizance  of 
the  special  or  mutual  interests  of  the  powers 
concerned,  and  lending  to  the  preservation 
j  of  such  agreements  the  force  that  is  derived 
j  by  cooperation  of  effort. 
i     There  is  reasonable  certainty  to-day  that 
Europe  will  never  again  witness  such  a 
coalition  as  once  annihilated  Poland.    In 
fact,  the  dread  of  spoliation  has  given  rise 
to  this  system  of  mutual  insurance.    The 


THE   POLICY   OF  UNDERSTANDINGS    15 

European  powers,  confronted  with  greater 
difficulties  than  our  own,  and,  perhaps, 
possessing  more  ancient  experience  in  the 
handling  of  foreign  affairs,  have  founded 
their  security  on  mutual  guarantees  in-v/ 
tended  to  preserve  policies  of  common  in- 
terest. Even  Japan,  the  last  comer  in  the 
comity  of  nations,  has  in  recent  years  been 
too  painfully  reminded  of  the  absence  of 
similar  precautions  not  to  welcome  the 
first  opportunity  of  preventing  its  recur- 
rence. For  us  it  may  also  become  advisable 
to  consider  the  adoption  of  a  foreign  policy  . 
upon  a  non-partisan  basis,  upon  broader 
foundations  than  would  have  been  war- 
ranted by  our  former  position,  and  in 
greater  conformity  with  actual  necessities. 
We  are  still  somewhat  unused  to  consider- 
ing questions  of  this  order  in  their  world- 
wide aspects.  Our  situation  as  a  great 
nation  has  been  established  by  the  logic  of 
facts,  and  without  the  corresponding  intel- 
lectual preparation,  so  impotent  when  it 
does  not  possess  the  material  foundation 


16  AMERICAN   FOREIGN   POLICY 

^      for  greatness.    Circumstances  have  placed 
'     us  in  the  forefront  of  world  powers.    But 
our  position  has  been  achieved  almost  too 
easily.    We  have  not  experienced  the  dis- 
cipline  of   adversity   which   has   schooled 
r.        other  great  states.    We  have  not  felt  the 
^:;|t<»l[  need  for  caution  in  our  acts  of  international 
significance.    We  have  gone  ahead  almost 
without  a  policy  other  than  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  and  our   traditional   non-entan- 
glement.    At  the  present  juncture,  even 
though  the  benefits  of  our  new  importance 
are  mainly  apparent,  and  we  rightly  look 
forward  with  confident  hope  to  the  future, 
it  may  be  advisable  for  a  prudent  state- 
craft to  take  cognizance  of  the  possibility  of 
shoals  in  the  course  that  lies  before  us.   Our 
diplomacy  ought  to  concern  itself  with  the 
preparation  of  a  policy  which  will  enable 
us,  so  far  as  human  foresight  can  foretell, 
^^  to  escape  such  perils  while  pursuing  our 
*'^'*^ destiny  as  a  great  nation.  * 

The  past  has  brought  us  into  contact 
with  the  Old  World  both  in  its  collective 


THE   POLICY   OF   UNDERSTANDINGS     17 

form  as  an  aggregate  of  states  and  with 
the  individual  European  powers.  In  the 
formulation  of  any  policy  the  experience  of 
history  cannot  be  disregarded,  and  we  have 
to  bear  in  mind  the  nature  of  the  dan- 
ger which  may  beset  us.  The  continental 
nations  have  always  inclined,  when  their 
contemplated  action  lay  outside  Europe,  to 
collective    manifestations,    as    being   of   a  * 

nature  to  diminish  their  risk  and  increase  ''•<****^ 
their    force,  while    protecting    them  from 
danger  behind.    We    have    witnessed    the 
effects   of   such   concerted   action   against 
Japan,  robbed  at  Port  Arthur  of  the  prize 
of  victory  over  China.    We  have  seen   it 
operating    with    varying    success    against 
Turkey.    We   have   heard    its    rumblings, 
however  faint,  even  against  ourselves.  The 
very  admission   that  this  peril   may  con- 
ceivably exist  means  that  we  cannot  with 
impunity  disinterest  ourselves  from  Euro-  , 
pean  politics.   The  future  possibility  of  a^   J 
concert  of  powers  can  never  leave  us  indif- 
ferent.    More  than  ever  our  new  depend- 


18  AMERICAN   FOREIGN   POLICY 

encies  make  us  vulnerable  and  offer  pawns 
for  possible  enemies  to  take  from  us. 

American  diplomacy  can  have  no  more 
important  mission  than  that  of  guarding 
against  this  danger,  which  would  be  brought 
about  by  the  hegemony  of  one  state  over 
others  in  banding  them  together  for  a  com- 
mon purpose.  The  first  principles  of  our 
policy  demand  that  we  view  with  disfa- 
vor the  efforts  of  any  power  to  assert  its 
own  predominant  superiority  over  weaker 
neighbors.  A  coalition  becomes  dangerous 
when  it  is  guideoby^asingle  power.  When 
nations  enter  upon  a  strictly  equal  footing 
their  efforts  are  too  often  at  variance  to  be 
easily  effective.  American  diplomacy  has 
a  definite  scope  before  it  in  exercising 
watchfulness  against  the  occurrence  of  such 
a  peril.  Nor  is  our  solicitude  exclusively 
political.  We  should  remember  what  a 
European  commercial  union,  advocated  by 
many  foreign  statesmen  and  economists, 
would  mean  for  us.  Even  if  such  union 
were  without  apparent  or  immediate  po- 


THE   POLICY   OF  UNDERSTANDINGS    19 

litical  scope,  its  formation,  directed  mainly    ^^^^^M- 
against  our  trade,  would  create  for  America 
a  most  serious  peril :  German  customs  unity 
preceded  German  political  unity. 

Yet  neither  hostile  alliance  nor  coalition 
need  alarm  us  so  long  as  we  do  not  volun- 
tarily cripple  ourselves  by  ignoring  the 
means  at  our  command  to  resist  these. 
This  does  not  imply  the  necessity  for  action 
on  our  part  in  events  of  a  strictly  European 
order.  The  disappearance  of  Dutch  inde- 
pendence, if  so  unfortunate  an  event  were 
ever  to  take  place,  would,  for  instance,  be 
keenly  regretted  by  us,  but,  except  for  the 
fate  of  Holland's  colonies,  it  would  not 
warrant  our  intervention.  Still  less  would 
any  concern  we  might  feel  in  the  ultimate 
disposition  of  Austria  be  likely  to  justify 
military  action  on  our  part.  The  diplo- 
matic solicitude  we  have  in  Europe  is  and  I 
should  remain  that  of  spectators.  But  our 
interests  are  now  too  widely  spread  to 
permit  us  longer  to  disinterest  ourselves 
from  any  concerted  action  of  the  powers, 


20  AMERICAN    FOREIGN   POLICY 

with  its  almost  inevitable  extra-European 
ramifications. 

It  is  only  a  short  step  for  European  influ- 
ence to  extend  beyond  the  Continent  and 
enter  into  spheres  which  concern  us  as  well. 
The  line  to  draw  is  indeed  far  more  subtle 
than  may  at  first  appear.  History  bears 
witness  that  in  diplomacy  unimportant 
beginnings  have  often  unexpected  conse- 
quences. It  is  to  guard  against  unpleasant 
surprises  of  this  nature  that  we  should 
neglect  no  opportunity  in  identifying  our 
action  with  that  of  the  European  states. 
The  more  we  assert  the  equality  of  our  rights 
and  responsibilities  with  theirs,  the  more  we 
make  felt  our  legitimate  influence  in  the 
councils  of  nations,  the  less  likelihood  will 
there  be  of  the  formation  of  any  coalition, 
commercial  or  political,  in  opposition  to 
our  interests.  Political  movements  possess 
in  themselves  an  organic  growth,  and  such 
future  danger  as  may  exist  for  us  could  more 
easily  acquire  head  by  our  aloofness  at  the 
time  of  its  inception  than  by  our  opposition 


THE  POLICY  OF  UNDERSTANDINGS      21 

thereto.  Its  maturity  would  present  for  us  A/(h\ 
greater  peril  than  its  infancy.  Nor  if  we 
act  prudently  need  we  ever  feel  ourselves 
alone  in  resisting  it.  Europe,  even  under  its 
present  cover  of  friendliness  toward  us,  con- 
tains many  conflicting  interests,  and  certain 
of  these  would  normally  be  favorable  to 
our  policy. 

We  can  hardly  suppose,  however,  that 
the  extension  unavoidably  taken  by  our 
diplomacy  will  not  encounter  resistance. 
No  power  can  hope  to  be  successful  with- 
out incurring  the  antagonism  of  others, 
even  though  our  own  peaceful  proclivities 
should  preclude  us  from  the  former  rapa- 
cious ambitions  of  Old  World  states.  But 
whatever  future  struggles  await  us,  we  can- 
not forget  that  diplomacy,  like  war,  may 
achieve  for  us  victories  or  defeats.  How-  . 
ever  powerful  we  may  become,  a  combina-\/ 
tion  may  array  against  us  power  as  great. 
The  burden  of  our  weight,  on  whichever 
side  of  the  scales  we  incline,  will  inevitably 
be  counterpoised.    Even  more  it  will  lead 


22  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

almost  inevitably  to  fresh  distributions  of 
strength.  While  the  present  grouping  of 
triple  "entente"  and  triple  alliance,  each 
reenforced  by  subsidiary  aids,  may  not 
prove  everlasting,  it  is  likely  to  provide  the 
basis  upon  which  such  new  accretions  will 
form.  Yet  even  future  combinations  need 
not  concern  us.  The  balancing  of  strength 
is  no  menace  of  war.  On  the  contrary, 
the  distribution  of  liability  in  such  an 
event  among  several  nations  is  the  most 
certain  guarantee  of  peace. 

Bellicose  tendencies  are  far  more  likely 
to  exist  in  a  single  nation  than  where  several 
are  allied  together,  and  modern  alliances 
tend  either  to  act  in  the  direction  of  peace, 
or  else  to  limit  the  scene  of  conflict.  The 
recent  Russo-Japanese  War  affords  the 
best  example  of  how  the  efforts  of  Great 
Britain  and  France,  in  spite  of  their  respec- 
tive alliances  to  each  of  the  contestants, 
succeeded  in  isolating  the  field  of  hostilities. 

As  for  the  argument  that  our  present 
strength  is  suflScient,  examples  are  not  want- 


THE  POLICY  OF  UNDERSTANDINGS      23 

ing  of  states  with  fleets  and  armies  greater 
than  our  own  who  feel  that  the  interests  of 
peace  would  best  be  preserved  by  a  policy 
of  understandings.  England,  with  a  sea 
force  far  superior  to  ours,  has  looked  to 
diplomacy  to  aid  her  navy  in  guarding  the 
British  Empire.  Allied  with  Japan,  an- 
other understanding  links  her  with  France, 
while  in  the  event  of  war  her  fleets  can 
make  use  of  Portugal's  unrivaled  strategic 
position  in  the  South  Atlantic  in  return  for 
guaranteeing  the  latter's  colonial  posses- 
sions. Diplomacy  has  been  used  by  Eng- 
land as  an  adjunct  to  naval  strength,  and 
her  policy  has  neglected  no  step  to  further 
secure  the  safeguard  of  India  as  the  pivot 
of  the  British  Empire.  By  these  alliances,  ^0iitf66 
culminating  in  the  recent  agreement  with  ^*^18!U 
Russia,  she  has  guarded  every  avenue  of 
approach  to  her  great  colony.  It  may  be 
urged  that  England's  exposed  position  ne- 
cessitates such  precautions.  But  has  she 
any  possession  more  vulnerable  than  are 
the  Philippines  ? 


24  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

The  colonial  position  of  France  more 
closely  resembles  our  own.  With  depend- 
encies situated  at  great  distance  from  the 
home  country,  she  had  felt  herself  unable 
to  protect  these  in  the  event  of  certain  con- 
tingencies. In  spite  of  the  lengthy  period 
of  Anglophobia  occasioned  by  colonial  ri- 
valry through  which  she  had  passed,  her 
diplomacy  effected  an  understanding  with 
Great  Britain.  France  by  this  means  ob- 
tained a  protection  for  her  dependencies 
greater  than  her  fleet  could  give.  To  this 
she  has  added  a  further  guarantee.  The 
defenselessness  of  Indo-China  and  the  feel- 
ing that  it  lay  at  the  mercy  of  Japan  had 
been  the  first  lesson  of  the  late  war  to  im- 
press her.  Without  slighting  the  suscepti- 
bilities of  her  Russian  ally,  France  has  been 
able  to  negotiate  an  agreement  with  Japan 
guaranteeing  each  other's  possessions  in  the 
Far  East. 

After  these  examples  of  nations  pos- 
sessing colonies,  yet  supplementing  their 
powers  of  defense  by  the  aid  of  other  states. 


THE  POLICY  OF  UNDERSTANDINGS      25 

we  may  consider  the  conditions  in  which  a 
similar  understanding  would  be  advisable' 
for  the  United  States.  The  problem  pre- 
sents itself  of  finding  a  desirable  partner 
willing  to  enter  into  a  well-defined  mutual 
insurance,  with  whom  no  conflicting  inter- 
ests are  likely  to  clash.  Our  old  prejudice 
against  alliances  had  Europe  in  view,  and 
to-day,  as  in  the  past,  any  treaty  or  pact 
which  would  entangle  us  in  the  internal 
affairs  of  the  Old  World  would  be  con- 
demned. But  it  is  difficult  to  see  the  inex- 
pediency of  an  arrangement  which,  without 
adding  a  ship  to  our  fleet,  or  a  dollar  to  our 
expenditure,  would  restrict  the  nation's 
liability  to  the  American  continent  and 
the  islands  of  the  Pacific,  in  return  for 
guaranteeing  the  status  quo  from  Maine  to 
Manila;  which  would  effectively  protect 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  the  Panama 
Canal,  and  safeguard  the  integrity  of  our 
dependencies,  and  in  removing  the  Pa- 
cific from  the  sphere  of  political  change 
would   assure  us   the   sovereignty  of  the 


\ 

\ 


26  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Philippines  for  such  eventual  disposition 
as  the  American  people  deem  fit  to  make. 
Can  it  be  doubted  that  an  understanding  of 
this  nature  would  immeasurably  strengthen 
our  position  and  our  policies,  and  be  a 
further  guarantee  for  the  preservation  of 
peace  ? 
kJ  The  price  to  pay  for  these  benefits  would 
^  be  too  heavy  if  we  should  be  dragged  as  the 
result  into  a  continental  conflagration,  and 
obliged  to  take  sides  in  a  struggle  between 
the  nations  of  Europe.  But  the  conse- 
quence of  our  understanding  with  either 
of  the  interested  parties,  in  the  event  of 
its  being  engaged  in  a  European  conflict, 
would  almost  certainly  be  to  restrict  and 
limit  the  seat  of  hostilities  by  removing  the 
American  continent,  and  such  parts  of  the 
Pacific  as  might  be  included  within  its 
scope,  from  the  field  of  operations.  The 
alternative  is  obvious.  If  any  hostile  power 
chose  to  disregard  our  warning  and  chal- 
^  lenge  our  ally  within  the  bounds  which  we 
had  declared  should  be  removed  from  the 


THE  POLICY  OF  UNDERSTANDINGS      27 

scene  of  conflict,  the  clearest  dictates  of 
self-preservation  would  impel  us  to  take 
arms  for  a  cause  which  would  then  become 
our  own.  But  this  contingency  is  almost 
too  improbable  to  mention. 

Such  an  understanding  would  thus  be 
of  an  essentially  peaceful  nature,  tending 
only  to  preserve  existing  conditions  by  re- 
moving all  motive  for  their  disturbance. 
In  contracting  it,  we  should  be  entering  into 
a  mutual  insurance  limited  by  the  terms  of 
the  agreement,  which  would  conceivably 
restrict  its  provisions  to  the  guarantee  of 
actual  conditions  within  the  lines  of  lon- 
gitude embracing  the  American  continent 
and  the  Pacific.  Providing,  therefore,  the 
nation  or  nations  with  which  such  under- 
standing had  been  entered  into  were  suf- 
ficiently powerful,  we  need  feel  no  concern 
for  the  future  of  the  Philippines,  the  safety 
of  the  Panama  Canal,  or  the  continuance 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  And  while  re- 
spect for  the  latter  may  be  obtained  by 
different  means,  the  security  of  bur  Asiatic 


28  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

possessions  can  hardly  be  assured  by  any 
other  feasible  method. 

As  an  American  power  and  as  an  Asiatic 
power,  we  have  to  deal  with  other  American 
and  Asiatic  powers,  considering  these  in  the 
light  of  possible  friends  or  adversaries  with 
the  consequences  attached  to  each  con- 
tingency. It  is  the  province  of  statesman- 
ship to  sort  the  threads  of  our  interests  and 
to  see  wherein  these  lie  parallel  with  theirs, 
and,  where  they  may  be  dissimilar,  to  en- 
deavor in  times  of  national  calm  to  adjust 
causes  of  friction.  The  practical  advan- 
tages of  such  a  process  of  diplomatic  house- 
cleaning  have  been  witnessed  in  the  recent 
agreements  effected  by  Great  Britain  with 
France  and  Russia.  Their  differences  have 
now  been  reconciled.  Their  diplomatic 
work  has  been  a  labor  of  peace,  and 
the  danger  of  war,  which  for  so  long 
appeared  imminent,  has  been  removed. 
Diplomacy  has  given  the  lie  to  the  "in- 
evitable conflict"  so  long  foreshadowed  be- 
tween these  states,  and  spared  each  nation 


THE  POLICY  OF  UNDERSTANDINGS      29 

concerned  its  treasure  and  its  blood,  making 
of  former  enemies  present  friends. 

We  have  a  far  easier  task.  Yet  although 
no  such  differences  or  ambitions  divide 
us  from  other  powers,  causes  of  friction  lie 
not  far  away.  But  partly  out  of  respect  for 
a  tradition  that  has  survived  its  utility, 
partly  because  of  still  other  reasons,  we 
have  not  availed  ourselves  of  the  diplo- 
matic advantages  at  hand  in  fortifying  our 
position.  We  have  not  utilized  the  power 
of  diplomacy  and  made  of  it  a  veritable 
instrument  to  strengthen  national  policies. 
It  still  lies  before  us  as  a  peaceful  means 
to  forestall  the  danger  of  war  and  remove 
the  causes  of  national  concern. 


/ 


CHAPTER  II 

RELATIONS  WITH  EUROPE 

We  had  so  long  been  regarded  as  a 
peaceful  republic,  occupied  solely  by  trade, 
that  Europe  was  startled  by  our  victory 
over  Spain  to  realize  that  we  possessed 
ambitions  similar  to  those  which  for  cen- 
turies had  spurred  on  her  peoples  to  assert 
their  influence  beyond  the  seas.  It  is  only 
half  correct,  however,  to  say  that  the  war 
caused  our  advent  as  a  world  power.  It 
inaugurated  a  new  period  less  than  it  has- 
tened the  development  of  a  growing  move- 
ment in  American  national  evolution  which 
by  its  means  attained  to  earlier  maturity, 
but  which  must  in  any  event  have  sooner  or 
later  made  itself  felt. 

Certain  causes  would  inevitably  have 
terminated  our  period  of  former  isolation. 
The  extension  given  to  our  commercial  in- 
terests abroad  had  already  for  some  time 


RELATIONS  WITH  EUROPE  31 

aroused  keener  interest  in  the  world's  af- 
fairs. So  long  as  American  export  trade 
formed  but  a  relatively  small  proportion  of 
the  country's  industrial  production  we  were 
economically  independent  in  our  seclusion. 
When  foreign  commerce,  however,  assumed  ^ 
an  importance  which  has  lately  amounted 
to  over  three  thousand  million  dollars  an- 
nually, any  curtailment  in  its  volume  meant 
serious  injury  to  our  industry.  Yet  the 
closer  interest  we  now  feel  in  the  world's 
affairs  has  been  brought  about,  not  so  much 
by  the  desire  to  enlarge  our  trade  and  the 
pressure  of  material  stakes  as  by  the  higher  ^ 
consciousness  of  new  responsibilities. 

Whereas  formerly  we  accepted  without 
compunction,  in  questions  of  international 
interest,  the  benefits  of  other  powers'  exer- 
tions without  ourselves  incurring  corre- 
sponding liabilities,  the  nation's  sense  of 
dignity  has  at  last  been  awakened  to  this 
impropriety,  and  can  never  again  relapse  in 
such  matters  to  its  former  callousness.  The 
yfelief  of  the  legations  at  Pekin  has  demon- 


32  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

strated  our  readiness  to  participate  in  affairs 
of  joint  concern  to  civilized  states. 

Except  for  Great  Britain,  the  result  of 
the  Spanish  War  had  been  little  welcome 
to  the  rest  of  Europe,  grown  accustomed 
to  the  thought  that  the  destinies  of  the 
universe  should  forever  be  in  the  hands  of 
five  or  six  of  its  states.  The  nations  of 
Europe  have  been  aptly  compared  by  M. 
d'Haussonville  to  a  party  of  gamblers 
seated  around  a  green  cloth  grown  some- 
what shabby  with  age,  where  each  in  turn 
takes  the  bank.  A  newcomer  enters,  his 
pockets  bulging  with  gold,  and  startles 
the  players  into  a  fear  that  he  may  at  once 
break  the  bank. 

In  destroying  the  time-worn  conception 
as  to  the  exclusive  supremacy  of  Europe  we 
appeared  as  intruders,  and  as  such  were  un- 
welcome. But  this  resentment  has  partly 
disappeared  since  the  more  recent  victory 
of  Japan  made  the  Old  World  recover  from 
its  first  surprise.  The  Continent  recog- 
nized that  our  appearance  might  offer  com- 


RELATIONS  WITH  EUROPE  33 

pensations  in  neutralizing  the  new  power  of 
the  East,  and  viewed  our  recent  Japanese  ^ 
difficulties  with  thinly  veiled  satisfaction. 
Our  single  entry  as  a  great  nation  had  for 
a  time  overturned  all  former  calculations 
and  shifted  the  axis  of  power.    But  offset 
by  Japan,  the  scales  are  only  more  heavily 
weighted  than  before,  and  the  fulcrum  has 
been  set  back  where  it  was,  though  the 
balance  is  less  delicately  adjusted.  Change 
has  come  through  the  enlargement  of  what 
had  been  a  restricted  horizon  to  its  present 
globe-embracing    proportions.     A  concert     >^w^v»i^' 
of  world  powers  has  dispossessed  the  con-   . 
cert  of  Europe.  i 

While  the  European  nations  are  rapidly^! 
adapting  their  diplomacy  to  conform  with 
the  new  requirements,  we  have  emerged 
from  our  former  aloofness  handicapped  by 
the  weight  of  a  traditional  policy  no  longer  « 
in  touch  with  actual  conditions.  Brought 
up  to  respect  the  wisdom  of  non-entangle- 
ment in  the  affairs  of  Europe,  we  now  find 
ourselves  called  upon  to  assume  our  place 


34  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

as  a  world  power,  yet  unable  to  separate 
the  international  position  of  foreign  states 
from  their  strictly  European  position,  or  to 
forget  that  the  general  interests  of  civilized 
nations  are  likewise  in  great  measure  the 
interests  of  Europe.  Our  attitude  toward 
such  countries  must  be  related  to  our  colo- 
nial situation,  and  it  may  even  vary  accord- 
ing as  their  over-sea  policy  affects  our  own. 
Foreign  relations  have  grown  for  us  in  com- 
plexity, and  our  requirements  have  ceased 
to  bear  the  same  uniform  hall-mark  of 
simplicity  in  every  region  of  the  globe.  We 
must  scan  more  critically  the  movements 
and  the  ambitions  of  other  states,  without 
being  able  as  before  to  disinterest  ourselves 
therefrom.  The  vital  interests  of  each  of 
(  the  great  European  powers  concern  us  in 
relation  to  our  policy. 

To  begin  with  a  sister  republic,  tradition 
and  sympathy  cause  us  to  regard  France 
as  the  most  ancient  of  our  friends,  to  whom 
we  have  been  bound  by  a  debt  of  gratitude 
not  yet  forgotten.    Our  friendship  toward 


RELATIONS  WITH  EUROPE  35 

her  rests  on  a  solid  basis,  nor  are  conflicting 
ambitions  likely  again  to  clash  between  us. 
As  an  American  power,  France's  posses- 
sions, of  slight  consequence  and  far  scat- 
tered from  the  St.  Lawrence  to  Guiana, 
are  mainly  of  historical  importance ;  but  as 
Asiatic  powers,  the  interests  of  the  two 
republics  are  similar.  Even  economically 
there  is  little  reason  to  anticipate  between 
the  two  nations  that  acute  commercial 
rivalry  which  so  often  precedes  political 
difliculties.  The  active  participation  of 
France  in  the  world's  affairs  is  now  con- 
fined to  a  role  of  peace.  There  is  slight 
probability  of  her  ever  again  seeking  to  pur- 
sue the  course  of  aggression  that  so  often 
made  her  in  the  past  the  disturbing  factor 
in  Europe.  With  reason,  therefore,  may  we 
look  to  the  future  continuance  of  our  an- 
cient friendship. 

From  having  been  the  most  warlike, 
France  has  in  recent  years  become  the  most 
peaceful  of  states.  Her  former  policies  of 
adventure  have  been  definitely  dismissed. 


36  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

and  like  another  and  greater  Holland  she 
has  subsided  into  a  rich  capitalist  nation, 
farming  out  her  millions  for  others  more 
active  to  employ  profitably.  Since  the  war 
of  1870  her  colonial  policy  has  been  dic- 
tated less  by  need  for  expansion  than 
through  fear  on  the  part  of  her  statesmen 
lest  their  country  be  outdistanced  in  the 
future,  if  new  national  interests  were  not 
created  beyond  the  seas.  Successful  in 
this  field,  her  colonial  enterprise,  save  in 
North  Africa,  is  no  longer  aggressive. 

France  has  ceased  to  be  a  menace  to  any 
state.  But  her  continental  position  im- 
poses upon  her  a  certain  policy.  Lying 
between  two  powerful  neighbors,  the  choice 
had  become  necessary  between  accept- 
ing the  consequences  of  naval  inferiority 
toward  Great  Britain  and  military  inferior- 
ity toward  Germany.  Friendship  with  the 
one  power  meant  a  guarantee  for  her  colo- 
nial empire  in  the  event  of  war,  but  at  the 
risk  of  invasion;  friendship  with  the  other 
meant  inviolability  of  territory,  but  the  al- 


RELATIONS  WITH  EUROPE  37 

most  certain  loss  of  colonies  in  case  of  such 
a  contest. 

Her  feeling  of  resentment  toward  Ger- 
many had  been  greatly  lessened  in  recent 
years.  The  sting  of  bitterness  caused  by 
the  remembrance  of  lost  provinces,  if  not 
forgotten,  was  at  least  relegated  to  the  rear 
by  the  more  recent  smart  of  national  humil- 
iation suffered  at  Fashoda.  Counsels  were 
therefore  divided  as  to  what  policy  to  adopt, 
when  the  events  which  led  to  the  Moroc- 
can Conference  demonstrated  that  France 
could  secure  the  Emperor's  friendship  only 
by  unreservedly  accepting  German  hege- 
mony. And  however  great  the  anxiety  to 
insure  the  safety  of  her  eastern  frontier, 
French  patriotism  revolted  at  accepting  a 
situation  which  would  have  forced  the 
nation  to  acquiesce  in  the  position  of 
an  inferior  power  definitely  submissive  to 
German  policy.  Hence  the  understanding 
with  England,  at  first  of  strictly  colonial 
interest,  afterward  assumed  a  new  and  un- 
expected importance,  the   significance   of 


S8  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

which  recent   developments   have  further 
augmented. 

While  France  to-day  seeks  only  to  pre- 
serve her  present  possessions,  Germany  is 
too  lately  born  among  great  nations  to  have 
enjoyed  the  inheritance  of  older  states. 
Hitherto  her  efforts  to  colonize  have  not 
been  altogether  successful,  and  her  foreign 
dependencies  remain  far  inferior  to  those  of 
even  small  powers  like  Holland  or  Portugal. 
With  a  rapidly  growing  population  ill  con- 
fined within  the  present  frontiers,  and  con- 
fronted by  grave  social  problems,  she  aims 
to  follow  the  example  of  her  neighbors  in 
securing  outlets  for  over-sea  trade  and  enter- 
prise. But  while  other  great  powers  have 
reached  a  stage  where  they  are  content  to 
develop  what  is  theirs,  Germany  feels  that 
she  has  not  yet  reached  her  full  measure,  nor 
has  her  national  energy  attained  its  zenith. 
She  seeks  a  position  where  she  will  be  able 
to  demand  participation  in,  or  compensa- 
tion for,  any  alteration  or  change  in  existing 
territorial  conditions,  in  whatever  quarter 


RELATIONS  WITH  EUROPE  39 

of  the  globe  it  occurs ;  and  to  prepare  for 
this  the  same  careful  labor  is  to-day  going 
on  in  the  German  navy  as  took  place  in 
the  Prussian  army  after  the  defeat  of  Jena. 
Will  a  united  Germany  care  to  wait  fifty 
years  to  witness  results?  Success  engen- 
ders the  wish  for  success,  and  the  remem- 
brance of  past  victories  has  been  too  vivid 
not  to  spur  on  future  hope. 

Such  ambitions  as  Germany  may  cher- 
ish are  accompanied  by  armaments  of  a 
nature  which  not  unnaturally  cause  solici- 
tude among  neighbors  at  whose  expense 
they  would  be  carried  out.  However  unfair 
it  would  be  to  criticise  her  for  an  eflSciency 
which  her  neighbors  may  envy,  which  has 
proved  the  reason  for  her  past  success,  and 
the  burden  of  which  concerns  her  alone,  it 
would  be  unwise  to  fail  to  appreciate  its 
consequences.  Her  deficiency  in  sea  power 
alone  prevents  her  from  wielding  the  same 
world  power  which  she  enjoys  as  a  conti- 
nental state,  and  to  remedy  this  Germany's 
present  efforts  are  strained.     Her  imme- 


4fO  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

diate  goal  is  not  the  acquisition  of  a  para- 
mount naval  position,  which  she  knows 
herself  unable  under  existing  conditions  to 
wrest  from  Great  Britain,  but  the  bringing 
about  of  a  state  of  armed  peace  on  sea,  as 
on  land,  which  would  terminate  the  latter's 
supremacy.  The  policy  of  armed  peace 
has  made  Germany  the  dominant  force  on 
the  Continent  since  1870,  and  her  success- 
ful pursuit  of  a  similar  condition  on  the 
high  seas  would  no  longer  render  hopeless 
a  possible  naval  contest  with  Great  Britain. 
German  naval  policy  to-day  aims  so  to 
enlarge  her  present  fleet  as  to  make  it,  even 
single-handed,  a  dangerous  adversary,  while 
it  would  always  constitute  the  nucleus  of 
a  possible  array  of  forces  which  might  be 
marshaled  against  a  common  foe.  The  con- 
ception is  Napoleonic  in  spirit.  Napoleon 
aimed  to  place  himself  at  the  head  of  a 
European  confederation  definitely  submis- 
sive to  his  policy ;  and  German  influence  is 
to-day  dominant  not  only  in  Austria,  her 
avowed  ally,  but  in  several  of  the  smaller 


RELATIONS  WITH  EUROPE  41 

states  of  northern  and  eastern  Europe. 
But  her  political  allies,  while  strong  in  their 
military  armaments,  are  crippled  by  an  in- 
adequacy of  sea  power  which  would  render 
their  assistance  of  slight  utility  in  the  event 
of  naval  war.  In  order  to  fulfill  her  ambi- 
tion, Germany  requires  both  to  isolate  her 
rival  and  to  obtain  the  aid  of  a  power  able 
to  prove  of  assistance  to  her  on  the  sea.  At 
the  present  time  we  are  the  nation  best  fitted 
to  render  her  such  services.  Our  resources 
and  our  naval  strength  would  be  of  inesti- 
mable advantage  to  the  emperor  in  a  pos- 
sible war  with  England,  and  the  cultivation 
of  our  friendship  may  well  appear  a  desira- 
ble goal  toward  which  his  diplomacy  should  7 
strive. 

The  former  vapors  of  conflict  between 
Germany  and  ourselves  are  fortunately 
long  since  dissipated.  Her  supposed  covet- 
ing of  the  Philippines  after  the  battle  of 
Manila  was  keenly  resented  by  us.  But  the  \ 
details  of  this  episode  would  prove  that  her  i 
conduct,  to  which  we  then  took  exception. 


i 


42  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

had  been  due  to  indiscretions  for  which  she 
was  in  no  way  to  blame.  Her  subsequent 
course  has  certainly  been  altogether  loyal, 
and  we  have  even  had  occasion  to  appreci- 
ate in  regions  of  special  interest  to  us  the 
friendliness  of  her  present  diplomacy.  All 
recollection  of  unpleasantness  is  happily 
effaced,  and  German  official  relations  have 
more  than  oscillated  to  the  extreme  pole  of 
friendship.  This  is  eminently  desirable, 
and  so  long  as  it  does  not  cause  us  to  forget 
vital  interests,  we  can  but  gain  by  the  pre- 
servation of  the  present  fortunate  cordiality. 
We  cannot  blind  ourselves,  however,  to  the 
fact  that  Germany  desires  our  amity,  in- 
spired by  deeper  motives  than  may  appear 
on  the  surface.  Even  if  our  active  aid  could 
not  be  enlisted,  to  endeavor  to  detach  us 
from  other  sympathies  is  legitimate  diplo- 
macy on  her  part.  From  our  standpoint, 
however,  the  benefits  of  any  closer  intimacy 
than  at  present  exists  would  be  hardly  com- 
mensurate with  the  corresponding  disad- 
vantages suffered  in  other  quarters.    The 


RELATIONS  WITH  EUROPE  43 

present  cultivation  of  friendship  with  so 
great  a  power,  and  from  whom  we  have 
much  to  learn,  is  to  be  earnestly  desired, 
but  any  closer  understanding  with  Germany 
would  present  for  us  too  many  obstacles  to 
be  enduring  or  advantageous. 

The  preponderant  influence  of  Germany 
in  European  affairs  has  been  somewhat 
heightened  by  the  temporary  exclusion 
of  Russia  from  her  accustomed  place  in 
the  councils  of  nations  and  her  condemna- 
tion for  the  next  few  years  to  a  rigid  policy 
of  internal  development.  The  period  of 
Muscovite  aggression  is  over,  for  a  time  at 
least,  and  as  a  constitutional  state  she  has 
settled  with  good  grace  to  the  acceptance 
of  a  new  role  of  peace.  Her  recent  under- 
standing with  Great  Britain,  which  brought 
to  an  end  long-standing  jealousies,  was  wel- 
come to  us.  We  had  no  cause  to  desire  the 
perpetuation  of  disputes  between  powers 
whose  interests  so  closely  resemble  our  own. 
In  the  past,  amity  with  Russia  has  been 
a  wise  tradition  in  our  diplomacy,  and  its 


44  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

continuance  should  prove  an  important  fac- 
tor in  our  future  European  policy.  The 
causes  of  friction  that  have  lately  arisen 
over  questions  of  jurisdiction  in  Manchuria 
are  of  passing  significance.  It  is  unlikely 
that  divergent  interests  of  vital  consequence 
will  ever  separate  the  two  nations,  while  cir- 
cumstances are  easily  conceivable,  in  the 
extreme  Orient,  in  which  they  could  render 
each  other  mutual  services. 

In  addition  to  political  considerations, 
our  commercial  interests  cause  us  to  desire 
a  closer  intimacy  with  Russia,  whose  Asiatic 
expansion,  with  its  consequent  needs,  is  not 
unlike  our  own  winning  of  the  West.  In  the 
struggle  for  the  trade  of  the  Near  and  Far 
East,  and  even  in  the  development  of  Euro- 
pean Russia,  numerous  opportunities  are 
^  ^  likely  to  occur  where  Russian  influence,  un- 
able itself  to  profit,  would  incline  to  favor 
our  enterprise  in  preference  to  that  of  other 
nations. 

With  the  remaining  continental  powers, 
apart  from  the  extensive  commercial  rela- 


v^ 


RELATIONS  WITH  EUROPE  45 

tions  we  have  with  them,  the  protection 
and  development  of  which  necessitate  a 
more  watchful  diplomacy  than  is  commonly 
supposed,  our  interest  arises  largely  from 
their  affiliations  with  Germany,  or  with  the 
Dual  Alliance,  and  Great  Britain.  While 
Austrian  diplomacy  has  in  recent  years  been 
increasingly  subordinated  to  that  of  Berlin, 
Italian  has  steered  a  more  independent 
course.  The  expression  of  fidelity  to  allies 
and  loyalty  to  friends,  so  frequently  invoked 
by  succeeding  Italian  Ministers  of  Foreign 
Affairs  in  explanation  of  their  country's  for- 
eign policy,  likewise  characterizes  its  nature.  ; 
The  course  of  conciliatory  opportunism  in  \/ 
harmony  with  the  country's  welfare  predi- 
cates for  Italy  a  cordiality  toward  both  sides 
which  would  tend  to  make  for  her, neutrality 
in  the  event  of  war.  This  augurs  well  for 
the  continuance  of  the  many  sympathies 
which  unite  us  to  Italy,  whose  ambitions 
are  unlikely  to  forebode  for  us  any  unex- 
pected or  unwelcome  developments. 

At  the  present  time,  when  every  year 


46  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

witnesses  a  growth  in  the  friendship  ex- 
isting between  Great  Britain  and  ourselves, 
it  may  appear  fanciful  to  speak  of  the  pos- 
sibility of  conflict  between  two  kindred  na- 
tions. But  the  recollection  of  a  Venezuelan 
boundary  dispute  is  not  long  enough  re- 
moved to  allow  us  to  forget  what  might 
have  occurred  without  Lord  Salisbury's  wise 
statesmanship.  The  efforts  of  the  two  gov- 
ernments to  smooth  all  sources  of  trouble 
at  a  time  like  the  present,  when  both  nations 
are  animated  by  the  friendliest  feelings,  is  a 
wise  indication  of  the  importance  attached 
to  such  amity. 

Towards  England  the  clearest  dictates 
of  reason  impel  us  to  turn, —  not  because  of 
the  intimate  ties  of  language,  blood,  and  civ- 
ilization, nor  because  the  two  nations  have 
shared  a  common  past.  Bonds  of  sympathy 
and  kinship  have  never  prevented  fratrici- 
dal strife ;  where  conflicting  interests  oppose 
they  offer  a  poor  foundation  upon  which  to 
base  an  understanding.  Identical  interests 
undivided  by  divergent  ambitions  afford 


RELATIONS  WITH  EUROPE  47 

a  far  safer  basis  for  friendship  between 
nations. 

The  most  serious  foreign  danger  which 
has  menaced  us  in  the  past  as  a  nation  was 
the  triumph  of  Napoleon  over  continental 
Europe.  As  Mr.  Olney  has  remarked/ 
were  his  career  ever  again  to  approach  or 
even  to  threaten  repetition,  not  merely  sen- 
timent and  sympathy,  but  the  strongest 
consideration  of  self-preservation  and  self- 
defense,  might  drive  us  to  take  sides.  Had 
the  power  of  England  then  been  annihi- 
lated, it  is  unlikely  that  we  would  have  at- 
tained our  present  greatness.  Great  Britain, 
though  fighting  us  at  sea,  yet  saved  us  from 
greater  peril.  Danger  for  her,  just  as  dan- 
ger for  us,  lies  in  a  coalition  of  powers,  and, 
in  consequence,  British  diplomacy  has  to 
oppose  the  combinations  of  Europe.  For 
the  past  three  centuries  England's  continu- 
ous policy  has  been  to  resist  the  efforts  of 
any  state  to  achieve  a  European  hegemony 
or  to  assert  a  paramount  influence.   When 

»  Atlantic  Monthly,  March,  1900,  p.  298. 


48  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Spain  was  dominant  she  opposed  her.  A 
century  later  she  fought  Louis  the  Four- 
teenth, and  alone  she  faced  Napoleon,  and 
later  resisted  Russia.  Time  and  time  again 
she  has  manifested  her  readiness  to  block 
any  concert  of  powers  directed  toward  an 
end  distasteful  to  her.  Canning  barring  the 
action  of  the  Holy  Alliance  on  the  morrow 
of  the  Congress  of  Verona;  Palmerston  re- 
fusing to  unite  with  Napoleon  the  Third, 
eager  to  destroy  our  unity  by  aiding  the 
South;  Salisbury  prepared  to  thwart  any 
European  coalition  at  the  outbreak  of  the 
Spanish  War,  are  so  many  illustrations  in 
point.  The  aid  England  was  ready  to  extend 
us  during  our  recent  war  proved  unneces- 
sary, since  no  hostile  coalition  attained  ma- 
turity. But  the  fact  that,  had  it  been  other- 
wise, the  dictates  of  self-preservation  would 
have  compelled  our  acceptance  thereof,  just 
as  we  accepted  the  aid  of  France  in  the  Re- 
volution, gives  the  lie  to  the  reverence  with 
which  we  still  regard  a  misinterpreted  tra- 
dition. ^Alliances  can  be  entangling  only 


RELATIONS  WITH  EUROPE  49 

when  they  are  disadvantageous.  To  guard  ^ 
against  their  being  so  is  the  duty  of  a  wise 
statesmanship. 

Without  regarding  any  power  as  hostile, 
we  cannot  avoid  the  conclusion  that  only 
from  England,  from  the  Continent,  or  from 
Japan  could  serious  danger  menace  us. 
While  England  as  the  mistress  of  the  sea 
would  be  our  most  formidable  adversary, 
she  could  also  be  our  most  useful  friend, 
and  her  friendship  is  of  as  much  importance 
to  us  as  is  ours  to  her.  Mutual  benefit  or 
mutual  injury  would  alike  be  greater  than 
either  could  experience  at  the  hands  of 
other  nations.  While  no  incentive  for  hostil- 
ity exists  on  either  side,  with  no  other  power 
would  the  advantages  of  an  understanding  \/ 
be  so  great  or  the  liabilities  so  small.  Eng- 
land controls  the  key  of  the  situation  for 
us  both  toward  the  Continent  and  toward 
Japan.  Under  existing  circumstances,  were 
she  unwilling,  no  power  could  menace  us. 
Nor  are  such  circumstances  likely  to  alter 
so  long  as  the  Continent  remains  divided. 


50  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

To  guard  against  this  is  the  primary  object 
of  British  diplomacy,  and  her  present  guar- 
antee against  a  united  Europe  lies  in  the 
understanding  with  France.  What  France 
is  to  England,  England  is  to  us.  Hence  the 
preservation  of  the  Anglo-French  under- 
standing, and  in  smaller  degree  the  under- 
standing with  Russia,  concern  us  only  a 
little  less  than  the  main  participants.  So 
long  as  these  subsist  the  British  navy  is  su- 
preme, and  with  our  own  maintained  at  such, 
strength  as  to  make  us  a  formidable  factor 
in  the  event  of  complications,  we  need  fear 
no  hostile  coalition  to  menace  our  policies 
or  our  dependencies.  Looking  toward  the 
Far  East,  Mr.  Olney  has  reminded  us  that 
except  for  Great  Britain's  countenance  we 
should  almost  certainly  never  have  secured 
the  Philippines.^  Her  alliance  with  Japan, 
coupled  with  the  consciousness  of  her  naval 
supremacy,  holds  that  power  in  restraint; 
while  in  China  our  policies  are  united  in 
upholding  the  open-door  principle.  In  every 

'  Atlantic  Monthly,  March,  1900,  p.  300. 


RELATIONS  WITH  EUROPE  51 

region  of  the  globe  we  find  similarity  in 
our  political  interests.  And  the  reason  is 
unquestionably  because  England,  with  the 
greatest  colonial  empire  the  world  has  yet 
witnessed,  can  seek  only  to  preserve  her 
birthright  and  not  to  expand  further.  Land- 
glutted,  she  desires  to  retain  her  present 
possessions  without  coveting  the  territories 
of  others. 

The  maintenance  of  that  empire  excites 
no  jealousy  in  us,  and  presents  no  incon- 
venience. The  Philippine  experiment  has 
allayed  whatever  lurking  ambitions  existed 
within  us  in  the  direction  of  colonial  ex- 
pansion beyond  the  western  hemisphere. 
While  for  better  or  for  worse  the  nation's 
destinies  must  for  an  indefinite  time  be 
connected  with  our  Oriental  dependencies, 
we  have  no  desire  to  enlarge  such  experi- 
ence. On  the  contrary,  we  should  prefer  to 
see  the  colonial  markets  of  the  world  con- 
trolled by  a  state  ready  to  throw  them  open 
to  all  comers. 

The  problems  of  imperial  responsibility 


52  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

for  the  acts  of  self-governing  British  colo- 
nies still  remain  to  be  solved ;  but  their  in- 
tention to  exclude  the  yellow  races  brings 
these  close  to  a  policy  which  must  hence- 
forth be  our  own.  In  that  as  well  lies  the 
opportunity  for  future  cooperation  of  mu- 
tual advantage.  Lastly,  we  cannot  forget 
that  Canada  is  too  integral  a  part  of  the 
American  continent  for  its  welfare  not  to 
be  connected  with  our  own.  While  this  is 
not  the  place  to  enter  into  the  problems, 
more  intricate  than  vital,  that  still  remain 
to  be  settled  with  our  northern  neighbor,  it 
is  obvious  that  the  closer  the  ties  binding 
us  to  the  mother  country,  the  easier  will  be 
their  solution.  Questions  like  those  of  the 
Newfoundland  fisheries  can  never  assume 
a  violent  form  if  the  colonists  realize  that 
overt  acts  on  their  part  will  deprive  them 
of  their  government's  support. 

The  furtherance  of  such  a  policy  of  close 
intimacy  with  Great  Britain  necessitates  a 
frank  exchange  of  views  on  all  matters  of 
common  interest.    But  such  understanding 


RELATIONS  WITH  EUROPE  53 

would  have  little  in  common  with  the  nature  V 
of  an  alliance.  It  would  base  itself  rather 
on  the  desire  to  settle  outstanding  ques- 
tions which  have  in  the  past  been  causes 
of  friction,  and  further  to  unite  in  the  mu- 
tual declaration  of  a  policy  of  joint  interest 
which  would  tend  to  perpetuate  existing 
conditions,  particularly  in  the  Pacific,  where 
our  desires  are  identical.  The  fact  that  our 
policies  would  cause  us  to  regard  with  dis- 
favor the  effort  of  any  nation  to  disturb 
present  conditions  within  spheres  of  com- 
mon interest,  does  not  imply  that  we  should 
be  drawn  thereby  into  conflicts  alien  to  us. 
Contact  even  with  the  Old  World  is  not 
synonymous  with  entanglement,  nor  does 
entanglement  of  necessity  mean  war.  Eng- 
land, which  has  continually  mingled  in  con- 
tinental affairs,  has  yet  since  Waterloo  gone 
through  but  one  European  war.  Her  efforts 
in  the  direction  of  her  traditional  policy  are 
indeed  more  likely  to  be  peacefully  effective 
if  our  own  approval  thereof  be  well  under- 
stood.  The  influence  of  the  two  great  naval 


54  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

powers,  already  united  by  so  many  intimate 
ties,  directed  toward  this  end  would  more 
than  in  any  other  way  strengthen  the  cause 
of  peace. 

A  guarantee  on  the  part  of  the  two  coun- 
tries to  maintain  the  present  territorial  and 
political  conditions  within  certain  deter- 
mined regions  could  hardly  be  viewed  as 
an  entangling  alliance.  It  would  rather  be 
a  pledge  against  war,  since  it  would  permit 
us  to  dispense  with  the  unlimited  extension 
of  armaments  otherwise  necessary  to  defend 
our  policies,  while  freeing  England  from 
anxiety  with  regard  to  her  American  colo- 
nies and  uniting  both  nations  in  guaran- 
teeing the  integrity  of  weaker  neutral  states. 
It  would  offer  a  permanent  basis  for  our 
foreign  policy  worthy  of  our  dignity  as  a 
great  power.  And  if  later,  as  a  result  of  this, 
additional  agreements  and  understandings 
tending  to  the  preservation  of  certain  de- 
sired conditions  within  definite  spheres 
were  to  be  contracted  with  other  states  simi- 
larly interested,  these  could  hardly  be  re- 


RELATIONS  WITH  EUROPE  55 

garded  as  entangling  us  in  the  labyrinth 
of  European  politics,  or  otherwise  than  as 
bespeaking  our  sincere  desire  for  peace  and 
our  determination  to  assist  its  preservation 
by  diplomatic  as  well  as  by  military  means. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  RECOGNITION  OF  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

The  external  problems  hitherto  confront- 
ing the  nation  have  been  mainly  of  a  sim- 
ple order.  Since  the  birth  of  the  Republic 
we  have  been  spared  the  intricate  questions 
of  foreign  policy  that  disturb  the  calm  of 
European  statesmen.  Our  diplomacy,  after 
the  remarkable  success  of  its  early  efforts, 
brought  to  the  consideration  of  interna- 
tional relations  a  directness  of  vision  and  of 
method,  differing,  perhaps,  from  that  of  a 
trained  service,  but  not  unsuited  to  accom- 
plish its  end.  With  neither  the  glamour 
nor  the  brilliancy  occasionally  present 
among  European  diplomatists,  our  public 
men  have  for  the  most  part  treated  foreign 
relations  with  the  sterling  sense  and  integ- 
rity of  purpose  characteristic  of  the  best 
traditions  in  our  government. 

So  long  as  national  conditions  remained 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  57 

unaltered  there  was  little  necessity  for 
change  in  method.  Isolation  afforded  the 
best  guarantee  for  our  security,  and  the 
ocean  provided  an  effectual  barrier  for  possi- 
ble diplomatic  shortcomings.  The  Spanish 
War,  with  the  responsibilities  it  created, 
sharply  marks  the  inauguration  of  a  new 
era  in  the  country's  development,  the  impor- 
tance of  which  history  will  only  accentuate. 
But  nowhere  have  its  effects  been  more 
marked  and  less  realized  than  in  our  diplo- 
matic position.  We  have  readily  appre- 
ciated the  difference  made  in  our  status 
from  a  colonial,  military,  naval,  even  from 
a  constitutional  standpoint.  To  a  less  de- 
gree have  we  been  conscious  of  the  change 
caused  in  our  international  relations. 

It  is  a  common  though  hardly  an  accu- 
rate remark  that  the  Spanish  War  awakened 
Europe  to  a  sense  of  our  greatness  as  a 
nation.  Though  this  was  true  of  the  masses 
on  the  Continent,  there  were  many  public 
men  abroad  fully  aware  of  our  resources 
and  our  capabilities.   It  was  rather  that  the 


58  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Old  World,  having  grown  accustomed  to 
consider  us  as  a  colossus  self-contained,  and 
voluntarily  abstaining  from  all  external  in- 
terference, suddenly  realized,  as  we  our- 
selves with  no  less  surprise  realized,  that 
that  day  was  over  and  that  henceforth  we 
were  ready  to  assume  our  part  in  the  world. 
With  justifiably  ambitious  views  of  the 
future  to  which  we  believe  our  destinies 
direct  us,  we  have  not  yet  renovated,  so  to 
speak,  the  mechanism  of  our  action.  Cer- 
tain of  our  methods  still  remain  unadapted 
to  new  conditions,  unchanged  from  what  they 
were  at  a  time  when  the  country's  responsi- 
bilities were  slight  and  its  foreign  problems 
simple.  We  still  view  international  relations 
with  the  same  directness  of  vision  as  before, 
without  fully  appreciating  the  possibilities 
which  lie  before  us  or  the  methods  which 
a  more  difficult  position  would  urge  us  to 
employ.  The  nation  at  large  is  hardly  con- 
scious that  we  have  to-day  outgrown  an 
antiquated  system  which  under  actual  con- 
ditions is  hardly  conducive  to  our  security. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  59 

Other  measures  have  become  necessary  in 
order  to  safeguard  the  foreign  relations  of 
a  great  state  that  has  to  defend  over-sea 
dependencies  and  a  policy  which  is  one 
of  the  greatest  burdens  ever  voluntarily 
assumed  by  any  nation. 

Although  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  passed 
into  an  article  of  national  creed  which,  irre- 
spective of  party,  appears  almost  axiomat- 
ieally  to  embody  our  foreign  policy,  the 
reverence  with  which  it  inspires  us  does  not 
equally  impress  other  nations.  It  would 
be  doing  the  country  poor  service  to  lull 
it  into  believing  that  the  European  powers 
accept  the  doctrine  in  the  same  spirit  as 
ourselves,  or  that  its  present  maintenance 
reposes  on  any  other  ultimate  basis  than 
that  of  force.  In  the  past  we  have  tacitly 
endeavored  to  secure  its  recognition  by 
abstaining  from  all  assertion  of  our  au- 
thority abroad.  We  treated  Europe  as  a 
monarchical  entity  and  expected  similar 
consideration  for  republican  institutions  in 
America.   But  we  lost  sight  of  the  fact  that 


60  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

when  this  policy  was  inaugurated  we  were 
in  no  position  to  warrant  the  great  Euro- 
pean powers  entering  into  such  a  bargain. 
Few  things  come  gratuitously,  particularly 
in  diplomacy.  When  in  later  years,  although 
able  to  make  our  voice  heard,  we  offered 
no  direct  compensation  in  return  for  favors 
we  did  not  ask,  other  nations  felt  under  no 
obligation  to  bind  themselves  to  the  accept- 
ance of  our  view. 

The  acquisition  of  the  Philippines,  re- 
sulting in  the  extension  of  American  power 
into  Asiatic  waters,  deprived  us,  in  the  mind 
of  Europe,  of  whatever  moral  justification 
we  might  previously  have  possessed  for  the 
Monroe  Doctrine.  According  to  the  idea 
that  had  been  prevalent  abroad,  the  sole 
basis  for  our  right  in  venturing  to  exclude 
the  Old  World  from  regarding  the  New  as  a 
field  for  further  colonial  aggrandizement  lay 
in  restricting  our  activities  to  the  western 
hemisphere.  The  fact  that  such  had  been 
our  course  since  the  birth  of  the  Republic 
appeared  to  give  additional  sanction  to  this 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  61 

idea.  When,  therefore,  the  Philippines  be- 
came an  American  possession,  we  seemed 
in  the  eyes  of  Europe  to  have  forfeited  all 
moral  claim  to  our  contention.  This  loss, 
however,  was  more  than  counterbalanced 
in  other  directions.  The  acquisition  of  new 
dependencies  and  the  vast  growth  of  Ameri- 
can influence  in  every  quarter  of  the  globe 
gave  us  a  prestige  far  more  diplomatically 
negotiable  than  the  position  we  had  left  be- 
hind. That  we  have  fully  availed  ourselves 
of  the  new  benefits  obtained  is,  however, 
questionable.  Antiquated  traditions  have 
caused  us  to  neglect  the  diplomatic  means 
wherewith  to  strengthen  our  position  and 
effect  a  security  for  our  policies  far  greater 
than  any  moral  right  could  ever  confer. 

The  nation,  peace-loving,  yet  determined 
at  all  costs  to  uphold  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
has  not  devoted  its  attention  toward  the 
pacific  methods  of  bringing  this  about.  We 
have  omitted  to  do  in  its  support  what 
powers  like  France  and  England,  in  the  face 
of  far  stronger  opposition  than  any  encoun- 


62  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

tered  by  us,  have  accomplished  in  countries 
where  their  action  was  less  justifiable  than 
our  own,  but  where  they  have  acquired  for 
their  position  a  sanction  which  the  acqui- 
escence of  the  only  powers  able  to  dispute 
their  titles  has  legitimized.  England,  for 
instance,  having  first  obtained  the  recogni- 
tion of  her  occupation  of  Egypt  from  the 
non-interested  powers,  secured  it  finally  by 
diplomatic  means  from  France,  in  spite  of 
the  latter's  previous  animosity,  which  on 
more  than  one  occasion  had  brought  the  two 
nations  to  the  verge  of  war.  Similarly  in  her 
seizure  of  Tunis,  France  first  obtaining  the 
aid  of  Germany,  eager  at  that  time  to  divert 
her  former  enemy  to  colonial  enterprises, 
and  later  winning  over  British  support,  her 
position  became  legalized  in  the  face  of  the 
hostility  of  Italy,  who  felt  unable  to  dis- 
pute it  single-handed  and  was  finally  forced 
to  content  herself  with  the  recognition  of 
shadowy  eventual  claims  over  Tripoli. 

We  have  been  unaccustomed  to  consider 
this  order  of  negotiation,  and  have  not  been 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  63 

aroused  by  lack  of  success  to  the  necessity  of 
taking  diplomatic  precautions.  Under  past 
conditions,  the  simplicity  of  our  former 
methods  and  requirements  was  suflficient  to 
permit  us  to  dispense  therewith.  But  now 
that  our  liabilities  have  more  than  kept  pace 
with  enjarged  resources  we  cannot  afford 
to  forget  the  hostility  which  the  "brazenly 
impudent"  Monroe  Doctrine,  as  Bismarck 
once  termed  it,  has  encountered  abroad,  or 
the  frank  denunciation  it  has  met  on  the 
part  of  public  men  and  political  writers  on 
the  Continent.  Although  this  animosity  is 
temporarily  quiescent,  our  diplomacy  has 
still  abundant  scope  before  it  in  endeavoring 
to  counteract  such  a  prejudice. 

But  for  the  Philippines  we  might  have 
been  indifferent  to  the  dislike  of  Europe.  To 
the  weakness  caused  by  our  pretensions  in 
South  America  we  have  added  the  weakness 
caused  by  Asiatic  acquisitions.  If  ever  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  is  challenged,  its  fate  may 
well  be  disputed  in  the  waters  of  Manila 
Bay.  There  exists,  however,  an  essential  dif- 


\ 


64  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

ference  in  the  degree  of  exposure  between 
our  position  in  the  Philippines  and  our 
assertion  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  While 
without  a  policy  of  understandings  the  se- 
curity of  the  former  can  hardly  be  assured, 
the  latter  may  be  safeguarded  by  obtaining 
its  recognition  from  the  only  powers  able 
to  challenge  it.  By  peaceful  methods,  as 
effectively  as  by  a  more  aggressive  policy, 
we  are  able  to  guarantee  its  preservation. 
No  nation  will  to-day  break  solemn  obliga- 
tions without  considerable  incentive  or  prov- 
ocation. If  ever  the  recognition  of  the  great 
European  powers  is,  therefore,  accorded  to 
a  policy  which  menaces  no  peace-loving 
state,  the  dangers  of  war  in  questions  rising 
out  of  the  interpretation  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  will  be  reduced  to  insignificance. 
Where  England  and  France  have  obtained 
the  acquiescence  of  other  powers  for  colo- 
nial ventures  of  questionable  character, 
we  can  secure  similar  recognition  for  our 
policy.  To  certain  nations  of  Europe  its 
acceptance  would   be  a  matter  of  indif- 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  65 

ference;  to  one  it  would  undoubtedly  be 
welcome. 

Great  Britain  has  often  given  us  the 
proof  of  her  sincere  friendship.  An  English 
statesman  first  suggested  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, and  the  strength  of  England  in  the 
days  of  our  weakness  made  possible  its 
preservation.  Great  Britain,  with  a  still 
dominant  trade  in  South  America,  is  almost 
as  interested  as  ourselves  that  no  portion  of 
that  continent  should  be  alienated  to  the 
advantage  of  any  European  power.  French 
interests  are  similar  to  those  of  England. 
Apart  from  the  natural  desire  to  round  out 
the  boundaries  of  her  great  African  empire, 
France  has  to-day  no  other  colonial  ambi- 
tion than  to  preserve  what  is  already  hers, 
least  of  all  one  of  the  serious  nature  which 
the  challenge  of  our  policy  would  require. 
And  although  the  doctrine  has  in  itself  been 
an  object  of  dislike  to  certain  French  polit- 
ical writers,  the  influence  of  their  ideas, 
which  tended  in  another  sphere  toward  alli- 
ance with  Germany  and  a  European  con- 


66  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

federation,  has  greatly  diminished  in  recent 
years. 

In  Russia,  as  well,  we  have  often  found 
a  friend  who  would  be  the  more  ready  to 
recognize  our  contention  in  South  America, 
as  she  is  herself  without  ambitions  or  inter- 
ests in  the  western  hemisphere. 

Only  two  European  powers  are  conceiv- 
ably likely  at  any  time  to  challenge  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  and  one  of  these  could 
not  be  in  a  position  to  do  so  for  many  years. 
Germany  and  Italy  are  alike  in  possessing 
great  interests  in  South  America.  The  dan- 
ger of  interference  by  the  former  in  south- 
ern Brazil  has  been  frequently  commented 
upon,  and  although  the  present  cordial  re- 
lations existing  between  the  German  Em- 
pire and  ourselves  render  such  peril  for  the 
time  without  foundation,  in  certain  not 
impossible  events,  coupled  with  any  neglect 
in  our  own  watchfulness,  it  cannot  be  said 
that  the  temptation  for  German  interven- 
tion in  South  America,  with  its  inevitable 
results,  would  not  present  itself.   It  would 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  67 

certainly  be  dangerous  to  interpret  Ger- 
many's consulting  us  in  her  recent  difficul- 
ties with  Venezuela  as  an  indication  of  her 
formal  subscription  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
The  convenience  of  negotiation  might  cause 
her  to  treat  with  us  repeatedly  without 
further  binding  her  to  the  recognition  of 
any  such  principle.  It  may  be  well  to  recall 
Napoleon  the  Third's  words  to  Slidell,  that 
in  diplomacy  nothing  was  held  to  exist  that 
had  not  formally  been  written.  (Had  M. 
Delcasse  remembered  this,  he  could  not 
have  made  the  mistake  of  believing  that 
Germany  assented  to  his  Moroccan  policy.) 
While  any  challenge  of  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine may  safely  be  set  aside  so  long  as  our  ^^^ 
naval  strength  makes  us  a  formidable  an- 
tagonist, it  is  doubtful  if  Germany  or  any 
other  nation  would  attach  importance  to 
inferences  which  might  be  drawn  from  past 
acts,  provided  the  existing  incentive  was 
adequate  and  the  danger  of  action  reduced 
to  insignificant  proportions.  Unless  a  na- 
tion's hands  are  formally  tied  by  written 


68  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

agreement,  its  acceptance  of  the  Monroe  or 
any  other  doctrine  against  its  own  interests 
cannot  be  presupposed. 

The  fear  of  Italian  interference  is  fortu- 
nately very  remote,  and  Italy's  recent  arbi- 
tration treaty  with  the  Argentine  proves  the 
peaceful  intentions  of  her  present  policy. 
Misfortunes  in  Abyssinia  have  for  the 
time  removed  from  her  all  taste  for  colonial 
ventures.  But  Italy,  rapidly  growing  in  na- 
tional wealth  and  strength,  wishes  to  regard 
herself  as  the  successor  of  Imperial  Rome. 
Her  present  policy  is  based  on  the  preserva- 
tion of  existing  conditions  until  such  time  as 
she  may  be  better  able  to  avail  herself  of  op- 
portunities. While  the  inflammable  nature 
of  her  masses  is  to-day  held  in  restraint  by 
an  able  governing  power,  a  real  or  fancied 
grievance  suffered  in  a  moment  of  violence 
by  Italians  in  South  America,  such  as  once 
took  place  at  New  Orleans,  might,  without 
attention  on  our  part,  lead  to  consequences 
antagonistic  to  our  policies.  We  cannot  for- 
get that  in  several'of  the  South  American 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  69 

states,  notably  in  the  Argentine,  the  Italians 
are  the  dominant  foreign  element,  and  that 
the  national  ethos  of  the  Latin  republics  is 
not  always  strong  enough  to  cause  emi- 
grants to  forget  the  links  that  bind  them  to 
the  land  of  their  origin.  Fortunately  the 
many  existing  ties  of  friendship  between 
Italy  and  ourselves,  which  were  strengthened 
by  the  aid  it  was  our  privilege  to  extend 
during  the  recent  Messina  disaster,  render 
most  unlikely  any  difference  between  two 
states  possessing  so  many  mutual  sympa- 
thies. 

The  day  may  never  come  when  either 
Germany  or  Italy  will  seek  to  interfere  in 
the  affairs  of  the  southern  continent.  But 
a  nation,  like  the  human  body,  acts  differ- 
ently under  the  stress  of  feverish  excite- 
ment, 'a he  wisdom  of  diplomacy  lies  in 
removing  possible  causes  of  friction  be- 
tween countries  during  normal  conditions. 
It  would  be  prudence  to  endeavor  to  se- 
cure from  these  powers  at  a  time  when 
no  popular  passions  have  been  aroused. 


-i 


70  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

when  neither  national  pride  nor  interests 
are  at  stake,  and  when  only  the  friendliest 
relations  exist  between  them  and  ourselves, 
a  recognition  of  the  principles  underlying 
the  Monroe  Doctrine.  If  the  acquiescence 
of  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Russia  were 
obtained,  Italy  would  hardly  care  to  place 
herself  in  opposition  to  subscribing  thereto. 
And  with  the  example  of  the  other  powers, 
Germany  and  her  Austrian  ally  value  our 
amity  too  greatly  to  take  a  position  which 
could  be  interpreted  as  unfriendly.  Ger- 
man diplomacy,  realizing  that  such  attitude 
on  her  part  would  tend  to  draw  us  closer  to 
England,  is  far-sighted  enough  to  accord 
her  recognition  in  this  event  to  our  South 
American  policies. 

With  the  Monroe  Doctrine  thus  officially 
recognized  by  the  only  powers  in  position  to 
dispute  it,  its  security  would  be  as  effica- 
ciously guaranteed  as  by  more  aggressive 
means.  Even  were  we  otherwise  unable  to 
obtain  such  recognition,  opportunities  have 
not  been  wanting  to  secure  it  where  we 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  71 

might  have  found  the  leverage  necessary  to 
effect  diplomatic  action.  For  instance,  the 
United  States  had  been  invited  to  participate 
in  the  conference  which  met  in  1885  to  settle 
the  future  of  the  Congo  and  resulted  in 
dividing  the  then  unapportioned  remainder 
of  Central  Africa.  Our  refusal  to  profit  by 
its  decisions,  which  our  delegate  had  been 
instrumental  in  bringing  about,  may  have 
been  justified  at  a  time  when  we  were  not 
yet  a  colonizing  power;  but  the  acquisition 
of  even  a  tract  of  African  jungle  might  have 
been  of  service  later  in  securing,  in  exchange 
for  its  cession  or  lease  to  some  more  inter- 
ested power,  the  recognition  on  its  part  of 
the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

Certain  more  recent  opportunities  al- 
lowed to  slip  occurred  during  the  Algeciras 
Conference.  Germany  on  that  occasibn,  in 
order  to  justify  her  position  and  give  equity 
to  a  procedure  the  high-handedness  of 
which  did  not  escape  the  criticism  of  neu- 
trals, had  placed  herself  upon  a  self-deny- 
ing basis  and  proclaimed  as  her  intention 


72  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

the  laudable  desire  to  safeguard  the  in- 
tegrity of  Morocco.  Her  position  towards 
that  state  was,  with  far  less  justification, 
analogous  to  the  one  we  occupy  towards 
South  America.  But  in  spite  of  the  appar- 
ent justice  of  her  contention,  save  for  Aus- 
tria, Germany  could  find  for  it  no  support 
from  any  of  the  great  European  powers, 
whose  aid  had,  for  different  reasons,  already 
been  pledged  to  France.  Germany's  efforts 
were  therefore  directed  to  winning  us  over 
to  her  side.  As  the  only  great  power 
enjoying  complete  freedom  of  action,  our 
role  permitted  considerable  latitude.  But 
though  its  possibilities  were  wisely  utilized, 
our  disinterestedness  might,  perhaps,  have 
been  coupled  with  a  vigilant  diplomacy  in 
enlarging  the  scope  of  the  German  conten- 
tion. Germany,  professing  eagerness  to 
preserve  the  integrity  of  Morocco  as  a  field 
of  equal  opportunity  for  all,  would  hardly 
at  the  same  time  have  acknowledged  enter- 
taining designs  of  a  different  order  in  the 
western  hemisphere.    While  her  diploma- 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  73 

tists  were  endeavoring  to  win  us  over  to 
their  support,  if  a  proposition  had  been 
advanced  aimed  at  guaranteeing  the  in- 
tegrity of  South  America,  in  the  same  way 
as  Germany  had  put  herself  forward  as  the 
champion  of  Morocco,  it  would  have  been 
difficult  for  her  to  refuse  us  formal  assur- 
ances regarding  the  future  of  the  Spanish 
republics.  A  pledge  thus  secured  might  on 
a  later  occasion  have  been  an  important 
factor  in  the  preservation  of  peace.  The 
hands  of  a  nation  are  tied  once  it  has  made 
official  declarations;  and  though  history 
shows  how  conventions  have  been  violated, 
a  country  will  be  far  more  likely  to  abstain 
from  action  when  it  has  given  pledges  than 
where  none  have  been  forthcoming.  We 
have  only  to  remember  how  the  French 
omission  to  consult  Germany  in  her  Mo- 
roccan venture  was  utilized  by  the  latter  as 
the  excuse  for  an  interference  which  brought 
the  two  nations  to  the  verge  of  war.  By  our 
neglect  to  commit  the  Great  Powers  to  a 
recognition  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  we 


74  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

have  lost  a  point  in  our  favor  which  in  a 
future  period  of  strained  relations  might 
conceivably  have  swayed  a  wavering  bal- 
ance in  the  direction  of  peace. 

Another  opportunity  occurred  at  the 
same  conference  in  connection  with  the 
Moroccan  state  bank.  Its  foundation  was 
exceptional  in  every  way.  But  in  semi-civil- 
ized states  commerce  and  diplomacy  are 
intimately  connected.  The  bank  share  in 
question,  to  which  we  were  entitled,  was 
first  accepted  by  us  and  then  allowed  to 
drop.  The  unprecedented  inconvenience 
in  the  government's  ownership  of  foreign 
bank  stock,  and  the  difficulties  of  its  dis- 
posal to  a  private  concern,  are  obvious. 
Representation,  however,  in  the  state  bank 
of  Morocco  would  have  given  us  an  entirely 
unexpected  leverage  to  advance  our  com- 
mercial interests  in  that  country,  and  have 
placed  us  on  a  footing  of  equality  with  na- 
tions far  more  directly  concerned  than  our- 
selves. A  less  scrupulous  diplomacy  might, 
perhaps,  have  utilized  such  share  for  still 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  75 

another  purpose.  Even  had  it  been  of  no 
immediate  advantage  to  us,  it  would  always 
have  been  so  to  a  nation  like  France,  pos- 
sessed of  special  interests  and  ambitions  in 
Morocco.  And,  although  its  direct  control 
could  not  have  been  ceded  to  any  for- 
eign power,  it  is  easy  to  imagine  circum- 
stances effecting  the  same  purpose  in  return 
for  equivalent  advantages  obtained  else- 
where. The  French  possessions  in  the  West 
Indies  and  off  the  St.  Lawrence  are  now  of 
little  use  to  her,  but  would  be  of  consider- 
able importance  to  us.  In  the  Moroccan 
bank  share,  which  after  having  claimed  we 
refused,  there  was  lost  to  us  a  negotiable 
asset,  so  to  speak,  for  the  furtherance  of 
our  American  policies. 

We  have  not  availed  ourselves,  in  the 
past,  of  the  natural  diplomatic  advantages 
which  so  often  befall  nations.  We  have 
been  too  self-centred  over  matters  which  ap- 
peared of  more  immediate  concern,  to  have 
noticed  distant  events  from  which,  without 
risk  or  loss,  we  might  have  profited.   Simi- 


76  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

lar  opportunities  unnecessary  to  mention, 
but  where  we  could  have  gained  substantial 
advantages,  have  arisen  elsewhere;  they 
are  likely  to  occur  again.  The  remedy  lies 
with  our  diplomacy  to  prevent  such  chances 
from  again  being  lost.  By  diplomacy  as 
well  as  with  battleships  we  can  seek  the 
advancement  of  our  policies  and  the  safe- 
guarding of  our  possessions. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  LATIN  REPUBLICS 

The  victory  of  a  republican  movement 
parallel  to  our  own,  which  resulted  in  liber- 
ating the  greater  part  of  the  New  World 
from  the  domination  of  the  Old,  could  have 
been  viewed  by  us  only  with  sympathy.  We 
welcomed  as  a  complement  to  our  own 
Revolution  the  success  of  the  Spanish 
colonies  in  establishing  their  independence, 
both  by  reason  of  the  extension  given  to 
the  republican  idea  and  because  it  re- 
moved so  great  a  portion  of  the  western 
hemisphere  from  the  field  of  European 
politics. 

The  real  beginning  of  our  interest  in 
Spanish  America  dates,  however,  from  the 
declaration  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  In 
proclaiming  this  we  did  not  incur  the  risk 
of  war  with  Europe  merely  because  of 
friendship  for  struggling  newborn  states,  or 


78  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

for  any  abstract  sentiment  in  favor  of  a  form 
of  government  which  was  frequently  to  be- 
come a  cover  for  dictatorship.  Our  deter- 
mination to  resist  any  extension  of  foreign 
influence  was  due  to  the  nation's  profound 
conviction  that  its  own  vital  interests  would 
thereby  be  imperiled.  American  foreign 
policy  has  nowhere  been  more  successful 
than  in  securing  the  possibility  for  the  New 
World  to  develop  free  from  European  in- 
terference. But  the  celebrity  achieved  by 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  obscured  the  real 
nature  of  our  intercourse  with  our  southern 
neighbors.  Superficially  the  doctrine  has 
appeared  to  sum  up  the  different  aspects  of 
our  diplomacy  toward  them.  In  reality  it 
has  had  but  little  to  do  with  such  relations. 
In  the  past,  present,  and  future  it  repre- 
sents a  permanent  policy  toward  European 
but  not  toward  American  states.  Its  rela- 
tion to  the  latter  may  be  likened  to  an  outer 
wall  on  which  we  have  mounted  guard  to 
permit  their  free  development.  Behind  it 
a  series  of  American  policies,  moulded  in 


THE  LATIN  REPUBLICS  79 

each  case  by  the  special  exigencies  of  our 
position,  still  remains  to  be  formed. 

Our  relations  with  the  Spanish  republics 
are  far  too  diverse  to  be  embraced  by  any 
single  formula.  Their  varying  geographi- 
cal situation,  even  if  no  other  cause  were 
present,  would  necessarily  be  productive  of 
different  degrees  of  diplomatic  interest  on 
our  part.  Thus  it  is  apparent  that  the 
Caribbean  concerns  us  more  intimately 
than  the  south  Atlantic.  Our  policy  in 
Cuba  could  manifestly  not  be  repeated  in 
Chili,  while  in  Salvador  we  should  act  other- 
wise than  in  Paraguay.  The  foreign  policy 
of  any  nation  is  dictated  by  its  require- 
ments, and  the  necessities  of  our  position 
are  far  from  uniform.  But  in  a  general 
way  the  Orinoco  may  be  said  to  provide  a 
natural  division  for  our  policies  in  South 
America.  The  interest  we  feel  in  the  great 
states  to  the  south  of  it,  Brazil  and  the 
Argentine,  is  eminently  one  of  disinterested 
friendliness,  aiming  principally  to  cultivate 
closer  commercial  intercourse.   Moreover, 


80  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

the  contemplated  increase  in  the  arma- 
ments of  the  larger  South  American  repub- 
lics, coupled  with  their  growing  importance 
as  nations,  bids  fair  in  time  to  make  these 
independent  of  our  aid. 

For  the  maintenance  of  such  relations  as 
we  may  wish  to  preserve  with  these  states 
we  must  prepare  other  measures  than  a  mere 
assertion  of  common  Americanism.  The 
bond  that  unites  us  is  hardly  more  evident 
than  is  the  Europeanism  linking  together 
a  Norwegian  and  a  Greek,  and  the  amica- 
ble sentiments  exchanged  over  toasts  and 
telegrams  rest  on  a  fragile  basis  so  long  as 
our  means  of  communication  remain  un- 
improved. It  is  difficult  to  convince  the 
inhabitant  of  Buenos  Ayres  or  of  Rio  de 
Janeiro  of  the  proximity  of  mutual  inter- 
ests when,  in  order  to  reach  North  America, 
he  finds  himself  obliged  to  go  by  way  of 
Europe.  A  direct  communication  between 
our  ports  and  theirs  is  as  much  a  political  as 
it  is  a  commercial  necessity.  For  our  trade 
in  almost  every  South  American  country. 


THE  LATIN  REPUBLICS  81 

badly  crippled  by  the  present  inadequate 
system,  finds  itself  relegated  to  an  inferior 
position.  In  order  to  justify  the  paramount 
title  to  which  we  lay  claim  in  the  Spanish 
republics,  it  still  remains  for  us  to  prove 
the  superiority  of  our  interests  to  those  of 
Great  Britain,  of  Germany,  and  of  France, 
whose  capital  has  constructed  most  of  their 
railways  and  financed  their  national  and 
municipal  loans 

On  the  Pacific  coast  we  are  fortunately  in 
better  position.  After  developing  Mexico, 
our  engineers  have  descended  into  Central 
America,  where  the  rails  they  are  laying  will 
one  day  serve  as  links  for  the  Pan-American 
road.  In  Peru,  and  now  in  Bolivia,  our 
enterprise  has  not  been  behindhand.  But 
we  have  still  considerable  to  accomplish 
to  overtake  the  financial  and  industrial 
efforts  of  European  powers  in  their  South 
American  enterprise. 

Europe  has  long  since  awakened  to  the 
importance  of  Spanish  America  as  a  neutral 
market  that  will  not  soon  be  closed  to  the 


r 


82  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

products  of  manufacturing  countries.  We, 
too,  need  anticipate  there  no  discriminating 
tariff  to  bar  our  exports,  while  the  increase 
of  trade  relations  should  be  of  mutual  ad- 
vantage. Our  political  interests  can  there- 
fore be  confined  to  the  grateful  task  of 
assuming  obligations  without  demanding 
corresponding  equivalents.  Our  fleet  is  the 
pledge  we  extend  to  exclude  the  possibility 
of  European  interference.  We  need  ask  for 
nothing  in  return,  since  we  desire  nothing 
save  the  continuance  of  existing  political 
conditions. 

Our  diplomacy  has,  however,  to  assert 
itself  more  emphatically  in  Venezuela,  Co- 
lombia, and  the  West  Indian  and  Central 
American  republics,  whose  harbors  com- 
mand the  approaches  of  the  Panama  CanaK 
The  cutting  of  the  isthmus  and  the  new 
importance  of  the  Pacific  force  us  to  real- 
ize that  whatever  consequence  we  formerly 
attached  to  the  Caribbean  has  been  im- 
measurably increased  since  the  West  Indies 
are  to  become  a  highroad  to  the  Pacific, 


THE  LATIN  REPUBLICS  8S 

instead  of  a  blind  alley  as  heretofore.  In 
determining  the  limits  of  our  influence  we 
must  apply  there  what  might  be  termed  a 
Caribbean  policy,  in  distinction  from  our 
relations  with  the  other  South  American 
states,  whose  geographical  situation  renders 
them  of  less  vital  importance. 

It  is  fortunate  for  us  that  the  countries 
whose  ports  in  unfriendly  hands  might 
prove  a  menace  to  us  are  debarred  by  their 
weakness  from  the  possibility  of  taking 
offensive  action.  It  is  less  fortunate  that 
their  weakness  should  not  have  constituted 
a  pledge  against  their  misconduct.  Vene- 
zuela has  so  often  in  recent  years  ruflSed  by 
misdeeds  the  diplomatic  calm  of  nations, 
that  our  solicitude  in  her  behalf  has  arisen 
rather  from  the  fear  lest  justifiable  redress 
be  sought  from  her  by  foreign  powers  whose 
action  would  necessarily  take  place  in 
waters  of  peculiar  importance  to  us.  Both 
Venezuela  and  Colombia  must  always  pos- 
sess for  us  a  special  interest,  due  to  their 
coast  line,  which  assimilates  them  to  the 


84  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

other  Caribbean  nations,  while  their  close 
proximity  to  the  isthmus  makes  it  necessary 
at  all  cost  to  preserve  their  independence 
and  guarantee  their  territory,  even  against 
themselves. 

The  two  states  enjoy  an  altogether 
anomalous  situation,  their  position  offering 
in  certain  respects  an  American  analogy  to 
the  problem  of  the  Dardanelles.  In  the 
same  way  that  England  has  twice  saved 
Turkey  from  dismemberment  in  order  to 
prevent  these  straits  from  falling  into  the 
hands  of  a  stronger  power,  it  must  be  our 
object  to  preserve  the  inviolability  of  both 
countries,  whatever  be  the  provocation  they 
give. 

In  connection  with  this,  a  word  may  be 
said  of  a  frequent  cause  of  dispute  with 
the  Latin  republics,  and  particularly  with 
Venezuela.  Besides  foreigners  who  possess 
perfectly  legitimate  business  interests  in 
Spanish  America,  there  are  others  who, 
actuated  by  the  hope  of  larger  profits, 
employ    more  questionable    methods.     In 


THE  LATIN  REPUBLICS  85 

return  for  special  advantages  or  the  expec- 
tation of  future  benefits,  it  often  happens 
that  they  afiiliate  themselves  unduly  either 
with  the  government  of  to-day,  who  may 
be  the  revolutionaries  of  to-morrow,  or  the 
revolutiojiaries  of  to-day,  who  may  be  the 
government  of  to-morrow.  In  either  in- 
stance, reprisals  in  the  nature  of  fines  or 
confiscations  are  likely  to  occur,  and  out  of 
these  grow  claims  for  damages  which  our 
government  as  well  as  others  has  frequently 
been  called  upon  to  enforce.  Such  penal- 
ties, however,  are  nearly  always  imposed  by 
decision  of  the  country's  highest  court, 
which,  outwardly  at  least,  complies  with 
the  customary  judicial  forms. 

It  matters  little  that  such  courts  are  tools 
in  a  dictator's  hands,  and  that  legally  their 
verdict  may  be  questionable.  If  we  op- 
posed our  own  administrative  judgment  to 
their  judicial  authority,  whatever  might  be 
our  right  in  substance,  we  should,  in  view 
of  the  high,  equitable  stand  we  have  always 
taken  in  such  matters,  err  in  form.  Remedy 


86  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

exists,  it  is  true,  in  the  procedure  of  sum- 
mary arbitration  provided  for  by  the  recent 
Hague  Conference,  but  this  has  still  to 
prove  its  acceptability.  It  might  be  well, 
therefore,  to  prepare  for  contingencies  of 
refusal,  and  either  enlarge  the  jurisdiction 
of  one  of  our  own  superior  federal  courts, 
or  else  establish  a  tribunal  which  might 
equitably  apportion  the  extent  and  nature 
of  claims  of  this  nature  prior  to  their  being 
filed.  Whatever  be  the  legal  competence 
of  the  State  Department,  its  opinion  in 
points  of  law  cannot  carry  with  it  the  same 
authority  before  the  nation  or  before  the 
world  as  would  that  of  a  properly  consti- 
tuted court.  Moreover,  since  the  efforts  to 
adjudicate  possible  claims  have  necessarily 
to  pass  through  diplomatic  channels  at 
some  stage,  it  would  be  placing  the  govern- 
mental department  concerned  with  foreign 
affairs  in  an  unfair  position,  to  demand  that 
it  both  judge  and  enforce  its  judgment. 
Our  diplomacy  would  escape  much  un- 
necessary and  unjust  criticism   if,   before 


THE  LATIN  REPUBLICS  87 

pressing  for  the  settlement  of  any  claim 
against  certain  countries,  we  should  insist 
on  its  first  being  examined  and  passed  on  by 
a  competent  tribunal.  This  accomplished, 
public  opinion  will  judge  as  to  the  relative 
merit  of  our  courts  in  comparison  with 
those  of  states  like  Venezuela;  but  without 
this  we  lay  ourselves  open  to  the  charge  of 
having  used  violence  to  enforce  doubtful 
claims  against  a  weaker  power. 

While  we  could,  if  necessary,  overrun  or 
occupy  without  great  impediment  any  of 
the  West  Indian  or  Central  American  states, 
our  action  in  South  America,  were  it  ever 
to  extend  beyond  the  limits  of  diplomacy, 
would  experience  diflSculty  in  going  beyond 
the  seizure  of  ports  and  the  blocking  of 
rivers.  Hence  Venezuela  and  Colombia 
stand  in  peculiar  relation  to  our  policy,  en- 
joying practical  invulnerability  by  nature 
of  their  continental  position.  Their  high- 
lands sloping  from  the  coast  mark  the  bar- 
rier we  must  impose  as  a  southern  limit  to 
our  active  intervention. 


88  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Elsewhere  in  the  Caribbean  our  position 
may  be  compared  to  that  of  the  owner  of  a 
great  estate  surrounded  by  smaller  neigh- 
bors. While  disposed  to  leave  these  in  un- 
disturbed possession,  should  their  property 
come  into  the  market  we  should  regard  its 
acquisition  prudent,  to  save  it  from  falling 
into  other  hands.  In  Great  Britain  and, 
in  lesser  degree,  in  France,  Holland,  and 
Denmark,  we  have  neighbors  with  whom 
our  future  relations  are  likely  to  be  as  sin- 
cerely cordial  as  are  our  present.  We  have 
neither  incentive  nor  desire  to  disturb  their 
actual  colonial  possessions.  But  if  for  any 
reason  there  should  ever  be  the  wish  to  dis- 
pose of  these,  we  are  not  likely  to  repeat  our 
former  error  in  neglecting  to  acquire  St. 
Thomas.  And  in  case  circui_xstances  place 
us  again  in  possession  of  territorial  or  dip- 
lomatic advantages  in  other  regions  of  the 
globe,  our  statesmen  may  find  therein  useful 
pawns  to  offer  in  exchange  for  islands  closer 
to  our  shores. 

The  nation's  policy  demands  that  we  im- 


THE  LATIN  REPUBLICS  89 

pose  in  the  Caribbean  the  pax  Americana 
by  refusing  to  permit  in  it  the  turbulence 
so  often  provocative  of  foreign  interference. 
In  so  doing,  Porto  Rico,  Cuba,  and  San 
Domingo  offer  the  precedents  for  our  fu- 
ture action.  The  one  presents  a  final  goal 
toward  which  our  policy  must  tend;  the 
others,  intermediary  stages  in  the  same  pro- 
cess. The  possession  of  Porto  Rico  has 
firmly  established  us  as  a  West  Indian 
power,  and  our  action  in  Cuba  inaugurated 
the  beginning  of  a  new  policy  toward  the 
islands  within  our  national  orbit.  When 
for  the  second  time  American  intervention 
had  been  invoked,  the  world  marveled  at 
the  political  suicide  Cuba  was  supposed  to 
have  committed.  It  is  characteristic  of  our 
generosity  that  we  pledged  ourselves  to  re- 
store the  Cuban  republic  as  soon  as  order 
had  been  established,  but  we  thereby  like- 
wise tied  our  hands  by  an  unexpected  de- 
claration and  put  off  an  almost  inevitable 
result.  The  laws  of  gravitation  operate 
with  states  as  with  planets,  and  the  ultimate 


90  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

future  of  Cuba  can  hardly  be  doubted. 
Nor  need  our  present  forbearance  be  re- 
gretted if  the  American  people  learn  from 
it  the  necessity  devolving  upon  them  of 
insuring  stable  government  at  their  doors. 
The  long  road  we  are  now  traveling  in 
Cuba  in  order  to  achieve  a  predestined  re- 
sult may  serve  at  least  to  abridge  later  steps 
when  next  a  similar  contingency  presents 
itself. 

A  different  stage  in  our  intervention  is 
now  witnessed  in  San  Domingo,  where,  with 
no  risk  to  ourselves,  we  are  showing  how 
the  muddled  finances  of  a  country  can  be 
placed  on  a  sound  basis  of  credit,  and  have 
the  opportunity  of  acting  in  a  disinterested 
capacity  without  imposing  an  unwelcome 
interference. 

The  justification  of  the  European  sys- 
tem of  colonization  over  already  populated 
areas  has  always  been  that,  whenever  the 
conditions  of  disorder  in  a  country  are  such 
that  the  principle  of  authority  ceases  to 
exist  and  a  menace  is  created  to  the  life  and 


THE  LATIN  REPUBLICS  91 

property  of  foreigners,  this  state  of  anarchy 
offers  sufficient  reason  for  the  interference 
of  a  more  powerful  nation  better  capa- 
ble of  maintaining  order.  In  the  western 
hemisphere  we  have  successfully  opposed 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  to  such  pretensions. 
But  we  should  be  lacking  in  equity  if  the 
result  of  our  policy  should  be  only  to  give 
a  guarantee  to  the  perpetuation  of  misrule 
and  the  freedom  from  molestation  of  a  fre- 
quently irresponsible  dictatorship.  The  jus- 
tice of  our  position  depends  upon  a  firm 
determination  to  remedy,  where  we  can,  the 
flagrant  abuses  which  would  otherwise  war- 
rant foreign  intervention;  and  since  it  is 
particularly  in  the  region  where  our  inter- 
ests are  most  vital  that  certain  states  appear 
unable  to  maintain  the  requisite  stability  of 
government,  it  becomes  our  duty  to  assist 
these.  \c;^^^N 

In  Mexico  we  have  to-day  an  orderly 
neighbor,  the  foundations  of  whose  pros- 
perity appear  to  be  solidly  laid.  Our  en- 
terprise and  capital  have  assisted  largely  in 


92  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

furthering  economic  expansion  south  of  the 
Rio  Grande.  But  to  what  extent  the  pre- 
sent conditions  of  order  are  due  to  the  sig- 
nal ability  of  its  President,  the  retirement 
of  Diaz  will  alone  prove.  Has  the  genius  of 
a  great  statesman  been  suflScient  to  instill 
habits  of  law-observance  and  a  conception 
of  representative  government  in  a  country 
unaccustomed  thereto?  The  capacity  of 
Mexico  as  a  modern  state  is  a  problem  that 
deeply  concerns  us,  not  only  because  it  is 
a  neighboring  country  wherein  we  have 
extensive  interests,  but  because  of  the  Cen- 
tral American  republics.  In  the  past  we 
have  protected  these  from  Mexican  en- 
croachments, and  even  less  could  we  per- 
mit a  change  in  their  status  now  that  they 
have  assumed  an  altogether  new  importance 
by  reason  of  the  Panama  Canal.  Their 
strategic  position,  commanding  its  northern 
approaches  on  both  the  Caribbean  and  the 
Pacific,  is  too  great  not  to  impose  on  our 
policy  the  desirability  of  continuing  the 
present  system  of  small  independent  states, 


THE  LATIN  REPUBLICS  93 

practically  under  our  protection  and  over 
whom  we  are  able  to  exert  influence  when 
necessary.  The  alternative  would  be  their 
union  with  Mexico  in  what  under  a  strong 
dictator  might  become  a  powerful  nation, 
possibly  antagonistic  to  our  policies  and 
able  to  invoke  the  intervention  of  foreign 
powers.  This  danger  can  be  effectually  pre- 
vented only  by  guaranteeing  their  present 
independence,  a  measure  in  line  with  our 
policy  of  years. 

There  exists  traditionally  what  might 
be  termed  an  unwritten  corollary  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  which  demands  that  the 
American  continent  be  not  made  the  scene 
of  such  territorial  partitions  and  seizures 
as  have  disgraced  European  warfare.  And 
while  we  cannot  lay  claim  to  having  fol- 
lowed this  with  strictness,  the  acquisition  of 
California  was  that  of  a  practically  unin- 
habited territory,  and  not  of  a  state  which, 
however  disorderly,  was  yet  self-governing. 
Further  land  we  neither  seek  nor  require, 
save  the  lease  of  such  coaling  stations  as 


94  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Amapala  Bay  on  the  west  coast  of  Central 
America,  the  possession  of  which  would 
offer  the  fleet  a  much-needed  strategic  base 
on  the  Pacific  close  to  the  canal,  while  our 
permanent  retention  of  a  small  armed  force 
at  this  junction  of  three  turbulent  republics 
would  act  as  a  wholesome  restraint  in  curb- 
ing local  revolution  and  assisting  the  main- 
tenance of  order. 

A  natural  sympathy  with  the  principle  of 
arbitration  has  caused  us  to  look  favorably 
on  the  recent  conference  of  Central  Ameri- 
can states  held  under  our  auspices.  It  is 
certainly  to  be  desired  that  it  fulfill  the  hopes 
of  its  promoters.  But  the  fear  may  be  ex- 
pressed that  these  states  are  not  yet  ripe 
for  the  principles  involved,  and  that  by  our 
assent  we  may  have  made  ourselves  party 
to  a  measure  which  will  possibly  deprive 
us  later  of  means  of  action  in  correcting 
injustice  when  committed.  Under  existing 
conditions  it  would  hardly  be  wise  for  us 
to  curtail  the  assertion  of  our  influence,  and 
any  forbearance  in  this  direction  out  of 


THE  LATIN  REPUBLICS  95 

respect  for  abstract  principles  would  only 
be  interpreted  as  a  weakness  which,  in  lands 
of  such  peculiar  interest  to  us,  might  lead 
to  fresh  disturbances. 

The  southern  limit  of  the  United  States  is 
no  longer  the  Rio  Grande,  but  the  Panama 
Canal,  and  although  our  territory  is  not  un- 
broken, our  influence  should  be.  The  Piatt 
amendment,  which  mapped  out  our  present 
policy  in  Cuba,  offers  a  guiding  precedent 
for  future  action  in  Central  America.  Nor 
is  it  believed  by  those  best  acquainted  with 
the  situation  that  any  insurmountable  dif- 
ficulty would  be  met  with  in  effecting  its 
acceptance  by  the  five  republics.  The  recog- 
nition of  some  such  principle  on  the  part 
of  all  the  states  bordering  on  the  Caribbean 
would  be  a  noteworthy  achievement  for 
our  diplomacy.  In  any  event,  it  is  most  im- 
portant that  our  envoys  should  everywhere 
occupy  in  the  Spanish  republics  a  para- 
mount position  as  friendly  advisers  to 
the  governments  to  which  they  find  them- 
selves accredited.   Their  disinterested  coun- 


i 


96  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

sel  tactfully  given  in  time  could  often  obviate 
entanglements  with  foreign  powers  and  thus 
relieve  us  from  having  recourse  to  pos- 
sible measures  as  necessary  as  they  would 
be  embarrassing.  Such  advice  could  be  suc- 
cessful, however,  only  if  the  influence  and 
sense  of  equity  of  our  envoys  were  to  be 
acknowledged  by  both  sides.  Our  policy 
should  therefore  aim  at  a  most  careful  se- 
lection of  diplomatic  representatives  who 
would  be  acquainted,  through  long  and  spe- 
cial training,  with  the  peculiar  problems 
they  would  be  called  on  to  handle.  More- 
over, it  should  endeavor  to  obtain  for  these 
higher  consideration  by  methods  similar 
to  those  employed  by  European  powers 
in  the  Orient.  Just  as  other  nations  have 
organized  picked  services  for  their  repre- 
sentation in  the  Levant  and  in  the  Far 
East,  a  like  necessity  impresses  itself  on  us 
in  Latin  America.  But  the  organization  of 
such  a  body  of  men  is  insufficient  without 
giving  it  a  prestige  and  advantages  which 
would  make  service  of  this  nature  prized 


THE  LATIN  REPUBLICS  97 

in  spite  of  undoubted  drawbacks  in  climate 
and  life.  The  failure  to  provide  advantages 
counterbalancing  the  hardships  would  only 
repeat  the  history  of  our  student  inter- 
preters in  China,  where  it  has  now  been 
found  necessary  to  remedy  a  condition 
which  left  within  the  service  chiefly  the 
inferior  men,  the  abler  ones  abandoning  it 
to  accept  more  lucrative  positions  in  com- 
mercial life.  It  would  be  no  less  short- 
sighted than  unworthy  of  us  as  a  nation,  to 
endeavor  to  dole  out  with  a  sparing  hand 
trifling  benefits  for  arduous  service  of  the 
nature  we  should  expect. 

The  government  ownership  of  suitable 
residences,  and  increases  of  pay  in  certain 
capitals,  would  do  much  to  mitigate  the 
present  unpopularity  from  which  Latin 
America  suffers  among  diplomatists,  while 
the  former  measure  ought  long  ago  to  have 
commended  itself,  if  on  no  other  ground 
than  as  a  national  investment  and  a  matter 
of  national  pride.  The  most  important  step 
is,  however,  for  our  representatives  to  enjoy 


08  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

when  possible  higher  diplomatic  rank  than 
that  of  their  colleagues.  The  European 
powers  have  been  accustomed  to  send  as 
their  envoys  to  the  Latin  American  coun- 
tries ministers  resident  or  plenipotentiary. 
In  the  same  way  France  out  of  compli- 
ment to  a  sister  republic  sends  an  ambas- 
sador to  Berne,  our  representative  could  in 
either  instance  be  of  a  higher  grade.  Hence 
the  recent  amendment  of  the  law  on  the 
creation  of  ambassadors  was  in  certain  re- 
spects unfortunate.  Instead,  for  instance, 
of  discouraging  Chili  from  sending  us  an 
envoy  of  the  highest  rank,  it  would  more 
likely  have  proved  to  our  advantage  to  have 
had  at  Santiago  an  oflScial  of  that  grade, 
who  by  virtue  of  his  grade  would  always 
have  been  dean  of  its  diplomatic  body. 

As  a  nation  we  are  disinclined  to  attach- 
ing significance  to  what  would  be  irrelevant 
forms  were  it  not  for  the  importance  at- 
tached thereto  by  other  nations.  With  our 
habits  of  thought  it  is  difficult  to  realize 
the  advantage  possessed  by  the  dean  of  the 


THE  LATIN  REPUBLICS  99 

diplomatic  body  not  only  in  prestige,  but  in 
all  questions  involving  concert  of  action. 
The  Spanish  republics,  however,  present  a 
field  where  American  diplomacy  may  often 
be  at  variance  with  that  of  the  European 
powers,  and  if  our  envoy  be  dean,  he  could 
at  times  prevent  possible  concert  on  the 
part  of  the  foreign  representatives  prejudi- 
cial to  our  interests.  Conversely,  it  is  not 
difficult  to  conceive  of  circumstances  where 
a  European  dean  might  make  use  of  his 
position  and  enlist  his  colleagues  in  a  com- 
mon action  far  from  agreeable  to  us. 

We  have  done  so  much  to  cultivate 
friendly  relations  with  our  southern  neigh- 
bors in  recent  years  that  it  is  unfortunate 
our  actions  should  at  times  have  been  mis- 
interpreted. That  a  more  correct  apprecia- 
tion of  our  motives  should  not  invariably 
have  existed,  can  in  a  certain  measure  be 
laid  down  at  the  door  of  diplomacy.  In  dip- 
lomatic intercourse  with  the  South  Amer- 
ican states  we  have  always  to  avoid  the 
strictures  of  unfriendly  criticism,  remember- 


100  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

ing  that  we  have  been  regarded  in  the  past 
with  a  not  unnatural  fear  and  distrust  by 
the  Latin  republics  lest  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine afford  a  subtle  means  of  drawing  them 
into  our  nets.  Pan-Iberism  has  been  op- 
posed to  Pan-Americanism;  "Against  Mon- 
roe we  will  pit  Monroe  and  a  half,"  a 
Brazilian  statesman  is  reported  to  have 
said.  In  Chili  especially  an  anti-American 
movement  had  asserted  itself,  and  the  idea 
was  even  mooted  of  a  Latin  American  con- 
federation, directed  as  much  against  us  as 
against  the  European  powers. 

Our  policy  of  benevolent  friendship  has 
not  always  been  appreciated  at  its  worth, 
and  we  have  found  ourselves  in  the  position 
of  having,  without  advantage  to  ourselves, 
given  unconscious  offense  to  nations  un- 
able to  retort  and  therefore  hypersensitive 
in  their  susceptibilities.  A  case  in  point 
occurred  during  the  recent  Pan-American 
Conference  at  Rio  Janeiro.  Our  delegation 
there  was  supposed  to  favor  a  so-called 
"monitor"  system,  whereby  it  was  intended 


THE  LATIN  REPUBLICS  101 

that  the  greater  powers  should  exercise  a 
general  surveillance  over  the  smaller  coun- 
tries in  curbing  their  turbulent  propensities 
and  keeping  the  peace.  While  the  inten- 
tion underlying  this  was  eminently  proper 
and  the  result  possibly  beneficial,  the  dif- 
ferentiation thus  suggested  among  Latin 
American  states  was  not  without  giving 
offense  to  the  weaker  countries  at  such  ex- 
pression of  their  inferiority.  Nor  is  it  cer- 
tain, even  if  there  existed  no  risk  of  the 
larger  powers  seeking  to  abuse  their  posi- 
tion, that  the  latter  would  be  better  able 
to  maintain  order.  The  annals  of  Uruguay 
are  perhaps  as  orderly  as  those  of  Brazil. 

It  is  not  difficult  to  see  that  the  beneficial 
results  of  our  policy  in  one  quarter  may  be 
nullified  by  unintentional  offense  given  else- 
where. Our  interests  are  everywhere  con- 
nected, and  concerted  action  is  no  less  ne- 
cessary on  the  part  of  diplomacy  than  in 
other  spheres.  The  recent  Hague  Confer- 
ence provides  further  illustration  of  this. 
Our  advocacy  there  of  compulsory  arbitra- 


102  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

tion,  while  proving  sympathy  for  humani- 
tarian ideals,  was  not  without  imperiling 
the  friendliness  of  relations  with  the  Latin 
republics.  Inseparably  connected  with  the 
principle  at  stake  was  the  creation  of  a  court 
to  judge  questions  of  arbitration,  and  our 
pitfall,  which  to  certain  powers  proved  not 
unwelcome,  lay  in  the  composition  of  this 
tribunal.  If  the  great  European  powers 
alone  had  been  concerned,  the  solution 
would  have  been  simple ;  but  it  was  appar- 
ent that  we  could  not  expect  these  to  allow 
questions  of  national  interest  to  be  decided 
by  the  judicial  representatives  of  Ecuador 
and  Paraguay.  And  while  an  ingenious 
compromise  smoothed  out  the  major  diffi- 
culties of  this  thorny  question,  in  view  of 
our  friendly  feeling  towards  Latin  America 
it  might  have  been  preferable  for  us  to 
have  expressed  our  adhesion  to  the  plan  of 
arbitration  presented  by  some  other  nation 
rather  than  to  have  proposed  it  ourselves. 
In  spite,  however,  of  certain  easily  reme- 
diable deficiencies,  our  relations  with  our 


THE  LATIN  REPUBLICS  103 

southern  neighbors,  owing  largely  to  the 
wise  policy  recently  pursued  with  eminent 
success,  have  never  been  so  cordial.  And 
since  our  friendship  is  sincere  and  our  inter- 
ests are  in  no  way  divergent,  there  is  every 
likelihood  of  the  present  amicable  senti- 
ments being  continued. 

Further  than  such  friendship  and  our 
self-imposed  unilateral  obligation  in  de- 
fending the  Monroe  Doctrine  it  would  be 
unwise  for  us  to  venture.  The  dream  of  a 
confederation  of  American  republics  headed 
by  us,  and  leagued  together  in  defense  of 
common  rights,  would  unfortunately  be 
mainly  impressive  by  the  number  of  its 
states.  It  could  not  be  regarded  as  a  safe 
working  basis  for  political  action  or  military 
defense,  nor  would  it  find  interest  in  our 
Asiatic  dependencies.  While  such  federa- 
tion might  prove  of  considerable  utility 
under  certain  conditions,  it  would  be  rather 
as  a  secondary  than  as  a  primary  basis  for 
defense.  An  understanding,  to  be  effective, 
can  be  contracted  only  with  naval  and  colo- 


104  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

nial  powers  of  the  first  magnitude,  having 
interests  similar  to  our  own. 

The  instability  of  many  of  our  southern 
neighbors  offers  both  the  cause  of  their 
weakness  and  the  reason  why  we  cannot 
blind  ourselves  to  the  responsibilities  which 
may  there  devolve  upon  us.  A  skilled  and 
watchful  diplomacy  maintained  by  us  in 
these  states,  however,  would  contribute 
more  than  anything  else  in  averting  this 
danger  and  extending  our  legitimate  influ- 
ence without  incurring  the  drawbacks  of 
new  and  undesired  possessions.  We  desire 
in  Latin  America  only  the  furtherance  of 
commercial  ties  and  the  preservation  of 
their  existing  independence.  In  our  own 
interest  we  can  wish  for  no  more. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  FAR  EAST 

Our  relations  with  the  Far  East  have 
pursued  a  distinct  course  since  the  early 
days  of  the  Republic  when  the  enterprise  of 
New  England  merchantmen  first  bore  the 
flag  into  Chinese  waters.  In  the  struggle  for 
commercial  success  in  the  Orient  we  were 
able  to  enter  on  an  equal  footing  with  the 
nations  of  Europe.  In  Japan  we  even  pre- 
ceded these  and  opened  the  Island  Empire 
to  the  commerce  of  the  world.  American 
intercourse  with  the  Far  East  stands  thus  on 
a  different  level  from  our  foreign  relations 
elsewhere.  We  have  abstained  from  all  in- 
terference in  Europe,  Africa,  and  the  Le- 
vant, and  rightly  upheld  preeminence  on  the 
American  continent;  in  the  extreme  Orient 
our  equality  with  the  European  powers  has 
from  the  first  been  asserted.  Geographi- 
cally, politically,  and  economically   alike, 


106  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

our  interests  predicated  the  position  we 
have  there  assumed. 

American  policy  in  the  extreme  Orient 
has  always  been  of  a  peaceful  and  commer- 
cialnature.  Where  Russia  and  France 
shaped  for  themselves  colonial  empires, 
where  Germany,  and  even  England,  were 
ready  to  share  in  the  spoils  of  an  antici- 
pated division  of  Chiiia,  we  have  wisely 
abstained  from  similar  attempts.  We  alone 
refrained  from  treating  the  Oriental  na- 
tions in  the  same  high-handed  manner  to 
which  they  were  subjected  at  the  hands 
of  European  powers.  Rather  have  we 
given  them  abundant  proof  of  the  sincerity 
of  our  friendship  and  the  equity  of  our 
conduct. 

Even  the  acquisition  of  the  Philippines, 
which  made  us  an  Asiatic  power,  did  not 
alter  previous  relations,  although  forcing 
us  to  consider  far  more  attentively  prob- 
lems that  had  before  been  remote.  Our 
possession  of  the  archipelago  disturbed  no 
balance  of  power,  cut  short  no  other  ambi- 


THE  FAR  EAST  107 

tions  than  those  of  Filipino  nationalism. 
We  entertained  no  further  territorial  desires 
in  the  Far  East,  nor  were  likely  ever  to 
do  so.  Hence  the  amicable  spirit  which  had 
characterized  our  former  intercourse  with 
China  and  Japan  bade  fair  to  be  continued. 
We  appeared  to  the  Orientals  as  the  one 
nation  in  whom  they  could  place  confidence, 
since  we  were  devoid  of  political  ambitions 
menacing  their  own. 

There  was  thus  no  reason  to  anticipate 
that  our  Far  Eastern  interests  need  ever  in 
the  future  clash  with  the  legitimate  aspi- 
rations of  these  powers.  No  fundamental 
differences  severed  us;  certainly  no  dif- 
ferences of  a  nature  necessitating  violent 
solution. 

Yet  out  of  this  clear  sliy,  after  a  half  cen- 
tury of  the  most  cordial  relations,  and  on 
the  morrow  of  a  period  during  which  we 
had  manifested  more  than  usual  friend- 
ship toward  Japan,  even  at  the  cost  of  a 
traditional  amity  with  Russia,  there  arose 
the  talk  of  war."*  From  a  trifling  matter  of 


108  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

school  attendance  the  question  was  broad- 
ened to  that  of  mastery  of  the  Pacific,  and 
sensation-mongers  exploited  that  cry  in 
justification  of  their  action.  Fortunately 
the  governments  of  both  nations  realized 
the  wicked  absurdity  of  a  contest  which 
would  have  no  object  and  would  settle  no 
question.  The  Pacific  is  easily  wide  enough 
for  both  Japan  and  America;  no  more  than 
the  Atlantic  can  any  one  power  now  domi- 
nate it. 

That  the  shipping  trade  of  the  western 
ocean  is  destined,  in  great  measure,  to  fall 
to  the  Japanese  can  hardly  be  doubted. 
Their  natural  aptitude  for  the  sea,  coupled 
with  a  cheap  standard  of  wages  and  an  in- 
ferior scale  of  living,  renders  their  competi- 
tion dangerous  not  only  for  us  but  for  every 
maritime  power.  The  very  few  American 
vessels  plying  the  Pacific  are  notoriously 
able  to  do  so  only  by  virtue  of  agreement 
with  the  Japanese  companies.  Without  this 
they  would  soon  be  driven  from  the  seas 
unless   provided   with  governmental   sub- 


THE  FAR  EAST  109 

sidies  of  more  liberal  nature  than  yet  con- 
templated. 

A  war  against  Japan  for  the  mastery 
ofx^n  ocean  over  which  American  vessels 
undei\normal  conditions  could  not  hope  to 
sail,  w<kild  thus  offer  but  a  sterile  victory 
for  our  shipping.  Moreover,  it  is  hardly 
likely  that  either  contestant  could  so  com- 
pletely crush  the  other  as  to  secure  its 
undisputed  supremacy.  Nor  ought  we  to 
forget  that  a  prosperous  Japan,  able  to  pur- 
chase our  exports,  is  in  many  ways  desirable 
to  us.  The  commercial  ties  binding  the  two 
natipns  work  for  their  mutual  benefit,  and 
the  buffering  of  one  cannot  but  react  on  the 
othe^.  Fortunately,  too  many  common  in- 
terestb  exist  for  the  diplomacies  of  both 
countries,  instead  of  running  counter,  not 
to  find  it  desirable  to  cooperate  in  neutral 
fields. 

Even  if  Japanese  protectionism  be  event- 
ually applied  to  Korea,  it  cannot  be  easily 
enforced  elsewhere  upon  the  Asiatic  main- 
land.   We  have  sought  to  profit  in  the  Far 


110  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

East  only  by  the  open  door  of  equal  oppor- 
tunity for  all,  and  Japan  has,  with  cause, 
pledged  herself  to  the  same  programme. 
Possessed  of  abundant  cheap  skilled  labor, 
resourceful  and  enterprising,  she  is  already 
underselling  her  commercial  rivals  in  many 
markets,  and  her  industry  has  no  need  to 
fear  the  competition  of  the  western  nations. 

The  source  of  the  present  difficulties  be- 
tween the  two  countries  is  based  rather  on 
the  white  workingman's  dread  of  the  vir- 
tues and  not  the  vices  of  the  yellow  races. 
The  Pacific  States  intend  to  remain  what 
has  become  vulgarly  known  as  a  "white 
man's  country,"  with  all  the  corollaries 
thereof  which  are  likely  to  become  multi- 
plying thorns  of  trouble  in  proportion  to  the 
growing  strength  of  Asiatic  powers.  With- 
out entering  into  the  moral  or  economic 
aspects  of  the  question,  we  must  well  under- 
stand that  henceforth  our  foreign  policy 
will  be  obliged  to  accept  this  attitude  as  a 
fundamental  condition  for  its  action. 

The  problem  is  no  new  one.   It  is  met 


THE  FAR  EAST  111 

with  in  every  land  where  a  white  self-gov- 
erning community  considers  itself  in  dan- 
ger through  the  economic  competition  of  the 
yellow  races.  The  novelty  of  the  present 
situation  arises  from  the  fact  that  for  the 
first  time  an  Asiatic  state  has  found  itself 
in  position  to  resent  the  discrimination  and 
insult  to  which  its  citizens  have  been  sub- 
jected. 

While  the  essential  features  of  the  ques- 
tion were,  perhaps,  unavoidable,  in  view  of 
the  violence  of  opinion  on  this  subject,  a 
similar  result  might  have  been  accomplished 
in  California  with,  perhaps,  less  slight  to 
Japanese  susceptibilities.  We  are,  as  a 
people,  too  little  conscious  of  the  importance 
of  form,  especially  in  dealing  with  a  highly 
sensitive  and  decorous  Oriental  race,  among 
whom  politeness  has  passed  into  a  second 
nature.  We  frequently  give  offense  where, 
with  a  little  care  and  under  a  slightly  dif- 
ferent form,  the  result  aimed  at  could 
have  been  otherwise  attained.  The  refusal, 
for  instance,  to  permit  Japanese  pupils  to 


112  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

attend  certain  San  Francisco  schools  was 
possibly  justified.  But  such  prohibition 
should  have  been  general  and  not  specific. 
Had  all  foreign  children  been  excluded, 
discrimination  could  not  have  been  alleged 
nor  offense  taken.  Individual  permission 
might  later  have  been  granted  exceptionally, 
no  matter  in  what  numbers,  and  the  same 
general  purpose  would  thereby  have  been 
achieved  if  even  a  very  few  Japanese  had 
been  included  in  order  to  take  the  force  out 
of  their  argument.  Needless  offense,  how- 
ever, was  given,  which  more  skillful  hand- 
ling could  probably  have  greatly  attenuated, 
even  had  it  not  altogether  removed  its 
ground.  It  is  certain  that  any  efforts  on  our 
part  to  avoid  giving  offense  to  the  pride 
of  the  Japanese  have  been  heartily  appre- 
ciated and  seconded  by  the  Mikado's  gov- 
ernment, which  desires  the  preservation  of 
friendly  relations  as  earnestly  as  does  our 
own.  Japan  still  owes  us  a  debt  of  grati- 
tude; and  though  a  certain  section  of  her 
public  opinion  may  be  trying  to  efface  its 


THE  FAR  EAST  113 

remembrance  by  directing  attention  to 
present  indignities,  enough  recollection  of 
former  friendship  still  remains  to  render 
unlikely  any  sudden  revulsion. 

If  there  is  no  reason  to  be  pessimistic 
with  regard  to  the  future,  undue  optimism 
is  hardly  less  dangerous.  The  present  set- 
tlement of  the  immigration  difficulties  is  of 
a  strictly  temporary  nature.  And  while  the 
Japanese  government  will  for  the  present 
restrain  emigration  and  continue  to  do  so 
as  long  as  it  suits  its  convenience,  the  vital 
question  at  issue  is  kept  in  suspense  and 
may  at  any  time  be  reopened.  Our  policy 
has  to  take  cognizance  of  these  conditions, 
and  our  diplomatic  position  at  its  point  of 
intersection  between  treaty  and  state  rights 
has  not  yet  achieved  permanent  results,  nor 
established  a  broad  harmonious  foundation 
for  our  future  relations  with  the  Island 
Empire. 

The  success  of  negotiations  between  na- 
tions usually  depends  on  the  concessions 
which  may  be  made  by  either  side  in  return 


114  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

for  proffered  equivalents.  We  have  been 
unduly  generous  in  the  past  in  bestowing 
diplomatic  favors  without  obtaining  or  even 
asking  compensation.  It  is  true  that  when, 
in  1894,  we  abandoned  our  extra-territorial 
privileges  in  Japan  we  obtained  the  treaty 
right  to  regulate  the  emigration  of  laborers, 
upon  which  rests  the  justice  of  our  present 
contention.  But  this  right  was  not  so  clearly 
indicated  and  defined  as  might  have  been 
desirable,  although  at  that  time  we  could 
more  easily  have  secured  concessions  than 
is  possible  to-day. 

Even  during  the  late  Russian  war  the 
more  than  benevolent  neutrality  and  sym- 
pathy shown  by  us  toward  the  Japanese, 
and  the  later  abandonment  of  our  legation 
at  Seoul,  which  we  were  the  first  to  give  up 
in  spite  of  our  great  interests  in  Korea,  were 
favors  freely  granted  without  return.  How- 
ever proper  may  have  been  our  action  in 
so  doing  —  and  generosity  on  the  part  of 
nations  is  not  always  an  unwise  policy  — 
it  is  conceivable  that,  had   compensation 


THE  FAR  EAST  115 

been  demanded,  it  would  have  been  to 
Japan's  interest,  at  a  time  when  her  na- 
tional energies  were  engaged  in  a  great  war, 
to  have  made  us  concessions  which  might 
have  prevented  the  present  difficulties  from 
arising.  Instead,  we  have  lately  found  our- 
selves in  a  position  where  negotiations  be- 
came necessary,  and  asking  for  favors  when 
we  had  no  longer  any  to  offer  in  exchange. 

The  demonstration  made  by  our  fleet's 
cruise  to  the  Pacific  and  thence  around  the 
world  has  proved  an  act  of  audacious  fore- 
sight. It  is  a  commonplace  to  say  that  the 
surest  guarantee  for  future  peace  is  the 
maintenance  of  so  large  an  armed  strength 
as  not  to  make  it  worth  another  nation's 
while  to  disturb  it. 

But  the  Tokio  government,  however  de- 
sirous to  avoid  war,  was  more  likely  to  turn 
a  deaf  ear  to  possible  popular  clamor  when 
conscious  of  the  magnitude  of  its  risk  than 
in  the  case  of  an  enterprise  presenting  no 
peril,  while  bellicose  clamor  on  the  part  of 
the  masses  was  also  less  likely  to  arise. 


116  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Frank  recognition  of  the  danger  of  war 
is  a  more  certain  means  of  preventing  its 
occurrence  than  the  refusal  to  admit  such 
possibility.  Such  danger  as  exists  to-day 
lies  in  chance  incidents  taking  place  on 
either  side,  as  unfortunate  as  they  may  be 
unforeseen.  The  violence  of  a  mob,  the  act 
of  a  lunatic,  is  sufficient,  once  popular  pas- 
sions have  been  aroused.  And  we  cannot 
afford  to  forget  that  in  the  event  of  conflict 
our  most  vulnerable  spots  would  be  Hawaii, 
where  more  than  half  the  population  is 
Japanese;  Alaska,  which  in  its  remote- 
ness and  uninhabited  condition  presents 
points  of  danger  like  another  Saghalien  to 
Russia;  and  the  Philippines.  With  regard 
to  the  latter  especially,  the  position  of  Japan 
would  not  be  dissimilar  to  our  own  at  the 
outbreak  of  the  Spanish  War.  We  had  then 
no  wish  for  the  islands  which  force  of  cir- 
cumstances were  to  place  in  our  possession. 
To-day  the  Japanese  assure  us  in  all  good 
faith  how  remote  is  their  desire  to  pos- 
sess them.   Nor  have  we  reason  to  doubt 


THE  FAR  EAST  117 

their  word.  Japan's  hands  are  tied  in  Ko- 
rea, where  a  sullenly  hostile  population 
has  caused  them  unforeseen  difficulties.  In 
Manchuria  and  China  their  course  has 
been  far  from  smooth,  and  the  pugnacious 
insistency  of  the  latter  power  in  questions  of 
Manchurian  jurisdiction  and  other  matters 
has  afforded  unexpected  surprises.  With 
Formosa  barely  pacified,  any  effort  to  ac- 
quire the  Philippines  would  involve  further 
drain  on  their  already  strained  resources  at 
a  time  when  they  are  traversing  a  financial 
crisis  and  have  to  face  budgetary  troubles. 
Moreover,  the  issue  of  the  war,  in  view 
of  our  present  superior  naval  strength, 
would  presumably  be  favorable  to  us.  On 
our  side  there  certainly  exists  no  desire  to 
spur  it  on.  While  Japan,  as  was  proved  by 
the  peace  of  Shimonoseki,  will  for  years 
smother  insults  until  strong  enough  to 
avenge  them,  yet  in  spite  of  weighty  consid- 
erations the  future  may  cause  present  prob- 
abilities of  peace  to  alter.  The  actual  dis- 
parity in  favor  of  our  sea  power  will  not  long 


118  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

continue  without  greater  efforts  on  our  part. 
Nor  can  we  forget  that  the  failure  of  Japan 
to  secure  the  much-coveted  indemnity  in  her 
recent  war  was  attributed  largely  to  our  in- 
tervention in  the  restoration  of  peace.  The 
capture  of  any  of  our  territory  in  the  event 
of  hostilities  might  easily  appear  to  the 
Japanese  imagination  as  a  surety  to  be  re- 
tained in  pledge  for  an  indemnity  of  which 
we  had  previously  deprived  them. 

Although  ominous  clouds  impend,  dan- 
ger will  be  remote  if  we  do  not  neglect  the 
natural  advantages  of  our  position,  dip- 
lomatic as  well  as  military.  We  have  in 
the  past  willingly  entered  into  cooperation 
with  other  powers  in  sanitary  matters  of 
mutual  interest.  A  similar  course  com- 
mends itself  in  questions  of  emigration. 
The  position  of  Australia,  of  New  Zealand, 
and  of  western  Canada  in  refusing  Japanese 
coolie  labor  is  in  such  matters  entirely  ana- 
logous to  our  own.  In  Australia  the  laws 
restricting  Asiatic  immigration  are,  if  possi- 
ble, even  more  stringent  than  ours.  But  the 


THE  FAR  EAST  119 

gravity  of  the  situation  created  by  such  hos- 
tility has  impressed  itself  upon  the  common- 
wealth. Mr.  Deakin's  recent  compulsory 
service  measures,  aiming  to  create  a  nation 
trained  to  arms,  prove  that  his  government 
fully  realizes  its  responsibilities  with  regard 
to  the  dangers  resulting  from  the  attitude 
assumed. 

If  only  for  future  contingencies,  we 
should  seek  closer  interchange  of  views 
upon  similar  matters  with  the  great  self- 
governing  British  colonies  bordering  on  the 
Pacific.  Among  obvious  measures  which 
commend  themselves  would  be  the  appoint- 
ment of  consuls-general  at  Melbourne,  at 
Wellington,  and  at  Ottawa,  who  should  be 
diplomatic  officers,  in  the  same  way  that 
European  governments  send  diplomatists 
as  consuls  to  such  capitals  as  Budapest 
and  Calcutta.  Our  interests  are  too  identi- 
cal not  to  be  mutually  reenforced.  Nor 
could  Great  Britain  regard  otherwise  than 
favorably  the  increase  of  our  intimacy 
with  her  colonies,  since  measures  concerted 


120  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

in  common  would  add  to  the  weight  of  any 
arguments  that  the  course  of  diplomatic 
negotiations  might  bring  forth.  By  mak- 
ing general  the  interest  of  any  question,  it 
would  be  plain  to  Japanese  statesmen  that 
wherever  their  position  might  be  contrary 
to  ours  it  would  likewise  be  opposed  to  that 
of  their  ally's  colonies. 

The  necessity  for  taking  such  precautions 
arises,  however,  from  our  acquisition  of  the 
Philippines.  Had  we  not  these  to  defend, 
Japan  would  have  been  almost  powerless 
against  us.  Possessing  them,  a  different 
course  of  action  imposes  itself  which  bids 
us  seek  an  understanding  with  Great  Britain 
to  maintain  existing  conditions  and  join  in 
a  mutual  guarantee  for  the  preservation 
thereof,  a  guarantee  which  it  is  likely 
enough  that  Japan,  realizing  her  conse- 
quent impotence  and  desiring  to  identify 
herself  with  the  other  Great  Powers,  would 
herself  subscribe  to,  as  she  lately  has  for  the 
French  colonies  in  Indo-China;  for  Japan 
diplomatically  isolated  would  be  powerless. 


THE  FAR  EAST  121 

The  alliance  between  England  and  Japan 
may  not  be  of  indefinite  duration.  The 
mutual  desire  to  resist  Russian  encroach- 
ments in  China,  which  originally  brought  it 
about,  now  appears  removed,  and  already 
conflicting  interests  and  prejudices  caused 
by  Great  Britain's  imperial  position  seem 
prepared  to  assert  themselves.  The  pres- 
tige justly  gained  by  Japan  through  her 
recent  war  has  extended  over  Asia,  where 
populations  once  submissive  have  had  in- 
stilled in  them  novel  ideas  of  independence. 
However  remote  it  may  be  from  the  minds 
of  Japanese  statesmen  to  profit  by  the  new 
feeling  of  unrest  which  has  made  itself  felt 
in  India,  it  would  be  only  human  if  con- 
sciousness thereof  were  coupled  with  any 
resentment  that  might  be  felt  for  the  humili- 
ation suffered  by  their  compatriots  in  British 
colonies.  This  feeling  would  naturally  tend 
to  loosen  the  bonds  of  an  alliance  which 
has  more  than  accomplished  the  purpose  for 
which  it  was  originally  intended. 

The  future  may  well  witness  Japanese 


122  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

friendship  inclining  toward  a  nation  like 
Germany.  The  essentially  military  fabric 
of  both  countries  offers  points  of  sympathy 
which  receive  support  from  the  fact  that  no 
divergent  interests  separate  the  two  powers, 
while  many  draw  them  together,  not- 
ably the  common  dread  of  Russia.  Now 
that  all  hope  of  establishing  a  German  co- 
lonial empire  in  China  has  been  abandoned, 
and  her  colony  at  Kiauchau  remains  like  a 
beached  vessel  to  mark  the  force  of  the  wave 
which  stranded  it,  there  are  no  longer  rival 
ambitions  to  clash. 

In  spite  of  his  early  warnings  against 
the  yellow  peril,  the  German  Emperor  has 
every  reason  to  feel  as  much  sympathy 
for  the  Japanese  as  for  the  Mohammedans, 
to  whom  he  once  announced  his  all-em- 
bracing friendship.  Japan  is  better  worth 
German  unity  than  Morocco,  and  an  alli- 
ance with  her  could  be  heralded  as  offering 
further  guarantees  for  the  preservation  of 
peace.  But  we  could  not  afford  to  regard 
this  contingency  with  indifference.   Should 


THE  FAR  EAST  123 

it  ever  approach  consummation,  German 
ambitions  with  regard  to  the  Philippines 
may  again  be  awakened  under  a  more  for- 
midable guise,  and  in  such  event  any  course 
for  us  other  than  a  prompt  understanding 
with  Great  Britain  is  likely  to  be  disastrous 
to  the  preservation  of  our  dependencies. 
Even  without  this  possibility,  which  fortu- 
nately still  belongs  to  the  future,  England 
provides  for  us  the  effective  means  of  safe- 
guarding the  possession  of  our  colonies  and 
forestalling  the  peril  which  unfriendly  com- 
binations of  powers  present  for  us. 

In  lesser  degree  our  diplomacy  may  de- 
rive much  benefit  in  strengthening  our 
Asiatic  position  by  a  frank  understanding 
with  Russia.  Now  that  the  latter's  Far 
Eastern  ambitions  have  been  curtailed,  the 
two  nations  can  find  mutual  advantage  in 
upholding  a  defensive  policy  aimed  at  the 
preservation  of  existing  conditions.  Our 
interests  are  mutual  in  so  many  respects 
that  a  far-sighted  policy  would,  perhaps, 
even  waive  the  assertion  of  certain  claims, 


124  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

however  justified  they  may  be,  in  return  for 
a  friendship  of  greater  importance  to  the 
future  of  our  position.  Japan  would  hesi- 
tate in  the  assertion  of  any  pretension  on 
her  part  if  she  felt  that  we  were  assured  of 
the  joint  support  of  Great  Britain  and 
Russia.  Hence  our  desire  to  recognize 
Chinese  sovereignty  over  Manchuria  should 
take  Russian  ambitions  into  consideration. 
Especially  at  the  present  time,  when  that 
power  is  unable  to  assert  an  aggressive 
policy,  such  action  on  our  part  would  be 
appreciated  far  more  than  it  would  have 
been  a  few  years  ago,  or  is  likely  ever  to  be 
in  the  future.  It  rests  with  our  diplomacy 
to  profit  by  opportunities  when  they  are 
best  worth  seizing.  The  Far  East  is  to  us 
what  the  Levant  has  been  to  the  European 
powers.  In  China  our  commerce  has  been 
intrenched  by  a  century  of  effort.  Mer- 
chants and  missionaries  have  extended 
American  enterprise  throughout  that  em- 
pire, while  at  home  our  educational  insti- 
tutions have  been  freely  opened  to  Oriental 


THE  FAR  EAST  125 

students.  We  cannot,  therefore,  regard  with 
indifference  the  impending  industrial  awak- 
ening of  China.  Our  energy  and  our  capi- 
tal have  every  right  to  participate  therein  at 
least  on  terms  of  equal  footing  with  those 
of  other  powers;  and  the  recent  efforts  of 
American  diplomacy  to  support  the  asser- 
tion of  such  right  in  the  matter  of  a  railway 
concession  offer  a  welcome  sign  that  the 
nation  is  awakening  to  the  growing  impor- 
tance of  our  over-sea  interests,  particularly 
in  the  Far  East.  Within  late  years  we  have 
taken  a  leading  part  both  in  virtually  de- 
feating the  desired  apportionment  of  the 
Chinese  Empire  into  rival  spheres  of  so- 
called  economic  development  and  influence, 
and  in  forcing  on  other  reluctant  nations 
the  policy  of  the  **open  door."  It  has 
rightly  been  our  aim  to  preserve  the  Chinese 
markets  open  for  all.  We  should  continue  to 
assert  vigorously  in  the  Far  East  a  policy  , 
in  conformity  with  the  principles  of  equity 
and  our  own  best  interests,  which  in  Asia  ^ 
are  commercial  and  cannot  be  political.      / 


126  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

We  should  especially  seek  to  continue  to 
play  a  leading  part  as  a  friendly  adviser  of 
China.  Nor  ought  this  to  be  difficult.  Our 
political  friendship  has  been  manifested  on 
frequent  occasions,  although  the  late  repay- 
ment of  the  exaggerated  indenmity  claims 
made  after  the  Boxer  rising  was  but  the 
correction  of  a  former  injustice,  an  example 
which  other  powers  have  not  seen  fit  to  fol- 
low. The  recent  developing  of  our  Chinese 
service,  and  our  creating  a  body  of  student 
interpreters  from  whose  ranks  it  is  hoped 
that  future  consuls  in  the  Far  East  will  be 
recruited,  offer  an  indication  of  the  increas- 
ing importance  the  Orient  has  rightly  as- 
sumed in  our  foreign  relations.  It  is  to  be 
hoped  that  every  effort  will  be  made  to 
strengthen  the  prestige  of  our  representation 
which  counts  for  so  much  in  the  East. 

But  if  we  have  befriended  China  politi- 
cally, in  other  questions  our  action  has  been 
less  amicable.  Even  though  we  need  fear  no 
military  consequence  of  her  possible  dis- 
pleasure, the  humiliation  imposed  upon  Chi- 


THE  FAR  EAST  127 

nese  in  America  has  in  recent  years  caused 
a  boycott  of  our  goods  extending  even  to 
Singapore.  With  China,  just  as  with  Japan, 
tactful  means  should  be  found  which  would 
accomplish  the  result  demanded  by  our 
.labor  in  the  Pacific  States  in  a  manner  less 
offensive  to  Oriental  dignity.  Fortunately, 
a  marked  improvement  has  lately  been  wit- 
nessed in  our  relations  with  China,  to  which 
the  present  resentment  felt  by  that  country 
at  the  high-handed  methods  of  Japan  is 
perhaps  not  foreign.  This  cannot  be  alto- 
gether disagreeable  to  us ;  and  it  should  be 
the  constant  object  of  our  diplomacy,  even 
at  the  risk  of  seeming  inconsistency,  to  avoid 
uniting  the  two  great  yellow  powers  by  fur- 
nishing them  with  a  common  grievance. 

Our  policy  in  the  Far  East  thus  finds  it- 
self limited  by  certain  existing  factors  im- 
posed by  labor  conditions  and  over  which 
diplomacy  has  but  a  feeble  control.  Since 
they  exist,  however,  a  course  of  action 
becomes  necessary  for  present  and  future 
intercourse.   To  extend  our  commercial  in- 


1«8  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

terests,  and  to  preserve  the  Philippines 
pending  the  decision  with  regard  to  their  ul- 
timate fate,  must  be  our  purpose.  The  goal 
toward  which  our  diplomacy  should  strive 
is  to  mitigate  as  far  as  possible  the  offense 
given  by  exclusion  acts,  while  so  intrench- 
ing our  position  as  to  minimize  the  risk  of 
its  ever  being  challenged. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  NEAR  EAST 

Even  before  the  recent  revolution  in 
Turkey,  a  decided  revival  of  diplomatic 
interest  in  the  affairs  of  the  Near  East  had 
begun  to  be  apparent.  The  conditions  of 
disorder  which  so  often  in  the  past  had  fur- 
nished there  the  pretext  for  foreign  inter- 
ference appeared  more  ominous  when  the 
danger  clouds  were  for  the  time  dissipated 
in  other  regions  of  the  globe.  A  feeling  of 
unrest  leading  to  violence  and  anarchy  had 
further  spread  over  the  Moslem  countries 
from  Morocco  to  Afghanistan.  Never  tran- 
quil even  in  orderly  times,  their  chronic  tur- 
bulence was  once  more  excited.  The  East 
was  beginning  to  appreciate  the  failure 
of  Mohammedan  institutions  to  renovate 
themselves  in  conformity  with  modern  re- 
quirements, and  its  intelligence  was  realizing 


130  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

keenly  the  inferiority  from  which  it  suf- 
fered. A  political  seething  connected  with 
the  idea  of  nationality  and  the  victory  of  an 
Asiatic  over  a  European  power,  and  influ- 
enced by  the  constitutional  struggle  in  Rus- 
sia, became  everywhere  apparent.  Western 
forecasts  regarding  Oriental  immutability 
were  rapidly  being  disproved. 

Although  almost  our  first  foreign  conflict 
had  been  with  the  Barbary  States,  tradition 
and  interests  alike  would  on  the  surface 
seem  to  counsel  us  aloofness  from  the  Mo- 
hammedan countries.  Having  voluntarily 
refrained  from  whatever  might  entangle 
us  in  the  internal  affairs  of  Europe,  how  ] 
much  more  remote  must  appear  the  inter- 
nal affairs  of  the  Near  East!  Such  argu- 
ments would  have  been  irrefutable  before 
the  Spanish  War,  and  would  still  be  so  if 
our  international  position  had  remained 
unchanged  and  we  could  feel  certain  of 
preserving  our  former  policy  without  refer- 
ence to  the  exigencies  of  a  new  situation. 
But  the  diplomatic  action  of  a  great  power 


\ 


THE  NEAR  EAST  ISl 

is  everywhere  too  closely  interwoven  to  be 
separate  and  distinct  in  each  country.  A 
purely  defensive  diplomacy  on  the  part  of  a 
great  state  is  as  much  a  heresy  as  is  a  navy 
built  only  for  defense. 

The  acute  interest  taken  by  the  European 
nations  in  Turkish  affairs  has  been  not  only 
because  of  political  and  commercial  oppor- 
tunities there  open,  but  also  because  the 
problem  of  an  empire's  dismemberment, 
which  for  so  long  seemingly  presented  itself 
as  imminent,  caused  the  statesmen  of  the 
Old  World  to  realize  that  without  the  great- 
est circumspection  in  their  action  a  con- 
flagration might  be  lit  over  the  division  of 
the  spoils,  setting  all  Europe  ablaze.  Even 
though  we  may  regard  the  Near  Eastern 
question  as  entirely  foreign  to  us,  it  can 
hardly  be  anticipated  that  a  European  war 
resulting  from  it  and  upsetting  all  former 
balances  of  power  could  leave  us  completely 
indifferent.  Our  desire  to  avert  such  dan- 
ger is  in  fact  second  only  to  that  of  the  Old 
World  powers.   It  behooves  us  as  well  as 


182         AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

them  to  take  the  proper  precautions  toward 
removing  such  causes  as  tend  to  disturb  the 
peace.  Although  we  may  not  choose  to  for- 
feit our  independence  of  action  by  entering 
into  present  or  future  concerts  of  nations, 
American  policy  can  no  longer,  as  in  the 
past,  afford  to  be  oblivious  thereto.  Seen 
in  this  light,  the  joint  action  of  the  Powers  in 
the  Near  East,  which  for  thirty  years  has 
contributed  largely  to  maintaining  peace 
if  only  by  isolating  its  occasional  conflicts, 
assumes  new  importance  for  us.  We  can 
hardly  disinterest  ourselves  with  impunity 
from  events  in  a  region  where  the  interests 
of  other  nations  with  whom  we  are  else- 
where intimately  connected  are  in  such 
close  juxtaposition.  The  Near  East  is  at 
one  door  of  Europe  and  we  are  at  the  other. 
The  distance  is  too  slight  to  leave  us  uncon- 
scious of  our  neighborhood. 

In  this  connection  another  possibility 
presents  itself  as  a  living  problem,  even 
though  to-day  its  contingency  is  remote. 
Only  a  few  months  ago,  however,  it  looked 


THE  NEAR  EAST  133 

as  if  a  new  congress  might  become  necessary 
to  revise  the  thread  worn  Treaty  of  Berlin. 
Had  this  occurred,  as  the  questions  it 
would  have  been  called  upon  to  regulate 
are  of  wider  than  strictly  European  order, 
and  as  its  aim  would  lie  in  the  direction  of 
permanently  establishing  the  bases  of  inter- 
national harmony,  we  could  not  have  been 
indifferent  to  its  deliberations.  Any  effort, 
towards  the  preservation  of  peace  in  any] 
region  of  the  world  concerns  us  as  well  as 
Europe.  It  matters  little  that  we  have  no 
direct  interest  in  determining  the  status  of 
territories  formerly  under  Ottoman  suze- 
rainty. We  feel  a  very  deep  interest,  first,  in 
any  measure  contributing  to  securing  uni- 
versal peace,  and  secondly,  that  no  concert 
of  nations  should  meet  to  decide  questions 
of  more  than  particular  or  local  interest  in 
any  portion  of  the  world  without  taking  our 
views  into  consideration. 

Public  opinion  in  the  United  States 
should  distinguish  sharply  between  spheres 
of  influence   with   regard   to   our  foreign 


184  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

policy  and  spheres  of  interest.  There  exist 
many  regions  of  the  globe  where  any  acqui- 
sition of  territory,  or  single  responsibility, 
would  prove  only  an  encumbrance  for  us. 
But  there  is  none  where  we  do  not  feel 
interested,  however  remotely. 

Our  special  right  to  participate  in  any 
international  deliberations  modifying  or 
altering  in  any  way  the  status  of  the  Otto- 
man Empire  is  based,  moreover,  on  the 
existing  treaties  we  possess  with  Turkey, 
which  cannot  be  changed  without  the  con- 
sent of  the  contracting  powers.  Hence  any 
alteration  in  the  legal  status  of  such  terri- 
tory would  almost  inevitably  entail  a  cor- 
responding modification  of  the  numerous 
rights  emanating  from  the  ancient  capitula- 
tions which  we  have  assimilated  by  virtue 
of  our  treaties  with  the  Sublime  Porte.  And 
while  we  may  be  indifferent  to  surrendering 
these,  we  cannot  permit  their  abrogation  to 
be  effected  by  other  powers  without  our 
consent,  unless  at  the  same  time  we  are  will- 
ing to  permit  other  remaining  rights,  as  well 


THE  NEAR  EAST  1S5 

as  our  international  prestige,  to  be  seriously 
jeopardized  by  such  surrender. 

Although  in  1878  our  position  as  a  great 
power  was  still  not  sufficiently  established  to 
warrant  a  representation  at  the  Congress 
of  Berlin,  American  over-sea  interests  have 
since  been  so  enlarged,  American  influence 
so  universally  recognized,  that  we  could  not 
absent  ourselves  from  another  such  confer- 
ence without  endangering  our  legitimate 
influence  in  the  world's  affairs.  Participa- 
tion would  not,  however,  mean  our  being 
dragged  into  acquisitions  of  undesirable 
or  indefensible  territory.  Certainly  no  Cy- 
prus nor  Bosnia  should  tempt  us  or  dis- 
tract our  attention.  Like  France  at  Berlin 
in  1878,  it  should  be  our  boast  to  leave  such 
a  conference  with  empty  hands.  Nor  again 
would  such  participation  by  us  mean  entan- 
glement in  the  internal  affairs  of  European 
states.  We  have  as  little  wish  to  so  enmesh 
ourselves  as  a  century  ago.  But  we  are 
unable  to  permit  questions  not  of  internal 
but  of  international   order,  which   might 


136  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

endanger  the  peace  of  other  powers  with 
whom  we  are  intimately  connected,  to  be 
decided  entirely  apart  from  our  knowledge 
and  consent,  without  surrendering  just  so 
much  of  our  influence  as  the  question's  im- 
portance in  its  international  aspects  may 
involve. 

It  should  further  be  our  boast  to  employ 
the  Republic's  efforts  wherever  possible  in 
the  direction  of  justice  and  the  extension 
of  liberal  ideas.  To  possess  a  true  meaning 
in  the  world,  our  influence  and  civilization 
must  not  remain  confined  to  a  single  hemi* 
sphere.  Though  its  paramountcy  in  both 
the  Americas  has  rightly  been  the  cardinal 
point  in  our  foreign  policy,  there  is  no 
reason  why  it  should  be  restricted  thereto. 
To  refrain  timidly  from  elsewhere  assert- 
ing ourselves  will  not  add  one  iota  to  the 
strength  of  our  position  in  the  western 
hemisphere,  where  our  claims  repose  on  no 
other  ultimate  basis  than  that  of  force. 

But  if  a  nation's  hegemony  can  be  as- 
serted only  with  the  adequate  backing  of 


THE  NEAR  EAST  137 

strength,  its  pretensions  to  equality  with 
other  powers,  especially  when  disinterested, 
may  rest  on  more  moral  grounds.  If  the 
direction  of  our  foreign  policy  in  other 
regions  of  the  world  bears  an  ideal  of  justice 
in  view,  there  is  no  reason  why  our  influence, 
earning  the  respect  due  to  its  unselfishness, 
should  not  contribute  toward  the  advance- 
ment of  those  general  ideas  of  humanity 
and  international  morality  with  which  we 
have  always  sympathized.  And  with  the 
growth  of  our  influence  abroad  will  follow 
the  extension  of  commercial  interests  in 
regions  before  unknown.  All  these  causes 
contribute  to  the  utility  of  our  taking  part 
in  future  international  conferences  and  ex- 
changes of  opinion,  where  our  presence, 
particularly  to  Great  Britain  and  France, 
would  be  welcome,  while  it  is  doubtful 
if  any  power  would  care  deliberately  to 
choose  to  incur  our  displeasure  by  opposing 
our  admission  to  the  councils  of  great 
nations. 

Paradoxical  as  it  may  appear,  the  student 


138  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

of  our  national  growth  can  hardly  avoid  the 
conclusion  that  just  as  our  former  weakness, 
with  its  dangers  limited  to  a  continent  dis- 
tant from  the  rest  of  the  world,  had  been 
our  strength,  our  present  strength,  with  the 
new  responsibilities  thrust  upon  us,  and 
the  rightly  felt  ambition  to  achieve  great 
deeds,  has  proved  a  source  of  weakness  to 
our  material  if  not  to  our  moral  position. 
It  is  curious  to  observe  that  the  vast  ex- 
tension given  within  recent  years  to  the  in- 
ternational influence  of  the  United  States 
and  to  our  supposed  designs  in  other  conti- 
nents, which  abroad  has  attracted  so  much 
attention,  has  yet  passed  almost  unnoticed 
at  home,  because  of  the  slight  consideration 
accorded  to  questions  of  foreign  policy. 
The  European  nations,  with  keener  sense  of 
the  scope  of  diplomacy,  long  since  perceived 
the  significance  of  our  advent  as  a  great 
power.  Almost  unknown  to  us  we  have 
been  included  in  their  new  world -balance 
which  has  replaced  the  former  continental 
equilibrium.    Indeed,   our    foreign    move- 


THE  NEAR  EAST  1S9 

ments  are  scanned  abroad  with  far  more 
critical  attention  than  they  receive  in 
America. 

A  case  in  point  occurred  in  1906  in  the 
elevation  of  our  legation  at  Constantinople 
to  the  grade  of  an  embassy.  The  impor- 
tance of  this  measure  passed  almost  unno- 
ticed at  home.  But  the  ill-will  it  provoked, 
especially  in  a  certain  section  of  the  con- 
tinental press,  proved  the  consequence 
attached  by  the  Old  World  to  a  step  inter- 
preted as  marking  the  entrance  of  America 
in  the  Near  Eastern  question.  Europe, 
which  jealously  feared  the  appearance  of 
another  claimant  in  the  then  anticipated 
division  of  the  spoils,  realized  the  opportu- 
nity awaiting  us  in  the  Levant,  where  with 
no  political  traditions  to  continue,  no  stakes 
to  defend,  no  territorial  ambitions,  entirely 
unpledged  and  free  in  our  actions,  a  skillful 
diplomacy  could  win  for  us  on  the  Bospho- 
rus  the  recognition  of  our  policies  in  other 
quarters. 

The  success  of  our  position  in  Constanti- 


/ 


140  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

nople  was  fortunately  never  predicated  on 
the  dismemberment  of  the  Ottoman  Empire. 
We  had  no  desire  to  see  it  divided,  nor  to 
watch  its  provinces  gradually  apportioned 
among  the  neighboring  powers.  It  has  al- 
ways been  to  our  advantage  to  have  Turkey 
preserved  as  one  of  the  few  neutral  markets 
still  open  to  the  world,  where  a  fair  field  could 
but  be  favorable  to  our  foreign  trade.  Va- 
rious conditions,  past  and  present,  have  con- 
spired together  to  prevent  it  from  becoming 
a  manufacturing  state.  For  many  years 
to  come  we  need  expect  there  no  prohib- 
itive tariff  to  bar  our  products,  such  as  pro- 
tects foreign  markets  and  our  own,  while 
the  alienation  of  Ottoman  territory  would 
have  meant  its  probable  inclusion  within 
the  customs  wall  of  some  foreign  power. 

Our  interests  therefore  coincided  with 
those  of  the  powers  desiring  the  preserva- 
tion of  Turkey.  But  not  even  her  best 
friends  believed  it  possible  long  to  avert  the 
doom  which  had  appeared  imminent.  The  l 
revolution  of  July,  1908,  exploded  like  a  » 


THE  NEAR  EAST  141 

bombshell  to  astonish  the  world  and  open 
a  new  chapter  in  the  Near  Eastern  question. 
By  its  promise  to  make  of  Turkey  a  modern 
state  in  place  of  a  decrepit  despotism,  it 
held  forth  the  vision  of  a  regenerated  nation. 
The  European  powers,  some  in  all  sincerity, 
others  not  wishing  to  appear  unfriendly, 
welcomed  the  advent  of  a  constitutional  gov- 
ernment. The  empire  which  for  two  cen- 
turies diplomatists  have  regarded  as  the 
peculiar  field  for  the  exercise  of  their  talents 
of  division,  appeared  by  a  miracle  of  mir- 
acles to  embark  on  a  new  life.  For  a 
moment  it  seemed  as  if  the  bond  of  Otto- 
man nationality  founded  upon  the  love  for 
a  common  soil  might  henceforth  unite 
without  dissension  the  many  creeds  and 
races  inhabiting  Turkey,  and  bring  to  an 
end  the  conflict  of  racial  ambitions  fostered 
from  without,  which  had  made  it  a  menace 
to  the  peace  of  Europe. 

To-day,  a  year  after  the  establishment  of 
constitutional  government,  if  the  aspirations 
of  the  leaders  of  the  new   movement  in 


142  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Turkey  are  in  certain  respects  less  gener- 
ous, they  rest,  perhaps,  upon  a  stronger 
foundation.  The  success  of  the  revolution 
had  been  too  sudden  and  overwhelming. 
It  had  not  to  fight  its  way  against  a  grad- 
ually receding  opposition,  but  triumphed 
almost  at  its  birth.  The  elements  of  reac- 
tion later  made  themselves  felt  with  the  real- 
ization that  the  heritage  of  long  years  of 
misgovernment  could  not  be  shaken  off  in  a 
day.  A  band  of  young  enthusiasts,  many  of 
them  bred  in  exile,  and  without  practical 
experience,  found  themselves  at  the  head 
of  a  nation  to  govern  which  presented  the 
most  diflScult  problems  of  statesmanship, 
from  without  as  much  as  from  within.  The 
ambitions  of  neighboring  powers,  the  con- 
flict of  races  and  religions,  the  ignorance  of 
the  masses,  the  ruined  finances,  an  ineffi- 
cient and  frequently  corrupt  bureaucracy, 
were  all  elements  to  be  reckoned  with;  and 
the  fact  that  as  each  problem  had  been 
the  product  of  years,  it  was  impossible  to 
solve  it  in  a  day,  has  caused  many  to  be 


THE  NEAR  EAST  14S 

unduly  pessimistic  regarding  the  future  of 
Turkey. 

There  is  no  reason,  however,  to  take  such 
a  dismal  view  of  the  situation.  The  neces- 
sary transition  between  the  old  order  and 
the  new  will  hardly  be  effected  without 
many  anxious  moments.  But  the  patriot- 
ism of  the  leaders  of  the  reform  movement 
in  Turkey,  and  particularly  the  devotion 
to  the  constitutional  cause  of  a  disciplined 
and  highly  efficient  army  composed  of  the 
best  elements  in  the  nation,  make  one  hope- 
ful that  a  land  so  richly  endowed  by  na- 
ture, and  whose  dominant  race  is  possessed 
of  so  many  military  and  other  virtues,  will 
in  time  again  assume  its  rightful  place  in 
the  world. 

We  can  view  with  warm  sympathy  the 
successive  steps  in  the  evolution  through 
which  Turkey  must  necessarily  pass  to  ac- 
complish this  desired  result.  We  can  even, 
without  prejudice  to  ourselves,  extend  it 
valuable  aid  when  the  proper  time  comes, 
by  abandoning,  as  in  Japan,  the  special 


144  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

rights  of  jurisdiction  formerly  acquired  by 
treaty,  and  aid  a  new  Turkey,  in  the  mea- 
sure of  our  ability,  to  extricate  itself  from 
one  of  the  burdens  of  its  inheritance  derog- 
atory to  its  sovereign  rights. 

The  existence  of  a  liberal  Turkey  is  wel- 
come to  us  both  on  sentimental  and  on 
material  grounds.  We  should,  indeed,  prove 
unfaithful  to  our  most  ancient  and  most 
generous  traditions  if  we  failed  to  view  with 
cordial  satisfaction  the  success  of  a  move- 
ment securing  liberty,  equality,  and  justice 
to  a  people  hitherto  deprived  of  the  most 
elementary  guarantees  of  government.  Be- 
cause our  history  has  served  as  a  guide  for 
other  nations  in  their  fight  for  freedom, 
they  look  toward  us  for  sympathy  in  their 
period  of  struggle  and  for  friendship  in  their 
success.  When  on  the  morrow  of  the  pro- 
mulgation of  the  constitution  the  crowd  in 
the  streets  of  Constantinople  cheered  the 
American  flag;  when  a  marshal  of  the  em- 
pire, the  victorious  hero  of  a  former  war, 
returning  amid  the  enthusiastic  demonstra- 


THE  NEAR  EAST  145 

tions  of  the  multitude  from  an  unjust  exile, 
paid  his  first  visit  to  the  American  ambas- 
sador as  a  tribute  to  the  representative  of  a 
nation  which  had  been  a  cradle  of  liberty 
and  a  refuge  for  the  oppressed,  it  was  be- 
cause we  are  regarded  as  possessing  funda- 
mental feelings  and  traditions  which  must 
cause  us  to  welcome  the  success  of  other 
nations  who  have  followed  our  example  in 
the  desire  for  representative  institutions.  We 
have  thus  to  fulfill  a  generous  and  pleasing 
role  in  no  way  contrary  to  our  real  interests. 
At  the  present  time,  when  the  demolition 
of  the  old  order  in  Turkey  causes  every 
European  nation  to  give  an  altogether  fresh 
direction  to  its  Near  Eastern  policy,  we  are 
able  to  enter  on  an  equal  footing  with  other 
powers  in  availing  ourselves  of  the  oppor- 
tunities certain  to  arise  with  the  industrial 
awakening  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  The 
system  is  fortunately  shattered  which  in 
the  past  debarred  from  participation  those 
who  scrupled  in  their  choice  of  methods. 
There  is  no  longer  to  be  the  same  disgrace- 


146  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

ful  scrambling  for  concessions  purchased 
through  palace  favorites  which  stained 
those  who  were  most  successful.  A  policy 
of  equal  opportunity  for  all  will  permit  our 
enterprise  to  profit  legitimately  in  what  is, 
perhaps,  the  richest  of  undeveloped  nations. 
Hence  interest  with  sentiment  counsels  our 
viewing  favorably  the  new  government 
which  in  saving  Turkey  from  dismember- 
ment has  preserved  it  as  an  open  market  for 
the  commerce  of  the  world. 

So  long  as  all  our  energy  and  capital  were 
engaged  in  developing  the  United  States, 
we  had  regarded  foreign  lands  rather  as 
convenient  dumping-grounds  for  our  sur- 
plus products  than  as  countries  where  our 
industrial  and  financial  influence  could  be 
Continuously  felt.  Save  along  the  Pacific 
coast  and  to  a  certain  extent  in  the  Carib- 
bean, the  possibilities  of  great  engineering 
works,  the  building  of  harbors  and  bridges 
and  railways,  the  equipping  of  lighting,  tele- 
phone, and  industrial  plants,  hardly  dawned 
upon  our  enterprise,  while  the  possibili- 


THE  NEAR  EAST  147 

ties  of  financial  operations  abroad,  and  par- 
ticularly in  extra-territorial  countries,  were 
still  uncontemplated.  If  it  has  not  been 
already  reached,  we  are  likely  in  the  near 
future  to  attain  a  stage  where,  the  consum- 
ing capacity  of  the  country  being  reduced, 
there  will  come  a  plethora  of  production 
and  of  unemployed  capital.  It  may  even 
be  said  that  the  recent  industrial  depres- 
sion in  the  United  States  would  have  been 
less  acute  if  its  foreign  trade  had  been 
greater  and  more  widely  distributed.  The 
gigantic  strides  taken  at  home  in  recent 
years,  however,  have  kept  us  from  culti- 
vating till  quite  lately  over-sea  outlets  for 
our  production  in  the  same  way  as  other 
powers  have  done.  Now  that  an  impetus 
has  at  last  been  given  to  export  trade,  we 
are  likely  to  find  other  interests  strongly  in- 
trenched in  neutral  markets,  and  our  com- 
petitors appearing  more  formidable  than 
would  have  been  the  case  if  our  efforts  to 
undersell  them  had  been  ripened  by  the 
experience  of  years.   But  in  any  event,  our 


148  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

best  openings  will  certainly  be  found  in 
lands  where  no  discriminating  tariffs  exist 
to  favor  home  industry. 

The  preservation  of  the  Moslem  nations 
as  a  fair  field  for  all  assumes  fresh  impor- 
tance for  us  because  of  this.  And  the  Near 
East  presents  enough  commercial  attrac- 
tions to  warrant  its  receiving  far  closer 
attention  from  our  trade.  The  European 
nations  have  better  understood  this  advan- 
tage in  the  Levant,  where  they  have  strained 
every  effort  to  secure  the  concession  of 
public  franchises.  In  the  Orient,  where 
commercial  enterprise  invariably  passes 
through  official  channels,  diplomacy  has  to 
concern  itself  with  questions  it  elsewhere 
ignores.  German  diplomacy  was  the  first 
to  recognize  this,  and  it  was  due  largely  to 
its  able  efforts  that  German  interests  in 
the  past  became  so  strongly  intrenched  in 
the  Ottoman  Empire.  Our  own  commerce 
and  enterprise,  in  spite  of  occupying  a  natu- 
rally favorable  position  to  extend  American 
trade  and  industry,  has  practically  neglected 


THE  NEAR  EAST  149 

a  field  where,  only  a  few  years  ago,  our 
exports  were  not  one  twentieth  those  of 
Belgium.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  one 
of  the  causes  contributing  to  the  success 
of  Belgian  diplomacy  in  securing  valuable 
concessions  in  foreign  countries  has  been 
that  nation's  political  weakness.  American 
enterprise  would  be  similarly  benefited  by 
our  remoteness  and  disinterestedness  as  a 
nation. 

Our  participation  in  industrial  competi- 
tion would  be  welcomed  by  a  government 
aiming  to  distribute  its  favors  widely  and 
realizing  that  we  possess  no  territorial  am- 
bitions over  the  Turkish  Empire.  The  rich 
grants  from  which  in  recent  years  Ger- 
man capital  has  benefited  in  Anatolia  and 
Mesopotamia,  British  in  the  Aidin  Valley, 
and  French  in  Syria,  are  by  no  means  ex- 
hausted. Thousands  of  miles  of  railway  re- 
main to  be  built  and  railway  material  to  be 
ordered.  The  whole  northern  portion  of  Asia 
Minor  and  the  fertile  valleys  of  the  centre 
are  still  destitute  of  adequate  means  of  com- 


150  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

munication,  although  it  is  notorious  that 
such  a  road  would  traverse  the  richest  part 
of  Turkey.  The  reason  why  it  was  left  un- 
built will  also  serve  as  an  example  to  explain 
the  chance  for  our  enterprise  to  profit  from 
the  peculiar  political  position  we  enjoy  in  the 
Near  East.  The  first  route  for  the  Bagdad 
Railroad  had  been  planned  fo  pass  through 
this  region.  But  Russia,  unwilling  to  see 
the  interests  of  a  powerful  nation  perma- 
nently established  close  to  her  own  Cauca- 
sian frontiers,  and  in  a  district  over  which 
she  was  supposed  to  cherish  ultimate  ambi- 
tions, demanded  the  immediate  repayment 
of  the  remainder  of  the  Turkish  war  indem- 
nity owing  her  since  1878.  As  this  was  im- 
possible, she  obtained  instead  the  guarantee 
for  such  road  to  be  built  either  by  Russian 
or  Turkish  enterprise,  while  the  Sultan  re- 
scinded his  first  offer  and  granted  the  Ger- 
man concession  by  the  less  favorable  route 
through  the  Taurus  Mountains,  and  thence 
across  the  semi-desert  from  Aleppo  to  Bag- 
dad.  The  reasons  which  animated  Russia 


>^ 


THE  NEAR  EAST  151 

to  take  such  a  position  would  not  be  so 
likely  to  militate  against  American  inter- 
ests. Hence  our  very  aloofness  from  politi- 
cal ambitions  in  the  East  should  stand  us  in 
good  stead.  In  the  numerous  concessions 
for  public  franchises  of  every  nature  which 
still  remain  to  be  granted  in  the  Near  East- 
ern countries,  while  we  may  anticipate  com- 
mercial rivalry,  our  enterprise  will  hardly 
suffer  from  political  jealousy.  On  the  con- 
trary, we  should  obtain  the  aid  in  such  ven- 
tures of  a  nation  like  Russia,  which,  without 
the  ability  to  profit  commercially  herself, 
would  prefer  to  see  our  interests  benefited 
rather  than  those  of  other  powers.  In  the 
Near  East  almost  as  much  as  in  the  extreme 
Orient  our  interests  may  work  in  harmony 
with  those  of  Russia. 

Opportunities  thus  await  American  capi- 
tal and  commerce  in  the  Levant  which  may 
be  further  increased  by  judicious  means. 
The  establishment  of  schools  in  the  Orient 
has  offered  a  recognized  method  of  extend- 
ing the  national  influence  of  powers  so  doing. 


15«  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Without  governmental  aid  American  mis- 
sionary establishments  scattered  through- 
out Turkey  have  accomplished  the  same 
purpose  and  extended  among  natives  the 
use  of  the  English  language.  Their  util- 
ity could  in  certain  respects  be  still  further 
augmented.  Many  members  of  our  cham- 
bers of  commerce  contribute  in  their  pri- 
vate capacity  to  the  support  of  the  missions 
abroad.  It  would  appear  to  be  supplement- 
ing the  influence  and  usefulness  of  the  lat- 
ter if  a  means  of  cooperation  could  be  found 
whereby  selected  mission  pupils  would  be 
assured  a  livelihood  in  advancing  American 
trade  interests.  In  addition  to  the  instruc- 
tion now  imparted,  commercial  courses 
might  be  given  which  would  prepare  schol- 
ars as  competent  agents  for  our  business 
enterprises.  Among  the  present  hindrances 
to  the  extension  of  American  trade  in  the 
Levant  is  the  absence  of  properly  equipped 
natives  who  alone  can  push  it  in  the  interior. 
In  our  mission  schools,  which  already  ac- 
complish much  useful  and  beneficial  work, 


THE  NEAR  EAST  153 

we  possess  the  nucleus  at  hand  to  remedy 
this  deficiency.  Next  to  Turkey,  and  in  spite 
of  its  present  anarchy,  Persia  offers  the  most 
attractive  outlook  in  the  commercial  future 
of  the  Near  East,  as  an  almost  entirely  un- 
developed country  possessed  of  natural  re- 
sources, where  only  the  most  rudimentary 
means  of  transportation  and  communica- 
tion exist,  and  where  possibilities  of  the 
same  character  as  in  the  Ottoman  Empire 
await  foreign  enterprise.  In  a  land  where 
the  dominant  influence  is  that  of  Russia 
in  the  north  and  England  in  the  south, 
we  should  be  able  to  advance  our  com- 
mercial interests  without  incurring  the 
political  jealousy  of  two  powers  that  are 
friendly  toward  us.  The  recent  Anglo- 
Russian  agreement  stipulated  that  central 
Persia  should  be  left  as  a  zone  between  the 
spheres  of  influence  of  either  nation.  There 
can  be  no  question  that  both  England  and 
Russia  would  choose  to  see  American  inter- 
ests established  in  this  buffer  region  in  pre- 
ference to  those  of  other  likely  powers. 


154  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

The  scope  and  direction  for  our  diplomacy- 
is  therefore  apparent,  if  our  enterprise  and 
capital  can  be  induced  to  venture  into  this 
new  field  and  reap  the  benefits  which  free- 
dom from  political  ambitions  should  obtain 
for  us. 

While  geographically  far  removed  from 
the  Near  East,  the  conditions  prevailing 
in  Morocco  align  it  with  other  Moham- 
medan countries  as  a  non-manufacturing 
state  with  yet  undeveloped  resources.  Al- 
though recent  events  have  partly  removed 
it  from  the  strife  of  political  competition, 
while  the  state  of  anarchy  in  which  the  coun- 
try has  been  plunged  during  late  years 
has  made  the  extension  of  any  commerce 
almost  impossible,  there  is  reason  to  anti- 
cipate that  greater  tranquillity  may  in  the 
future  prevail  and  peace  be  restored  to  a 
distracted  land.  The  guarantee  of  a  fair 
field  for  all  nations  was  among  the  most 
fortunate  achievements  of  the  Algeciras 
Conference,  although  we  unfortunately  re- 
fused to  avail  ourselves  of  the  proffered 


THE  NEAR  EAST  155 

share  in  the  state  bank  of  Morocco,  which 
would  have  secured  for  us  a  favorable  posi- 
tion to  exert  influence  in  behalf  of  American 
enterprise.  But  proper  diplomatic  support 
may  yet  place  us  on  an  equal  footing  with 
other  states  in  the  future  award  of  public 
works  and  the  distribution  of  concessions. 

Our  diplomacy  skillfully  handled  can 
perhaps  still  find  in  Morocco  a  pawn  to 
be  utilized  for  advantages  to  be  gained  in 
other  quarters.  We  need  only  remember 
the  compensations  secured  by  Great  Britain, 
Italy,  and  Spain  in  surrendering  to  France 
their  more  or  less  shadowy  Moroccan  claims, 
to  realize  that,  possibly,  even  at  this  late 
hour,  we  can  secure  certain  advantages 
from  the  latter  power  in  regions  of  closer 
interest  to  us,  while,  without  injury  to  our-  ^ 
selves,  we  further  possess  the  welcome  op- 
portunity of  being  of  service  to  Spain  in  her 
special  ambitions  over  northern  Morocco. 

The  Near  East  is  by  no  means  the  remote 
region  it  has  so  long  seemed  to  us.  Diplo- 
matically and  commercially,  advantages  are 


156  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

there  presented  which  in  the  past  we  have 
been  slow  to  cultivate.  It  is  natural  that 
Europe  should  have  forestalled  us  in  fos- 
tering relations  with  the  Moslem  powers; 
but  for  us  longer  to  neglect  the  opportuni- 
ties there  open,  and  allow  our  diplomatic 
and  trade  intercourse  with  the  Levant  to 
continue  in  its  present  undeveloped  state, 
is  unworthy  of  a  great  and  ambitious  na- 
tion. With  the  extension  everywhere  given 
to  the  protective-tariff  system,  the  few  neu- 
tral markets  remaining  will  be  increasingly 
prized.  Turkey,  Persia,  and  Morocco  offer 
lucrative  opportunities  to  our  enterprise 
and  to  the  extension  of  our  influence.  We 
are  still  in  time  to  profit  by  the  possibilities 
there  open,  while  the  natural  advantages 
we  enjoy  by  reason  of  our  remoteness  and 
political  disinterestedness  place  us  in  a  pe- 
culiarly favorable  position  to  find  support 
for  our  policies,  and  aid  for  our  industrial 
enterprises  in  lands  where  our  advent  would 
be  welcomed  in  preference  to  that  of  other 
powers. 


,v- 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE  DIPLOMATIC  SERVICE  AND  THE  STATE 
DEPARTMENT 

The  brains  and  energy  of  the  nation  have 
been  largely  absorbed,  during  the  last  cen- 
tury, by  its  industrial  expansion.  Whereas 
in  the  Old  World  they  went  by  preference  to 
the  service  of  the  State,  with  us  they  have 
gone  rather  into  business  life.  The  insecur- 
ity of  government  employment  was  able  to 
offer  but  a  scanty  equivalent  for  the  prizes 
awarded  to  success  in  industry  and  com- 
merce. Public  services  stagnated  while  in 
all  other  directions  the  current  of  progress 
bore  the  country  swiftly  along.  The  funda- 
mental reason  for  any  inferiority  in  our  gov- 
ernmental efficiency  has  been  the  political 
nature  of  its  recruitment,  with  the  resulting 
conditions  little  conducive  to  permanence 
or  training.   The  disadvantage  of  utilizing 


158  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

national  services  as  instruments  of  politi- 
cal reward,  even  though  native  talent  has 
occasionally  compensated  for  lack  of  expe- 
rience, requires  no  comment  here.  For 
diplomacy,  however,  there  has  been  and 
still  is  a  certain  justification.  Apart  from 
our  scarcity  of  the  prizes  of  political  life, 
which  other  nations  are  able  to  dispense 
more  lavishly,  we  have  felt  a  certain  pride 
in  the  fact  that  our  diplomatists  stand  for 
the  best  traditions  of  American  citizenship 
rather  than  as  the  representatives  of  a  caste. 
The  example  of  Franklin  is  still  a  living 
one.  Diplomacy,  moreover,  is  no  esoteric 
mystery,  and  the  qualities  of  shrewdness  and 
balance  apparent  in  our  business  and  polit- 
ical intercourse  are  essential  to  the  skillful 
negotiator.  There  is  no  reason  why  any 
administration  should  restrict  the  selection 
of  its  ambassadors  to  the  exclusive  choice 
of  candidates  appointed  thirty  or  forty 
years  previously,  as  is  the  case  in  certain 
continental  services.  There  is  especially 
no  likelihood  of  any  American  government 


THE  DIPLOMATIC  SERVICE  159 

SO  doing.  A  rapidity  of  action  and  success 
is  still  manifest  in  our  public  life.  We  have 
slight  respect  for  the  slow  gradations 
which  lead  in  older  nations  to  positions 
of  dignity.  In  examining  our  diplomacy 
as  it  now  is,  these  elements  of  actuality 
have  to  be  considered.  The  problem  is  not 
to  devise  an  ideal  service  in  an  ideal  state, 
but  to  increase  the  efficiency  of  existing 
methods  and  adapt  them,  where  necessary, 
to  modern  requirements. 

The  former  idea  of  utilizing  the  foreign 
service  as  part  of  the  spoils  system  sufficed, 
however  inadequately,  for  our  requirements 
so  long  as  external  questions  were  of  simple 
order.  Even  then  certain  elements  of  per- 
manence and  continuance  of  policy  were 
found  to  be  necessary,  and  both  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  and  several  of  our  missions 
abroad  contained  men  whose  presence  out- 
lasted any  administration.  It  seems  likely 
that  this  tendency  will  increase  in  the  fu- 
ture. No  general  can  win  a  battle  without 
lieutenants,  and  the  advantages  of  a  skilled 


160  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

rank  and  file  in  diplomacy,  as  in  other  public 
services,  has  become  more  widely  appreci- 
ated. Recent  efforts  in  this  direction  have 
certainly  given  considerable  impetus  to  a 
movement  which  must  commend  itself  to 
all  intelligent  observers. 

The  future  success  of  our  foreign  policy 
will  undoubtedly  depend  in  great  measure 
upon  the  skill  of  our  diplomacy.  The  wel- 
fare of  the  nation  at  large  is  indeed  far  more 
intimately  bound  thereto  than  may  be  com- 
monly believed.  An  idea  has  been  widely 
prevalent  that  with  the  increase  of  rapid 
means  of  communication  and  the  diffusion 
of  news  through  the  press  the  importance  of 
diplomats  was  on  the  wane.  Ambassadors 
were  pictured  as  clerks  at  the  end  of  tele- 
graph wires.  Had  diplomacy  been  unable 
to  renovate  its  eighteenth-century  garb  of 
court  intrigue,  this  might  have  been  true. 
But  the  proof  of  its  utility  is  that  it  has 
conformed  itself  to  modern  requirements. 
It  has  become  economic  where  economic 
questions  were  at  issue.  It  has  arranged  cus- 


THE  DIPLOMATIC  SERVICE  161 

toms  schedules;  it  has  framed  discriminat- 
ing tariffs  and  forged  the  weapons  for  com- 
mercial warfare.  It  has  served  the  ends  of 
finance  and  industry.  The  preservation  of 
peace  and  the  diplomatic  preparation  for 
war  are  to-day  but  its  occasional  concern. 
It  is  the  will  of  the  sovereign  people,  no 
longer  the  whim  of  kings,  that  determines 
the  graver  questions  which  now  preoccupy 
it.  Herein  diplomatists  can  act  only  as  in- 
termediaries, with  no  power  save  to  register 
decisions  or  transmit  information.  The 
real  scope  of  diplomacy  is  both  narrower 
and  deeper, — narrower  in  effecting  the 
settlement  of  unimportant  current  ques- 
tions that  are  daily  met  with  in  inter- 
national relations;  deeper  in  contributing 
to  lay  the  broad  foundations  for  a  na- 
tion's future  action  by  aiding  to  form  its 
opinion  in  foreign  policy.  Herein  it  be- 
comes the  instrument  of  statecraft  in  inter- 
national relations.  Its  duty  to  keep  the 
central  government  informed  of  everything 
of  interest  abroad  should  serve  future  as 


162  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

well  as  present.  And  since  popular  passions 
cannot  be  causelessly  stirred,  it  is  the  pro- 
vince of  diplomacy  to  see  that  such  occasion 
should  never  arise  without  good  reason. 
Diplomatists  act  thus  as  the  scouts  of  na- 
tions as  well  as  the  negotiators;  and  any 
line  of  foreign  policy  which  does  not  take 
into  view  their  action  is  hardly  likely  to 
achieve  success.  The  creation  of  a  diplo- 
macy able  to  supply  the  mechanism  for  the 
assertion  of  our  foreign  policy  thus  com- 
mends itself  as  a  corollary  to  our  future 
position  in  the  world.  We  have  built  up  a 
great  navy  which  now  provides  the  material 
reserve  upon  which  to  base  the  means  of 
enforcing  our  contentions;  but  the  navy  is 
incomplete  without  building  up  our  diplo- 
matic service  and  making  of  it  a  useful  force 
in  the  national  life. 

The  improvements  which  remain  to  be 
effected  involve  no  radical  changes  alien 
alike  to  our  traditions  and  our  habits  of 
thought.  The  foundations  of  reform  which 
have  lately  been  laid  in  so  many  directions 


V 

^  THE  DIPLOMATIC  SERVICE  163 

have  been  inaugurated  as  well  in  the  foreign 
services  with  a  view  to  securing  that  har- 
monious cooperation  of  effort  essential  to 
success. 

The  necessity  existing  for  reform  arises 
from  the  continuance  of  certain  methods  that 
have  survived  the  conditions  for  which  they 
were  originally  intended.  While  a  perma- 
nent service  is  able  more  easily  to  renovate 
itself  in  conformity  with  new  necessities, 
a  transient  one  can  rarely  do  more  than 
pass  to  its  successor  the  methods  it  has  re- 
ceived from  its  predecessor.  The  efficiency 
of  to-day  only  too  easily  degenerates  into 
the  sterility  of  to-morrow,  and  the  utility 
of  any  governmental  branch  finds  itself  cur- 
tailed because  its  development  has  not  cor- 
responded with  the  growth  of  other  national 
activities.  While  our  diplomacy  has  hitherto 
amply  sufficed  for  the  disposition  of  cur-  \ 
rent  questions,  it  has  hardly  as  yet  adapted 
itself  to  the  new  conditions  which  confront 
us,  or  exercised  its  full  scope  as  an  instru- 
ment in  the  nation's  welfare. 


164  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

The  spirit  animating  a  service  is  the  ele- 
ment most  conducive  to  its  efficiency,  and 
its  infusion  into  a  body  can  alone  weld  the 
latter  into  a  homogeneous  whole  capable 
of  high  achievements.   The  problem  is  how 
to  reconcile  the  conditions  of  permanence 
necessary  for  this  spirit  with  the  peculiar 
exigencies  imposed  by  our  political  system. 
The   past   has   left   an  unfortunate   heri- 
tage in  the  artificial   separation  not  only 
of  kindred  branches,  but  of  different  divi- 
sions of  one  service.   The  remembrance  of 
a  former  and  purely  political  method  of 
recruitment  of  all  officials  still  causes  our 
diplomatic  posts  abroad  to  feel  perhaps  too 
isolated  from  one  another,  and  not  as  parts 
of  one  great  system  bound  together  by  com- 
mon action  inspired  by  a  common  purpose. 
The  diplomatic  service,  as  has  been  stated, 
should  be  the  eyes  and  ears  of  the  nation 
in  its  contact  with  foreign  powers.    While 
journalism  has  to  a  certain  extent  taken  its 
place  in  the  communication  of  news,  even  at 
the  present  day,  especially  in  the  older  coun- 


THE  DIPLOMATIC  SERVICE  165 

tries,  a  diplomatist  can  reach  sources  not 
accessible  to  the  press.  Information  of  na- 
tional interest  is  usually,  however,  of  a  dif- 
ferent order  from  the  current  news  of  the 
press.  Its  acquisition  and  its  transmission 
in  the  shape  of  studied  reports  treating  of 
every  phase  in  the  life  of  a  country  count 
among  the  elements  which  in  foreign  diplo- 
matic services  make  most  for  their  utility. 
The  subsequent  diffusion  of  such  reports  in 
the  form  of  confidential  prints  circulated 
in  the  service  engenders  a  healthy  rivalry 
which  links  the  post  closer  together  by  keep- 
ing them  informed  with  regard  to  events  in 
other  lands  and  the  character  of  the  work 
done  by  other  missions. 

In  giving  greater  attention  to  junior 
diplomatic  officers  the  administration  has 
wisely  recognized  in  them  the  element 
most  essential  to  permanence  in  the  ser- 
vice. The  importance  of  a  body  of  capa- 
ble secretaries  is  felt  especially  in  a  service 
such  as  ours,  where  the  great  posts  are 
usually  granted  to  those  who  have  gained 


166  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

prominence  at  home.  A  high  degree  of 
efficiency  can  be  secured  only  by  the  pre- 
sence of  a  permanent  element  more  famil- 
iar with  diplomatic  traditions  than  could  be 
expected  of  envoys  often  fresh  from  civil 
life.  The  art  of  diplomatic  forms  is  acquired 
mainly  by  experience  and  training,  and  the 
value  of  such  knowledge,  somewhat  alien  to 
our  habits  of  thought,  cannot  be  over-em- 
phasized in  view  of  the  undue  sensitiveness 
which  characterizes  the  international  rela- 
tions of  the  continental  powers.  The  an- 
cient tradition  of  the  "point  of  honor"  has 
survived  in  the  offense  so  easily  taken,  espe- 
cially by  European  nations,  at  any  departure 
from  the  conventions  of  diplomacy.  An 
ambassador,  in  spite  of  otherwise  signal 
ability,  may  easily  find  the  efficiency  of  his 
mission  impaired  through  having  given  un- 
intentional offense  by  some  trifling  breach 
of  form.  In  this  lies  the  need  for  an  efficient 
body  of  secretaries  acquainted  with  tradi- 
tions and  able  properly  to  embellish  the  phra- 
seology of  an  envoy  whose  early  training 


THE  DIPLOMATIC  SERVICE  167 

may  not  have  sufficiently  prepared  him  for 
the  necessary  suavity  of  a  diplomatic  style. 

By  far  the  most  serious  element  preju-J^ 
dicial  to  the  unity  of  our  diplomacy  lies^ 
however,  in  the  complete  division  which 
separates  the  diplomatic  service  from  the 
Department  of  State.  In  the  army  we  have 
adopted  the  system  of  interchange  between 
the  line  and  the  general  staff;  but  in  our 
foreign  and  departmental  services,  the  meth- 
ods of  recruitment  and  promotion  being 
entirely  different,  we  have  not  yet  been  able 
to  follow  the  example  of  other  nations  who 
have  either  fused  or  assimilated  these  in 
grade.  In  Italy,  for  instance,  by  a  recent 
radical  reform,  all  officials  at  the  Ministry 
in  Rome  have  been  given  either  diplomatic 
or  consular  rank,  varying  with  their  posi- 
tion. In  every  European  foreign  office, 
moreover,  interchange  is  encouraged  be- 
tween service  at  home  and  abroad,  thus 
bringing  the  personnel  of  the  two  branches 
of  one  service  into  close  cooperation.  With 
us,  although  a  wise  innovation  now  requires 


168          AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

all  new  diplomatic  appointees  to  undergo  a 
brief  period  of  instruction  in  the  depart- 
ment, the  subsequent  separation  is  com- 
plete. While  the  civil-service  regulations 
protecting  departmental  officials  render  later 
assimilation  difficult,  means  could  proba- 
bly be  found  to  obviate  this  impediment 
and  bring  about  a  closer  fusion  than  now 
exists,  to  the  advantage  of  both  services. 
Reform  within  the  diplomatic  service  can 
only  go  hand  in  hand  with  reform  in  the 
department,  and  either  is  well-nigh  useless 
without  the  other. 

With  the  growing  accumulation  of  work, 
the  limitations  of  human  energy  must  make 
themselves  felt  more  and  more.  When,  a 
century  and  a  quarter  ago,  John  Jay  be- 
came Secretary  of  State,  his  only  assistants 
were  two  clerks.  It  is  a  striking  tribute  to 
the  devotion  to  duty  of  our  cabinet  officers 
that  even  to  this  day  they  have  retained  so 
great  a  body  of  work  on  their  own  shoulders. 
But  in  spite  of  the  aid  of  assistant  secre- 
taries, actual  conditions  still  seem  to  impose 


THE  DIPLOMATIC  SERVICE  169 

an  unfair  tax  upon  their  energy.  Amid  the 
rapidly  increasing  volume  of  foreign  affairs, 
a  body  of  specialists  with  diplomatic  train- 
ing would  permit  the  Secretary  of  State  and 
his  immediate  assistants  to  give  greater 
attention  to  the  more  important  questions, 
permitting  matters  of  routine  and  special 
knowledge  to  be  treated  by  competent  ex- 
perts. Of  late  this  necessity  has  impressed 
itself  on  nearly  all  the  European  foreign 
offices,  which  have  been  reorganized  with 
a  view  to  enlarging  the  responsibilities  of 
juniors  and  the  specialization  of  bureaus 
along  political-geographical  lines.  Where 
formerly  the  entire  labor  devolved  on  the 
ministers  and  under-secretaries,  who  utilized 
their  assistants  in  a  purely  clerical  capacity, 
this  order  of  work  has  been  reversed,  and 
the  latter  are  now  given  opportunities  for 
proving  their  worth. 

The  great  advantage  in  any  specializa- 
tion of  bureaus  is  that  it  creates  a  body  of 
experts  with  detailed  knowledge  of  the  af- 
fairs of  foreign  countries.   The  result  has 


170  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

been  to  obtain  a  certain  standard  of  action, 
a  certain  norm  of  method,  and  coordination 
of  parts,  which  in  the  conduct  of  affairs  of 
state  takes  the  place  of  genius.  Ministers 
of  foreign  affairs  abroad  are  not  depend- 
ent on  clerks  alone  to  second  or  to  inform 
them,  but  can  rely  on  the  technical  advice  of 
skilled  officials  possessing  expert  and  usu- 
ally personal  acquaintance  with  the  nations 
whose  affairs  they  are  specially  called  upon 
to  handle.  In  Europe  the  foreign  offices  are 
recruited  in  the  same  manner  as  the  diplo- 
matic services.  Their  staff  rises  to,  and 
interchanges  with,  similar  grades  in  diplo- 
macy. Their  bureaus  are  presided  over  by 
ministers  and  ambassadors.  Their  tradi- 
tions are  inspired  by  centuries  of  precedent. 
It  is  obvious  that  a  weight  of  moral  au- 
thority would  therefore  be  attached  to  the 
recommendations  of  the  chief  subordinate 
officers  which  no  politically  constituted 
cabinet  would  override  without  good  cause. 
Our  own  State  Department,  through  no 
fault  of  its  own,  can  hardly  as  yet  aspire 


THE  DIPLOMATIC  SERVICE  171 

to  the  same  authority  in  its  recommen- 
dations to  Congress.  Cognate  to  this  there 
arises  a  more  important  question.  It  has 
often  been  remarked  that  we  may  demand 
of  foreign  states  that  they  live  up  to  treaty 
obligations  which  we  ourselves  are  unable 
to  enforce.  Our  mixed  order  of  government 
contains  unquestionably  an  element  of 
weakness  in  the  occasional  clash  between 
federal  and  state  power.  The  equity  of  our 
contentions  abroad  can  at  any  time  be 
undermined  by  the  inability  of  the  govern- 
ment to  exercise  its  authority  over  sovereign 
states.  This  problem,  which  only  lately 
assumed  a  pressing  form,  is  likely  to  be 
increasingly  encountered  with  the  growth  of 
our  foreign  intercourse.  Among  the  reasons 
which  hitherto  have  militated  against  any 
surrender  by  the  states  of  their  sovereign 
rights  has  been  a  constitutional  unwilling- 
ness to  see  the  executive  power  increased. 
The  eighteenth-century  conception  at  the 
basis  of  our  Constitution  looked  to  a  balance 
of  the  different  governmental  parts  some- 


17«  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

what  in  the  nature  of  a  diplomatic  equi- 
librium. New  accretions  of  power  by  any 
governmental  branch  could  be  viewed  only 
as  being  at  the  expense  of  its  other  divisions, 
and  contrary  to  the  spirit  of  the  Constitution. 
Any  weakening  in  the  assertion  of  state 
rights  appeared  to  signify  a  corresponding 
increase  in  the  power  of  the  executive.  But 
this  held  true  only  because  the  adminis- 
trative branches  of  the  government  were 
directly  subservient  to  the  executive  and 
exclusively  responsible  thereto.  Cabinet 
ministers  are  still  secretaries  in  practice  as 
in  name,  and  as  such  theoretically  presi- 
dential clerks.  If  the  states,  therefore,  were 
ever  to  waive  any  portion  of  their  sovereign 
rights  in  favor  of  the  federal  government, 
yet  without  unduly  augmenting  the  execu- 
tive power,  it  could  be  done  only  by  increas- 
ing the  authority  of  certain  departments 
and  removing  these  as  much  as  possible 
from  the  sphere  of  politics.  The  formation 
upon  a  non-partisan  basis  of  a  permanent 
diplomatic  service  and  State  Department 


THE  DIPLOMATIC  SERVICE  173 

would  appear  to  offer  an  advantageous 
solution  of  the  problem  of  equalizing  the 
extension  of  power  accruing  to  the  execu- 
tive through  any  abrogation  of  state  rights. 
The  increase  of  presidential  power  would 
be  balanced  by  the  fact  that  any  exercise 
of  such  authority  could  be  invoked  only 
through  the  agency  of  a  department  semi- 
independent  of  the  executive,  and,  save  at 
its  head,  independent  of  political  change. 

The  close  cooperation  not  only  between 
the  different  ramifications  of  one  service,  but 
between  the  different  services  of  a  govern- 
ment, is  the  condition  essential  to  success, 
and  is  especially  necessary  in  an  adminis- 
trative personnel  such  as  our  own,  composed 
both  of  permanent  and  of  temporary  oflicials 
whose  maintenance  in  office  depends  on  the 
party  in  power.  The  efficiency  of  our  for- 
eign service  is  conditional  as  well  upon  its 
relations  with  the  other  branches  of  the 
government.  The  ability  and  devotion  of 
officials  finds  its  scope  restricted  without 
such  cooperation  of  effort.   A  line  of  foreign 


174  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

policy  is  frequently  adopted  in  conformity 
with  the  means  at  a  government's  disposal. 
To  assert  a  pretension  impossible  to  en- 
force exposes  the  nation  to  the  danger  of 
humiliation.  A  close  cooperation  between 
departments  of  War,  Navy,  and  State  thus 
becomes  necessary.  And  while  this  is  al- 
ready obtained  at  cabinet  meetings,  there 
are  numerous  problems  that  could  advan- 
tageously be  discussed  by  experts  of  each 
department,  who  would  then  be  in  better 
position  to  advise  their  respective  chiefs. 
The  general  naval  board  instituted  a  few 
years  ago  furnishes  the  type  of  a  similar 
advisory  council  which  could  to  advantage 
include  representatives  of  the  three  depart- 
ments concerned. 

Opportunity  for  further  cooperation 
would  appear  to  present  itself  in  the  rela- 
tions between  the  Departments  of  State  and 
Justice.  At  present,  the  Secretary  of  State 
is  usually  apprised  through  a  foreign  envoy 
at  Washington  of  cases  concerning  citizens 
of  his  nation,  and  once  such  affairs  have 


THE  DIPLOMATIC  SERVICE  175 

been  taken  up  diplomatically,  they  add  to 
the  labors  of  the  government.  If,  however, 
the  federal  attorneys  throughout  the  coun- 
try were  instructed  to  report  to  the  State 
Department  all  cases  concerning  foreign 
subjects,  it  might  frequently  be  possible  to 
settle  difficulties  out  of  court  before  they 
had  attracted  public  or  diplomatic  atten- 
tion and  assumed  a  form  complicating  their 
solution  or  possibly  even  embittering  inter- 
national relations. 

Our  foreign  policy  is  destined  by  the  very 
basis  of  American  national  existence  to  be 
developed  amid  conditions  differing  from 
those  prevalent  elsewhere.  In  European 
states  it  lies  within  the  power  of  the  exe- 
cutive to  frame  alliances  without  having 
recourse  to  parliamentary  approval,  unless 
budgetary  considerations  be  involved.  A 
British  Cabinet  is  able  to  negotiate  a  mili- 
tary treaty  with  Japan  unknown  to  the  Brit- 
ish nation,  and  even  republican  France  can 
sign  an  alliance  with  Russia  the  articles  of 
which  still  remain  a  secret.    With  us  the 


176  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Senate's  necessary  ratification,  and  the  con- 
sequent publicity  in  the  case  of  all  agree- 
ments of  a  binding  nature,  entail  a  radically 
different  procedure.  There  can  be  no  ques- 
tion that  the  Senate's  action  has,  in  the  main, 
proved  beneficial.  If  its  decisions  have  not 
always  been  marked  by  an  appreciation  of 
our  future  needs,  as  in  rejecting  the  pur- 
chase  of  St.  Thomas,  as  a  rule  it  has  had  a 
very  clear  comprehension  of  where  lay  the 
nation's  interests.  Nor  is  it  either  likely  or 
desirable  that  it  should  divest  itself  of  any 
of  its  power  in  our  foreign  relations.  As  a 
permanent  committee,  fairly  representative 
of  the  country  at  large,  it  gives  the  seal  of 
national  approval  to  our  policy  abroad. 

It  may  be  hoped  withal  that  the  present 
tendency  to  remove  certain  questions  from 
party  considerations  will  more  and  more 
find  useful  application  in  foreign  affairs. 
The  Monroe  Doctrine,  which  has  always 
been  regarded  as  a  non-partisan  measure, 
affords  a  precedent  for  this.  The  European 
nations,    divided    internally    along    party 


THE  DIPLOMATIC  SERVICE  177 

lines,  have  yet  achieved  a  stability  of  policy 
in  their  foreign  relations  and  in  questions 
of  defense.  Any  other  course  on  our  part 
would  be  parading  to  the  world  dissensions 
where  it  is  most  important  that  none  ex- 
ist. Our  external  policy  should  be  national 
and  not  partisan.  Whatever  be  its  trend, 
it  should  at  all  times  have  behind  it  the 
support  of  the  entire  country.  Of  late  there 
has  been  a  fortunate  disappearance  of 
that  lack  of  sympathy  which  long  existed 
between  Congress  and  the  Department  of 
State.  The  good  will  of  the  Senate  being 
essential,  it  is  only  wisdom  to  take  counsel 
of  its  views  beforehand  and  avoid  a  repeti- 
tion of  so  unfortunate  an  incident  as  the  de- 
feat of  the  arbitration  treaties  a  few  years 
ago.  Nowhere  is  close  cooperation  between 
the  different  branches  of  government  more 
important  than  in  diplomatic  questions, 
where  the  nation  ought  to  present  a  united 
front.  Nowhere  is  any  misunderstanding 
so  likely  to  be  fatal  to  our  foreign  policy  or 
so  disastrous  to  the  efficiency  of  the  ser- 


178  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

vice.  Strength  at  home  permits  of  strength 
abroad,  and  the  department's  complete  har- 
mony with  Congress  is  the  primary  con- 
dition for  diplomatic  success.  It  is  an 
unfair  tax  on  any  Secretary  of  State  to 
demand  that  in  addition  to  attending  to 
administrative  duties  he  be  called  upon 
to  appear  personally  before  the  Senate  and 
House  committees  on  Foreign  Relations. 
This  work  could  be  accomplished  as  well 
by  a  congressional  secretary  charged  with 
explaining  details  and  answering  questions 
of  foreign  policy.  An  official  who  could  act 
as  the  recognized  permanent  link  between 
the  Senate  and  House  committee,  at  whose 
constant  disposal  he  would  be,  and  the  De- 
partment of  State,  ready  to  give  to  the  na- 
tion's representatives  the  information  they 
desired,  would  be  able  to  avoid  misappre- 
hensions and  errors  on  either  side,  and  effect 
that  close  cooperation  between  the  execu- 
tive and  legislative  branches  of  the  govern- 
ment which  is  indispensable  to  the  highest 
success. 


THE  DIPLOMATIC  SERVICE  179 

A  more  intimate  union  of  sympathy 
would  further  appear  desirable  between  the 
department  and  the  nation  at  large.  The 
press  has  furnished  a  great  medium  of 
communication  between  the  government 
and  the  country,  and,  with  the  growth  of 
democratic  ideas,  its  importance  has  been 
enlarged  and  its  powers  strengthened.  It 
therefore  becomes  of  national  interest  to 
possess  a  press  ably  directed  and  well  in- 
formed, which  may  intelligently  influence 
the  masses.  Our  people  have  been  too  little 
accustomed  to  judge  of  foreign  affairs. 
Often  they  have  not  fully  appreciated  the 
significance  of  phases  in  international  rela- 
tions, or  again  have  over-emphasized  their 
importance.  The  creation  of  a  qualified 
press  bureau  in  the  Department  of  State,  as 
the  recognized  channel  of  communication 
between  the  government  and  the  public  in 
all  matters  of  foreign  policy,  would  remove 
a  part  of  the  burden  which  the  reception 
of  newspaper  correspondents  still  imposes 
upon  our  public  men.    The  views  of  the 


180  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

government  on  questions  of  foreign  policy 
\         could  be  given  to  the  country  through  the 
!        medium  of  some  such   channel  as   those 
I        which  continental  foreign   oflfices  possess, 
j         and  which  would  allow  public  opinion  to  be 
held  in  restraint  or  prepared  for  any  course 
of  action  or  event.   An  official  whose  sole 
duty  would  be  to  inform  the  press  of  our 
national  necessities  in  questions  of  foreign 
policy  could,  without  in  any  way  improp- 
erly interfering  with  the  independence  of 
its  judgment,  exert  a  healthy  influence  in 
educating  the  country  by  its  means  to  an 
intelligent  appreciation  of  our  international 
relations. 

With  our  new  world-wide  responsibilities, 
the  cultivation  of  a  competent  public  opin- 
ion in  questions  of  foreign  policy  has  be- 
come an  urgent  necessity.  On  the  one  hand 
the  patriotism  of  the  great  majority  of  the 
people  is  too  easily  led  astray  by  unreason- 
ing enthusiasms  which  reflect  greater  credit 
on  the  generosity  of  its  feeling  than  on 
its  mature  judgment.     On  the  other  there 


THE  DIPLOMATIC  SERVICE  181 

exists  the  small  minority  of  those  who  cavil 
at  every  manifestation  of  our  influence  or 
authority  abroad.  Between  the  two  re- 
mains to  be  formed  an  enlightened  and  in- 
intelligent  body  of  opinion  competent  to 
judge  questions  of  foreign  policy  in  the 
same  way  as  it  judges  questions  of  interior 
policy.  The  press  should  furnish  the  vehi- 
cle for  the  diffusion  of  such  opinion.  But 
with  a  few  noteworthy  exceptions,  it  has  not 
yet  displayed  the  same  intelligence  in  con- 
sidering our  foreign  interests  that  it  mani- 
fests in  domestic  matters.  It  is  still  inclined 
to  treat  such  questions  with  a  levity  or  a 
sensationalism  which  contrasts  unfavora- 
bly with  the  balanced  judgment  of  serious 
European  journals.  Keenly  avid  for  news, 
it  has  felt  less  interest  in  discerning  the 
importance  of  the  information  published, 
or  in  weighing  its  consequences  below  the 
surface  of  sensation.  It  still  remains  pro- 
vincial and  inadequate  to  the  dignity  to 
which  it  should  properly  aspire  in  its 
functions. 


182  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

While  the  remedy  for  this  condition  rests 
ultimately  with  the  nation,  which  has  not 
yet  realized  the  importance  of  foreign  ques- 
tions, the  Department  of  State  through  the 
proposed  press  bureau  ought  to  aim  as  well 
to  educate  the  country  to  a  more  intelligent 
appreciation  of  our  interests  abroad.  In 
a  democracy  such  as  ours,  public  opinion 
provides  the  final  sanction  against  which 
no  government  can  rule.  It  becomes  of  the 
highest  consequence  that  this  opinion  be 
intelligently  formed,  in  order  that  it  may 
weigh  with  discernment  the  needs  of  the 
nation  in  its  relations  with  the  world. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE  FUTURE  OF  OUR  INTERNATIONAL 
POSITION 

Our  energy,  our  resources,  and  that 
force  of  circumstance  known  as  destiny 
have  hitherto  contributed  to  carry  us  into 
the  forefront  of  nations.  Our  rightful  place 
has  been  won  almost  without  present  effort. 
The  Civil  War  made  us  a  great  nation  be- 
cause it  proved  that  we  possessed  the  spirit 
of  national  sacrifice.  The  Spanish  War, 
with  its  diplomatic  significance  out  of  all 
proportion  to  its  military  importance,  noti- 
fied the  world  that  we  were  a  great  power. 
But  though  possessing  the  material  founda- 
tion which  entitles  us  to  our  new  situation, 
and  though  filled  with  a  lofty  resolution 
which  has  hitherto  saved  the  nation's  ac- 
tion, even  when  mistaken,  from  ever  being 
ignoble,  our  preparation  for  the  new  order 


184  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

of  responsibilities  before  us  has  been  inade- 
quate, and  we  remain  handicapped  by  a  sys- 
tem no  longer  in  conformity  with  actual 
requirements.  We  stand  to-day  at  a  transi-' 
tion  point  where,  feeling  only  the  presenti- 
ment of  our  high  destiny,  we  trust  rather 
to  chance  and  the  wisdom  of  the  moment 
than  to  conscious  effort  to  direct  our 
course. 

Every  age  is  as  much  trustee  for  the  future 
as  it  is  heir  to  the  past.  Foresight  is  an 
essential  quality  of  statesmanship,  and  a 
government  would  be  remiss  in  its  duty  if  it 
failed  to  take  into  consideration  the  needs 
of  later  generations.  American  foreign  pol- 
icy of  to-day  should  be  based  not  only  on 
the  expediency  of  the  moment,  but  on  the 
necessity  of  maintaining  our  international 
position  in  the  manner  best  calculated  to 
prepare  for  the  future  which  properly 
awaits  us. 

External  problems  of  policy  can  never  be 
separated  from  their  internal  significance, 
and  both  the  material  and  moral  aspects  of 


OUR  INTERNATIONAL  POSITION       185 

a  foreign  policy  must  be  either  the  result  or 
the  cause  of  siruilar  tendencies  within  the 
nation,  and  inevitably  react  on  each  other. 
With  the  growth  of  our  international  rela- 
tions such  elements  will  become  increas- 
ingly important.  Whatever  necessity  we 
may  at  present  experience  for  the  assertion 
of  our  influence  abroad  can  only  augment 
in  time.  In  less  than  a  half  century  our 
population  should  be  one  hundred  and  fifty 
millions;  were  our  territory  as  thickly  set- 
tled as  Germany,  it  would  be  nine  hundred 
millions. 

The  problem  lies  in  moulding  a  policy 
which  will  gauge  the  nation's  present  and 
future  requirements  in  conformity  with  the 
means  it  has  and  is  likely  to  possess.  Cer- 
tain tendencies  which  must  influence  our 
future  course  are  already  apparent.  A  grow- 
ing industry  will  strengthen  our  interest 
in  the  world's  markets,  and  as  we  become 
more  dependent  upon  our  over-sea  trade, 
closer  scrutiny  will  inevitably  be  given  to 
foreign  and  colonial  problems  now  remote. 


18«  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

and  to  the  navy  as  a  protecting  accompani- 
ment of  commerce. 

The  tendency  toward  increased  arma- 
ments has  received  fresh  strength  from  re- 
cent developments.  Economic  reasons  will 
probably  one  day  place  a  curb  upon  their 
further  extension,  just  as  economic  reasons 
provide  in  ultimate  analysis  the  necessity 
for  sea  power.  But  forecasts  into  the  future 
can,  for  the  present,  neglect  any  schemes  of 
disarmament,  and  to  propose  these  prema- 
turely would  be  more  likely  to  defeat  their 
purpose  than  to  aid  it.  The  rapid  growth 
of  our  fleet  in  recent  years  makes  it  safer 
to  presume  that  the  efforts  which  have 
carried  us  into  our  present  place  among 
naval  powers  will  not  soon  be  discontin- 
ued. American  diplomacy  has  every  reason 
to  anticipate  from  it  the  assistance  which 
armed  strength  alone  is  able  to  confer. 

Whatever  the  future  may  hold  in  store 
for  us,  we  need  anticipate  as  little  the  birth 
of  an  order  of  events  likely  to  transform 
us  into  a  world-conquering  power  as  one 


OUR  INTERNATIONAL  POSITION       X87 

which  will  permit  the  nation  to  continue  its 
tranquil  policy  pursued  before  the  Spanish 
War.  Our  external  problems  will  diminish 
only  in  so  far  as  increased  force  has  made 
of  us  a  more  redoubtable  antagonist.  While 
certain  of  our  pretensions  are  for  this  rea- 
son less  likely  to  encounter  resistance  than 
before,  consciousness  of  strength  may  also 
lead  to  difficulties  which  would  once  have 
been  avoided.  A  world  position  inevitably 
entails  world  responsibilities. 

Whatever  new  questions  may  in  time 
arise,  the  present  problems  that  confront 
us  are  not  likely  to  be  dismissed  soon.  The 
extension  given  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine  in 
recent  years  is  certain  to  make  continual  de- 
mands on  our  vigilance,  even  if  no  stronger 
measures  become  necessary.  Coupled  there- 
with, the  building  of  the  Panama  Canal  has 
widened  our  national  interests  and  placed 
the  countries  bordering  on  the  Caribbean  in 
the  same  relation  toward  us  as  was  formerly 
Cuba  alone.  The  necessity  to  preserve  neu- 
tral markets  has  further  caused  the  extended 


188  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

assertion  of  our  influence  in  the  Orient, 
where  we  have  of  late  been  rudely  awak- 
ened to  the  change  caused  by  the  rising 
power  of  Japan.  Everywhere  our  horizon 
has  been  enlarged ;  everywhere  we  are  called 
upon  to  handle  new  problems  both  in  the 
light  of  our  own  general  interests  and  from 
the  more  special  point  of  securing  the  pre- 
servation of  the  Philippines. 

The  nation,  conscious  of  its  responsibili- 
ties and  dangers,  has  in  recent  years  de- 
veloped its  means  of  defense.  The  same 
sentiment  must  inevitably  make  toward 
renovating  our  diplomacy  as  the  navy's 
complement  in  preserving  peace  and  safe- 
guarding over-sea  interests.  This  does  not 
signify  the  reversal  of  past  traditions.  We 
may  preserve  their  spirit  while  infusing  into 
them  fresh  life,  enveloping  what  is  vital 
in  a  form  appropriate  to  new  requirements. 
The  navy  would  to-day  cut  a  sorry  figure 
if,  because  the  Monitor  had  once  proved 
so  serviceable,  we  had  never  gone  beyond 
it  as  a  type  for  our  war-ships.    Yet  in  the 


OUR  INTERNATIONAL  POSITION       189 

handling  of  foreign  affairs  we  have  remained 
"content  with  a  diplomatic  service  always 
inadequate  and  often  positively  detrimental 
to  our  interests."  ^  We  have  not  recognized 
in  diplomacy  the  technique,  so  to  speak,  of 
statesmanship  in  the  nation's  foreign  rela- 
tions. Having  minimized  its  role  as  the  act 
of  international  intercourse,  its  importance 
in  securing  economy  of  effort  has  been 
minimized  for  us.  One  cannot  draw  from 
a  jar  more  than  it  contains;  and  diplomacy 
has  hitherto  occupied  too  minor  a  part  in 
the  national  life  to  have  been  utilized  as  the 
instrument  of  strength  it  should  be.  Its 
possibilities  still  remain  for  us  as  virgin  as 
were  our  forests. 

Fortunately  we  can  start  on  our  march 
under  unparalleled  auspices.  Where  the 
nations  of  the  Old  World  have  been 
obliged  hitherto  to  rely  on  comparatively 
slight  means,  and  where  their  success  has 
depended  on  a  high  power  of  organized 
efficiency,  we  are  already  their  equals  in  ca- 

*  Mr.  Olney,  AUantic  Monthly ,  March,  1900,  p.  289. 


190  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

pacity  for  organization,  while  our  resources 
are  well-nigh  boundless  and  our  possibilities 
unlimited.  The  possession  of  such  national 
baggage  is  not  without  consequence.  The 
fulfillment  of  certain  duties  from  which  we 
can  neither  hope  nor  wish  to  dissociate 
ourselves  will  in  the  future  more  and  more 
be  impressed  upon  us.  "A  nation  which 
is  at  once  the  granary,  the  coal  and  iron 
mine,  and  the  cotton  field  of  the  world  can- 
not as  formerly  remain  enclosed  in  its  con- 
tinent, indifferent  to  what  occurs  in  other 
parts  of  the  globe.  It  is  too  great  a  parcel 
of  humanity  to  enjoy  the  right  of  isolation. 
It  feels  that  its  power  makes  demands  upon 
it.  Its  strength  creates  a  right;  this  right 
turns  to  pretension,  and  this  resolves  itself 
into  a  duty  to  pronounce  on  all  questions 
which  the  agreement  of  European  powers, 
formerly  determined."  ^ 

While  statecraft  is  in  the  first  instance  an 
enlightened  selfishness,  and  while  we  are 

^  E.  Boutmy,  Psychologie  du  Peuple  Am^ricain,  Paris, 
1902,  p.  337. 


OUR  INTERNATIONAL  POSITION       191 

paramountly  concerned  in  our  own  welfare, 
present  and  future,  in  the  history  of  nations, 
as  in  the  lives  of  individuals,  occasions  pre- 
sent themselves  when,  with  little  or  no  risk, 
the  cause  of  humanity  may  be  advanced. 
Without  indulging  in  Quixotic  dreams  of 
redressing  the  evils  of  this  world,  we  may 
yet  look  forward  to  exemplifying  in  our  for- 
eign intercourse  certain  of  the  ideals  which ' 
are  at  the  foundation  of  the  Republic.  Our  ^^^ 
diplomacy  must  rest  primarily  on  the  solid 
basis  of  material  interest,  but  it  should  seek 
to  identify  such  interest  so  far  as  possible 
with  that  of  humanity.  The  political  legacy 
bequeathed  by  our  forefathers  is  not  at 
variance  with  this  ambition.  The  tradi- 
tions they  have  handed  down  should  rather 
ennoble  and  spiritualize  our  aim.  No  more 
mischievous  illusion  exists  than  the  belief 
that  because  we  are  launched  as  a  world 
power  our  future  course  must  be  one  of 
rapacity,  regardless  of  others'  rights.  The 
goal  before  us  has  in  it  nothing  that  is  base, 
but  likewise  nothing  that  may  not  become 


192  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

either  noble  or  ignoble.  For  better  or  for 
worse,  a  wider  scope  has  been  held  out.  It 
rests  with  us  to  decide  what  it  shall  be. 
But  our  future  course  affects  more  than  our- 
selves. Our  single  action,  supreme  in  one 
hemisphere,  second  to  none  in  the  other, 
will  more  than  that  of  any  other  power 
influence  the  political  ethics  of  the  world. 
At  Gettysburg,  almost  a  half  century 
ago,  Lincoln  immortally  proclaimed  before 
a  divided  nation  the  American  gospel.  To- 
day, when  we  are  united,  his  words  offer  a 
reminder  that  the  future  should  not  find  us 
unworthy  of  the  past.  The  higher  our  aim, 
the  more  worthy  will  it  be  of  those  who  in 
the  past  served  and  saved  the  Republic. 


CAMBRIDGE  .  MASSACHUSETTS 
U   .   S   .  A 


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